Grippin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
409 P.3d 529
Colo. Ct. App.2016Background
- Shane Grippin was seriously injured in a motorcycle accident and had over $400,000 in damages; he obtained some recovery from GEICO policies but sought additional UM/UIM benefits under four State Farm policies issued to his grandparents.
- Each State Farm policy defined an “insured” as “you and resident relatives,” and defined “resident relative” to require that the relative “reside primarily” with the first-named insured on the declarations page.
- Grippin lived with his grandparents about one week per month (kept a room, belongings, helped with maintenance) while maintaining a primary home in Colorado Springs with his wife and children.
- State Farm denied coverage under the “reside primarily” definition and moved for summary judgment; the trial court granted summary judgment for State Farm.
- On appeal Grippin argued the “reside primarily” requirement violates Colorado public policy by narrowing the statutory class of insureds, and alternatively argued ambiguity and reasonable-expectation theories based on renewal forms and post-accident statements.
- The Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment, holding the “reside primarily” clause is void as against public policy and remanded for further proceedings; it rejected Grippin’s ambiguity argument and did not decide the reasonable-expectation claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether policy clause requiring a relative to “reside primarily” with the named insured is enforceable | Grippin: the qualifier "primarily" narrows the statutory class of "resident relatives," so it violates public policy and is void | State Farm: the policy may define "resident relative" and the statute’s phrases imply the Legislature intended a primary-residence limit | Court: the "reside primarily" requirement narrows statutorily mandated coverage, violates public policy, and is void; reverse summary judgment and remand |
| Whether listing Grippin on Auto Renewal "Other Household Drivers" creates an ambiguity making him an insured | Grippin: listing creates ambiguity about who is an insured and should be resolved for coverage | State Farm: declarations pages unambiguously name the insureds; renewal list expressly does not expand coverage | Court: no ambiguity; renewal forms are not part of policy and expressly state they do not extend coverage |
| Whether the reasonable-expectation doctrine entitles Grippin to coverage based on renewal forms and post-accident statements | Grippin: renewal listing and an employee’s assertion after the accident created a reasonable expectation of coverage | State Farm: reasonable-expectation doctrine applies only to insureds; Grippin must first be an insured | Court: did not reach the merits because whether Grippin is an insured is a factual question for further proceedings |
| Whether the statutory definition of "resident relative" allows multiple residences | Grippin: statute’s language contemplates residing in the named insured’s household and does not limit to a single "primary" residence | State Farm: statutory phrases ("at the time of the accident," "even if temporarily living elsewhere") indicate a primary-residence concept | Court: a person may reside in more than one place; the statute does not impose a "primary" requirement; State Farm’s reading would render statutory coverage narrower and violate intent |
Key Cases Cited
- Bailey v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 255 P.3d 1039 (Colo. 2011) (policy provisions that dilute or limit statutorily mandated UM/UIM coverage violate public policy)
- Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. McMichael, 906 P.2d 92 (Colo. 1995) (UM/UIM coverage must be coextensive with liability coverage)
- Potter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 996 P.2d 781 (Colo. App. 2000) (residence for insurance exclusions determined case-by-case considering intent and permanence)
- Iowa Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boatright, 516 P.2d 439 (Colo. App. 1973) (factors for determining residence in household include intent, permanence, and existence of other lodging)
- Midwest Mut. Ins. Co. v. Titus, 849 P.2d 908 (Colo. App. 1993) (child may reside in more than one household under joint custody/visitation)
- Wheeler v. Allstate Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 9 (Colo. App. 1991) (evaluating whether an individual’s presence reflects intended residence in insured’s home)