Grogan v. City of Dawsonville
305 Ga. 79
Ga.2019Background
- In May 2017 the Dawsonville City Council removed W. James Grogan as mayor after a municipal-court‑presided hearing; Grogan sought review in superior court by filing a direct appeal and later a writ of certiorari.
- Grogan remained working as mayor during the superior‑court proceedings and received salary and benefits.
- The City answered and asserted counterclaims: (1) money had and received (seeking reimbursement of salary/benefits paid during the appeal if the City prevailed) and (2) attorneys’ fees. The City also moved to dismiss Grogan’s direct appeal as procedurally improper.
- Grogan moved to dismiss the City’s counterclaims under Georgia’s Anti‑SLAPP statute, OCGA § 9‑11‑11.1, arguing the counterclaims punished his petition/free‑speech activity. The superior court denied Grogan’s Anti‑SLAPP motion and granted partial summary judgment to the City on the money‑had‑and‑received claim.
- Grogan appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court, challenging (inter alia) the denial of the Anti‑SLAPP motion, the dismissal of his appeals from the removal decision, and the grant of summary judgment for the City on the money‑had‑and‑received counterclaim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Grogan) | Defendant's Argument (City) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Grogan’s appeal from denial of Anti‑SLAPP motion was properly before the Supreme Court (procedural/jurisdiction) | Appeal from denial of OCGA § 9‑11‑11.1 motion is immediately appealable under OCGA § 5‑6‑34(a)(13); notice of appeal suffices | City argued discretionary application (OCGA § 5‑6‑35) or interlocutory route required for appeals reviewing administrative decisions; also nonfinal judgment | Court has jurisdiction: denial of Anti‑SLAPP motion is immediately appealable and OCGA § 5‑6‑34(d) permits review of related orders raised on the appeal |
| Whether Grogan’s challenges to dismissal of his direct appeal and certiorari petition are justiciable (mootness; name‑clearing) | He sought reversal partly for name‑clearing to avoid future disqualification from office | City argued appeal/relief moot because a special election occurred and Grogan was not seeking reinstatement | Court held those challenges are moot: no available remedy and OCGA § 21‑2‑8 disqualification applies only to criminal convictions, so name‑clearing relief unnecessary |
| Whether the City’s counterclaims (filed after removal) were protected activity subject to Anti‑SLAPP dismissal | Grogan: counterclaims punish exercise of First Amendment petition/speech rights; thus dismiss under OCGA § 9‑11‑11.1 | City: counterclaims arose from invocation of supersedeas and legitimate claims for recovery; Anti‑SLAPP inapplicable; City showed likelihood of success | Court did not decide Anti‑SLAPP merits (because resolution of money‑had‑and‑received dispositive) but affirmed that Anti‑SLAPP denial was properly appealable |
| Whether the superior court correctly granted summary judgment to City on money‑had‑and‑received counterclaim | Grogan: he performed mayoral duties and receipt of salary/benefits was not unjust enrichment; genuine equity issues exist | City: seeks recoupment of salary/benefits paid during pending appeal if City ultimately prevailed | Court reversed the partial summary judgment for City and held City was not entitled as a matter of law to recover compensation for services actually rendered; Grogan may retain payments |
Key Cases Cited
- Rollins v. Rollins, 300 Ga. 485 (discussion of interlocutory appeal procedure and necessity of statutory certification)
- Schumacher v. City of Roswell, 301 Ga. 635 (must check discretionary‑application statute when underlying subject matter is listed)
- King v. City of Bainbridge, 272 Ga. 427 (order not involving administrative‑agency review is directly appealable)
- Martin v. Williams, 263 Ga. 707 (OCGA § 5‑6‑34(d) permits review of related, otherwise nonappealable orders when joined with a directly appealable order)
- Haggard v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Ga., 257 Ga. 524 (same principle re: fees and related appealability)
- Sentinel Offender Svcs., LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315 (definition and elements of money‑had‑and‑received unjust‑enrichment claim)
- Joiner v. Glenn, 288 Ga. 208 (distinguishing name‑clearing remedy where due process was not denied)