Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. McMichael

AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY

COMPANY, Petitioner,

Phillip McMICHAEL, Respondent.

No. 94SC225.

Supreme Colorado, Court

En Banc.

Oct. Jaudon, P.C., Long,

Long & Frederick W. Denver, Lindsay, Lee A. for Petitioner. Associates, Lloyd Lloyd C. C. Kordick & Kordick, Springs, Respondent. Colorado Opinion of the Justice LOHR delivered the Court. granted certiorari to review Colo Appeals’

rado Court of decision McMicha (Colo. el v. Aetna Insurance 878 P.2d 61 App.1994), which reversed the trial court’s summary judgment grant for the defen dant, Casualty Surety Company & (Aetna),1 Phillip against plaintiff, court, however, parties plaintiff consistently referred to briefs before both correctly Company, refer to the defendant below as Aetna Insurance and the defendant as Aetna court, Surety Company. Casualty & In the trial McMichael, declaratory judgment facts, therefore, in a following action are taken from the brought scope parties’ to establish submissions to the trial court direct- an automobile under ed to that motion. sought uninsured/underinsured employed by Irving McMichael was F. (“UM/UIM”) pursuant motorist benefits to a (Jensen) Company, Jensen Inc. an as assis- Coverage Policy Business Auto that Aetna superintendent tant of construction.2 On employer. issued to McMiehael’s McMichael 1, 1990, February assigned Jensen McMicha- pursued injuries these benefits for in he joints el to saw concrete the median of a sawing joints curred high while concrete in a highway. McMichael, divided along with an- way employer’s in front of his vehicle. The employee, other a company-owned drove appeals public court of that policy held parked. truck to the median and The truck section specially equipped with an overhead bea- insurers to a UM/UIM emergency con and flashers. McMi- After class of individuals as broad as the class truck, parked chael running, he left it provided with coverage under the turned on the emergen- overhead beacon and terms of the policy. automobile insurance flashers, cy began his work. McMichael at policy 63. Because the Aetna process joints was in sawing in the provided permissive users of covered vehicles concrete some distance front of the truck liability coverage, permission was when a car approaching opposite from the undisputed, appeals the court of concluded direction swerved into the median and struck that McMichael would be entitled to UM/ suggests him. The record that the windows if using UIM benefits he was a covered vehi over, making car were frosted it diffi- cle at the time of the accident. Id. at 64. cult for the driver to see. aAs result of this appeals

The court of further determined that collision, injury McMichael suffered to his McMichael was a covered vehicle as a neck. warning and, thus, barricade and a device The motorist who struck McMichael did compensation injuries was entitled to for his enough not maintain automobile insurance to policy. interpret under the Id. We now compensate injuries. McMichael his To 4-609(1) require insurers to 10 — compensation, obtain full McMichael filed an offer coverage to a class of individ UM/UIM Aetna, underinsured motorist claim with uals as broad as the class covered under the insurer for Jensen’s vehicles. Jensen carried liability provisions of an automobile insur Coverage a Business Auto Policy through policy. addition, ance In agree we with the (the policy). Aetna policy The Aetna court appeals the salient facts are covered eighty compa- more than of Jensen’s undisputed and that McMichael was ny-owned provided vehicles. It UM/UIM covered vehicle at the time of the accident. following individuals: Therefore, affirm appeals’ the court of B. WHO IS AN INSURED grant reversal of the trial summary court’s 1. You. judgment for Aetna and the direction on remand judgment that the trial court enter you individual, 2. If any “family are an declaring scope McMichael to be within the member.” at Anyone “occupying” 3. else a covered issue. “auto” temporary or a substitute for a covered “auto.” The covered “auto”

I. must be out of service because of its breakdown, The trial court resolved this case on repair, Aet- servicing, loss or de- na’s summary judgment. motion for struction. appeals’ opinion court designa- uses that latter companies iaries of Jensen. Since all of these tion. were insured under the same automobile insur- policy, ance the fact that McMichael worked for during

2. At employ- various times McMichael's subsidiary companies various does not affect this Jensen, ment with McMichael worked with and case. compensation through received various subsid- Anyone damages is The he she of the Aetna “bodily permissive to recover because of covered users of insured automo- entitled injury” by another “insured.” biles while the sustained only permissive occupiers. par. B3 of to the “Named The term “You” referred policy, supra, p. 4. McMichael Declarations to Insured” shown argued public as a matter of “Irving listed F. coverage should be extended to Co., Inc.” In Jensen as the named insured. cover a class as broad as that covered response to claim McMiehael’s for UM/UIM liability portion policy, in this case benefits, coverage. Aetna in- Aetna denied addition, permissive users. formed McMichael that his loss was not cov- truck, argued “using” that he was Jensen’s response ered the terms of the vehicle, protection an insured for at the time denial, complaint a to this McMiehael filed of the accident.4 Therefore, McMiehael declaratory compel for relief and to arbitra- claimed that he was entitled to underinsured against County in El District tion Aetna Paso coverage. motorist Court. granted summary judg- The district court an a Aetna filed answer and motion for ment for Aetna. It found there were no summary judgment. In sum- its motion for disputed issues of material fact and conclud- mary judgment, argued that because ed that: a McMiehael was not named insured under Policy policy] Auto [T]he Business [Aetna policy, the could he recover underinsured at unambiguous issue here is clear and only injured motorist benefits if he was while and, law, as a matter of does not afford “occupying” par. an vehicle. insured B3 Plaintiff for because he policy, supra, p. at 4. insurance Because not a named insured and was not it was uncontroverted that McMichael was occupying a covered vehicle at the time occupying not an insured vehicle at the time the accident. of the Aetna claimed McMichael nothing The court noted that there was not entitled to benefits. McMichael, the record to indicate that as an response In his to Aetna’s motion for sum- employee, was intended to be a named in- mary judgment, argued McMichael that be- addition, In parties agreed sured. both that Jensen, corporation, cause the listed a occupying an McMichael was insured ve- insured, employees as the named the of the Thus, hicle at the time of the accident. corporation should be considered named in- trial court determined that McMichael was alternative, sureds. McMichael ar- not entitled to underinsured motorist cover- gued that underinsured motorist age policy. under the terms the insurance under the insurance should be extend- appealed rul- the district court’s persons ed to cover same class of covered ing Appeals. to the Colorado Court of by liability provision policy. of the appeals The court of reversed the district liability provision following listed the individ- ruling court’s and remanded the case with uals as insureds: judgment declaring directions enter 1. AN WHO IS INSURED by McMichael to be covered the UM/UIM McMichael, Policy. provision of the Aetna following are “insureds”: appeals P.2d at 65. The court of held You[3] any a. for covered “auto.” that not issue an automobile insurers Anyone using your policy including b. else while automobile insurance UM/ own, you persons permission a covered “auto” UIM that covers a class of except [listing exceptions or than under hire borrow is narrower the class covered applicable policy. of the Id. at 63. here]. above, parties dispute 3. As noted the term “You” refers to the 4. The do not the fact that Jensen's named insured as listed in the Declarations to the truck was a covered auto under the terms of policy. the named insured was policy. supra, pp. Jensen. See at 4-5. everyone eligi liability provision of the Aetna extend Because the liability coverage under permissive users of ble for policy covered autos, disagree. appeals court of held review therefore, peals’ decision P.2d at 64-65. protection at the missive auto, age if he was el was the UM/UIM McMichael was entitled certiorari ^[1] court of at the time Whether users. sought review of the court of to resolve the was covered appeals Jensen’s undisputed facts in the the court of Id. time of the accident supra, this court. We Jensen’s concluded at truck for also must cover following 64; injury. appeals truck, see that McMicha- p. warning par. two issues: a covered erred in After granted record, cover- lb of per- and, ap- part: protection Insurance vehicle who are motor vehicle licensed for this state therein or motorists. posed by motor vehicle suffered delivery against Section ownership, shall be delivered or issued for loss in this state with by any person arising 10M-609(1) legally supplemental law of protection against maintenance, unless (1) resulting from persons No automobile entitled to recover dam- bodily states insured thereto or use of a injury highway respect thereunder uninsured liability out ... pertinent or death provided insuring use motor any im- holding petitioner must extend ages operators unin- from owners or of coverage anyone using an in- to ...; except UM/UIM motor that the sured vehicles permission of the sured vehicle with may reject coverage named insured such in named insured. writing.

We his ^[2] hold that section holding employer’s truck when he was Whether that the [the] respondent court of 10-4-609, 4A appeals injured. “using” C.R.S. erred their ty policies to include surance (Emphasis policies companies issuing added).5 unless the named insured re This section UM/UIM automobile coverage compels liabili in (1994), requires jects coverage writing. Morgan insurers to offer such v. UM/UIM Exch., 201, 203, coverage to a class as extensive as the class Farmers Ins. 182 Colo. 511 (1973). liability 902, covered under the of an Although 904 we have con P.2d sistently required automobile insurance In the context held that insurers are to customers, coverage of this Aetna was to offer offer their UM/UIM coverage permissive per Jensen we have never determined what class of UM/UIM company-owned of automobiles. In ad- users must Allstate Ins. sons this offer cover. See (Colo. dition, 905, considering undisputed Parfrey, facts in v. 830 P.2d 912-13 Co. (insurer record, 1992) agree ap- duty notify we with the court of has one-time peals that has established that he purpose of the insured of the nature and using a auto at the of the time and to the insured offer purchase coverage). accident. therefore affirm the court of opportunity such 10-4-609(1) terms, appeals’ grant of trial By prohibits reversal court’s of its summary judgment and its companies issuing remand or deliver entry judgment trial ing policies case to the court this state “unless declaring scope that McMichael is within the provided supplemental is therein or protection persons of the of the at thereto ... for the legally issue. insured thereunder who are entitled damages opera to recover from owners or ” II. motor tors of uninsured vehicles.... 10-4-609, argues resolve the issue before us we that section order to meaning phrase. require does not insurers to must determine the of this C.R.S. 10-4-609, § present 4A C.R.S. 5. Section 10-4-609 was amended in 1995. case. However, above-quoted provisions (1995 remain Supp.). unchanged, applicable and the amendment is not

97 majority of uninsured motorist stat- A. expressly utes do not define the classes of determining the nature and persons to whom uninsured motorist cov- duty pursuant to section scope of an insurer’s They erage is intended to be extended. 10-4r-609(l), by long-estab guided are we simply state that automobile insur- statutory Par rules of construction. lished policies ance uninsured mo- interpreting firey, 830 P.2d at 911. When protection per- “for the torist give full effect to the intent statutes we must insured thereunder.” Such terminol- sons legislature. Passamano v. Travelers of the ogy interpreted as intended to has been (Colo.1994). Co., 1312, 1318 Indent. 882 P.2d coverage upon uninsured motorist confer so, statutory duty interpret it is our To do anyone insured under the who is plain their terms in accordance with coverages ordinary meaning. Bertrand v. Board of (Colo. Comm’rs, 223, County 872 P.2d 228 Sehermer, Liability 2 Irvin E. Automobile 1994); Scoggins Unigard Ins. v. Insurance No-Fault Insurance Uninsured 202, (Colo.1994); § 1B P.2d see 27.07, Coverage § Compulsory Motorists (1980). ambiguous, If a we (2d 1994). Accord, C.R.S. statute e.g., 27-42 ed. State legislative history as indicative Reaves, consider 218, Ala. Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. 2-4-203(1)(c), § legislative (Ala.1974) intent. 1B 95, (plain lan- 292 So.2d (1980); Niemet, Elec. General Co. mandating guage of statute cover- (Colo.1994); 1361, Chames v. “persons age for insured thereunder” re- (Colo.1988). Boom, More quires coverage for uninsured motorist those over, may underly take into account the liability portion policy); insured under ing purpose statutory enact Omar Group Pappas v. Central Nat. Ins. in determining legislative (1977) ha, ments when 400 Mich. 255 N.W.2d Express (UM/UIM tent. Gambler’s Inc. v. Public provided must be Comm’n, 405, (Colo.1994); Utils. 868 P.2d liability por- persons of insured under class 1236, Royal, Estate 826 P.2d re policy). interpretation of tion of Our section of (Colo.1992). 10-4-609(1), therefore, comports with eases states, have held that in- from other which of 10-4- Read within the context section provide coverage to surers must UM/UIM 609(1), phrase protection per- the “for the of the same class of individuals covered under sons insured thereunder” means that insur- liability provisions the of automobile insur- provide coverage for the ers UM/UIM policies. ance protection persons of insured under the lia- bility issuing. policy that the insurer is The legislative history policy underly and liability 10-4-609(1) word “thereunder” refers back to the ing adoption of section lend the being policy that is delivered or issued. 1965, support to our conclusion. In further thereunder,” accordingly, “Persons insured Assembly Bill adopted House the General persons liability the refers insured under 1116, the first two sections of which estab Thus, plain meaning policy. under the of requirement lished the that uninsured motor 10-4-609(1), provide insurers must purchasers coverage ist be made available to coverage all for individuals covered 91, liability UM/UIM of automobile insurance. Ch. liability under the 333-58; 1965 Colo.Sess.Laws see Passama n unlessthe named insured refuses such cover- no, section, 882 P.2d at 1319. first age writing. Purpose,” of contained entitled “Declaration following language: jurisdictions that have reached this

Other Purpose. phrase question interpreted “for the Section 1.—Declaration —The general assembly acutely aware of the protection persons insured thereunder” as life, provide suffering in human and loss of intended to uninsured motorist cov- toll limb, by erage any person liability property negligence in who has cover- and caused age operation of motor vehicles our under the his treatise on insurance, Although recognizes it that this ba- automobile Irvin E. state. being by problem sic can and is dealt with Sehermer writes: designed protect direct measures our adoption behind the of section 10- 4-609(1) people ravages irresponsible from the support our conclusion that insurers drivers, general assembly very is also must offer coverage to a class much concerned with the financial loss vis- coextensive with offered under upon ited innocent traffic accident victims by negligent financially motorists who are Similarly, jurisdictions other have em irresponsible. In prescribing the sanctions ployed purpose public policy underly requirements act, of this it is the ing the enactment of uninsured motorist stat policy of this state to encourage induce and utes, here, akin to the one at support issue all provide motorists to for their financial for their conclusion that the statutes man responsibility others, protection for the date to the same class widespread, and to availability assure the provisions under the poli insuring public protec- See, e.g., cies. Mullis v. State Farm Mut. against by tion loss neg- caused financial Co., (Fla. 229, Auto. Ins. 252 So.2d 233-35 ligent financially irresponsible motorists. 1971) (public policy of uninsured motorist 91, 1, (em- Ch. sec. 1965 Colo.Sess.Laws 333 provide statute is to uniform specific added); phasis § see also insurance benefits bodily injury to cover (1995 Supp.). by enacting sec- negligence caused of insolvent or 10-4-609(1), tion Assembly the General in- motorists); uninsured Forrester v. State protect tended to public from the devas- Co., 442, Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 213 Kan. tating financial loss that a traffic accident 173, (1973) (“purpose of the unin victim can incur. Parfrey, See also 830 P.2d sured motorist law recompense is to innocent (purpose at 911 requiring insurers to offer persons damaged who are through the protect is “to the insured wrongful act of uninsured motorists who are against inadequate the risk of compensation financially responsible”); Kaysen v. Fed resulting injuries damages incurred Co., (Minn. eral Ins. 268 N.W.2d in an automobile accident with an uninsured 1978) (legislature pro intended broad-based motorist”). Further, or underinsured tection when it uninsured motorist Assembly General intended to protection of individuals insured through mechanism which an insured could thereunder); Liberty Rau v. Mut. Ins. purchase against loss (1978) 21 Wash.App. negligent caused conduct of a finan- (statutory policy any attempt vitiates to cially irresponsible motorist. Krai v. Ameri- meaning make purposes “insured” for can Hardware Mut. Ins. 784 P.2d uninsured motorist narrower than (Colo.1989). 763 language of the decla- meaning section). of term under By purpose ration of also legisla- demonstrates a requiring a broader class of insureds to be tive encourage intent to widespread the avail- provision covered under the of au UM/UIM ability of coverage. UM/UIM tomobile policies, insurance these courts have intent, Given this interpret we section 10- attempted give public policy effect to the 4-609(1) require insurers to offer UW of protecting devastating motorists from the UIM to a class of individuals coex- financial loss that can result from automobile tensive with the class covered accidents. respective To hold conclusion, we hold implement plain otherwise would fail to that the lan- the Gener- guage legislative al and Assembly’s history of intent to make section 10-4^- cov- UM/UIM 609(1), erage widely together public policy upon available. with the Consumers unaware of or based, vagaries unschooled in which the compel statute was insurance contracts could believing they be misled into conclusion that insurers must offer UM/UIM purchased reality when in to a class of insureds coextensive they Moreover, have not. interpretation this with the class of insureds covered under the provides protection to individuals from loss In the con- by negligent, caused financially irresponsible text of this policy because the Aetna motorists. legislative history permissive users of insured vehicles Bill liability coverage, [now it was re- House codified at section 10- purposes Id. at 1320. permissive quired policy that the cover users 4-609].” purposes of of covered vehicles for adja- These sections came to be codified coverage. only cent to each other as a result of subse- quent repeals, reenactments and reeodifica- B. tions, none of which was intended to effect argues that section 104- Aetna next any change interpretation in the substantive (1994), exempts pol C.R.S. Id. at 1320-21. Pas- provisions. of these covering than vehicles from icies more four samano, reorganization we noted that 10-4-609(1), 4A requirements of section language did not affect the thrust of (1994). interprets 10- section C.R.S. the relocated sections: to mean that when an automobile lia The Cancellation Act remained codified at bility policy insures more than four automo (1973 -608, section 10-4-601 to & C.R.S. biles, the insurer is not to offer Supp.). language of section 10- coverage to an insured. Because (1973 4-609, Supp.), 4 C.R.S. & 1979 re- Aetna issued to Jensen insured exclusively require- mained directed to the vehicles, eighty more than Aetna contends it purchasers ment that liabili- automobile comply requirements did not have to with the ty policies oppor- be offered the 10-4-609(1). disagree. of section tunity purchase uninsured motorist cov- pertinent part: 10-4-608 states in Section requirement erage. That furthered the “jExemptions. part apply This 6 shall not purpose declaration of articulated sec- any policy insuring ... than four more 1116; tion 1 of House Bill it had no rela- argues that automobiles.” Aetna we tionship purposes requirements exempt the Aetna read statute of the Cancellation Act first articulated vehicles, eighty which covers more than from Bill Senate 350 and recodified requirements of section 10-4-609. Be- -608, 104-601 to 4 C.R.S. sections indepen- cause section 10-4-608 was enacted (1973). dently of 10-4-609 in- section not Passamano, 882 P.2d at 1321. Viewed in the modify tended to or otherwise affect legislative development, context of their interpretation substantive of section 104- provisions entirely these are unrelated mandate, uninsured motorist 609’s together read to create an should be reading. adopt we decline to such a unintended limitation on the cover- Indemnity In Passamano v. Travelers age requirements Ac- of section 104-609. Company, (Colo.1994), cordingly, hold that 104-608 does we provisions currently explained complying exempt the Aetna 10-4-608, 4A codified as sections 10-4-601 to requirements of section 104-609 as (1994 Supp.), & 1995 and section 10- out IIA. set above 4-609, (1994), respectively, 4A C.R.S. were originally years apart enacted four and were III. not codified the same volume of the Colo argues Aetna that even if we hold rado Revised Sections 10-4-601 to Statutes. liability coverage and UM/UIM regulated procedures 10-4-608 for auto coextensive, excluded must be McMichael is policy while section 104b- mobile cancellation coverage by from the terms of the coverage. 609 related to uninsured motorist disagree. insurance contract.6 We in Passa As 882 P.2d at 1320-21. we stated mano, policy adoption Act II of the Aetna is entitled “The of the Cancellation Section “Liability Coverage.” part A of section provisions now codified at sections 104- [the II, liability coverage policy 601 to in 1969 did not undermine describes 1041-608] including adoption provides, who is an insured. the intent or effect of the 1965 of it Although grant fully 6. not within our to resolve this case. this issue was certiorari, briefly it here in order consider

McMichael, per- provisions the extent that he was a Ran v. UM/UIM vehicle, Co., 326, Liberty Wash.App. a covered is an in- Mut missive user of Ins. (1978). 157, liability coverage Despite sured under the section. P.2d 159-60 the exclu sions, par. policy, supra, p. employees of insurance lb remain as insureds under policy of the Aetna as II, policy B of section lists long they as are a covered auto. Ac “Exclusions,” presumably meaning exclusions cordingly, because the exclusions set forth liability coverage. It states: from above do not affect MeMichael’s status as an B. Exclusions: liability portion insured under the apply any This insurance does not apply only and the exclusions in the following: liability provisions, may context of the providing use the exclusions to avoid 3. WORKERS COMPENSATION coverage to McMichael. UM/UIM Any obligation for which the “insured” or the “insured’s” insurer be held IV. any compensation,

liable under workers Because we have concluded that Aet disability unemployment benefits or 10-4-609(1), na violated compensation any law or similar law. policy it an when issued 4. EMPLOYEE INDEMNIFICA- provided liability coverage for users of TION AND EMPLOYER’S LIABILI- insured vehicles but limited cover TY vehicles, age occupiers of insured we must “Bodily injury” to: remedy determine what the for this violation employee An arising a. of the “insured” should be. employment out of and in the course ambiguity, In the absence of an “insured”; by the given be effect accord quoted types These sections relate to ing plain ordinary meaning of its liability coverage claims excluded from Daigle, terms. Matter Estate 634 P.2d merely pay having absolve Aetna from 71, (Colo.1981). However, even if a might certain claims that McMichael assert provision unambiguous, provision is against employer, his Jensen. In this public void and unenforceable if it violates suing McMichael is Aetna for ben- “dilute, condition, policy by attempting to efits. These benefits substitute for benefits statutorily coverage.” limit Meyer mandated that McMichael would have received Co., v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 689 P.2d injuries. the motorist who caused his (Colo.1984) (superseded by statute compen- do not constitute benefits workers’ Feghali, as stated in Allstate Ins. v.Co. sation benefits and do not result because of a (Colo.1991)). Insurance brought by against suit Jensen. contrary clauses that are to a Because McMiehael’s claim is based on the against public policy. of a statute are void as incurred the driver who caused Meyer, Consistently, 689 P.2d at 588. apply the exclusions do not provisions court has refused to enforce McMichael’s claim for benefits.7 policies against automobile insurance that are See, specific As public policy. e.g., McMichael’s claims are not ex Krai American cluded, may prevail only provi if the Hardware Mut. Ins. (Colo.1989) (subrogation

sions affect status an McMichael’s insured clause and release purposes liability coverage. agreement for The exclu trust unenforceable because en exempt paying inability sions listed above Aetna in forcement would result to obtain for liability coverage compensation certain claims under the full for loss therefore They policy. legislative policy); Meyer, of the do not determine who is would violate 689 (household liability provisions an insured under the and P.2d at 592 exclusion unenforcea thus also purposes covered as an insured under the ble because violative of of No-Fault Compensation against 7. The Workers' statute does not the driver who caused the accident. 8-41-203, (1995 bringing Supp.). § bar McMichael from a action 3B C.R.S. tort

101 Act). using his truck. The court of that the chael was have determined Because we however, on the appeals, held that based we policy violated section Aetna facts, injuries undisputed McMMiael’s arose provision limit uninsured motorist hold the agree use of the truck. We persons occupying a covered out of the ing coverage to appeals’ vehicle, affirm the court of deter- pursuant to which Aetna denied therefore mination that McMichael was within the simply permissive as a UM/ policy. user, coverage of the par. void. B3 of insurance UIM to be See policy, supra, p. 4. 10-4-609(1) A. compels cov

Section erage covered under the for all those briefly inter We first review our case law policy. provisions an automobile insurance in insur preting the term “use” automobile policies with insurance that vio Courts faced policies. In Kohl v. Union Insurance ance mandatory coverage requirements have late Co., (Colo.1986), interpreted 731 P.2d 134 we requirements policy. into the read those 42-7-413(1)(c), 17 C.R.S. Co., 691, Dairyland Murphy v. Ins. 747 P.2d provides minimum of cover which level (because (Colo.App.1987) 696-96 age required an automobile insur for PIP policy adopted term language of section 42-7- ance public policy, general policy against as void 413(l)(c) requires liability policies in of such term must be utilized definition every person on account [insured] to “insure PIP determining plaintiffs entitlement maintenance, use, operation policy); v. under accord Hendricks benefits Kohl, we stated motor vehicle.”8 Co., 133, 22 Meritplan Cal.App.2d Ins. occurs ‘on account of the use “[a]n accident 682, (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1962) Cal.Rptr. injury forms the a motor vehicle’ if the (language requiring code unin of insurance causally to a basis of the claim is related in a motorist becomes effect sured vehicle that is conceivable use of the insured if part policy it were written out purpose.” 731 foreign to its inherent itself); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 135; Employers v. P.2d at see also Azar Selders, 342, 190 789, 187 Neb. N.W.2d Co. v. Co., 61, 554, 58, Casualty 495 P.2d 178 Colo. (1971) (if comply policy fails to with Co., (1972); Mason v. Celina Mut. Ins. statute, policy); Am statute will be read into (1967). 24, 442, 444, 161 Colo. Co., 44 Fire Ins. idzich Charter Oak an aid in applied this definition as (1969) (insur 45, 170 813, 817 Wis.2d N.W.2d requirement contained interpreting a similar omitting required coverage will ance a in provision in an in an uninsured motorist if be enforced as written accordance with Farm policy. Cung La v. State surance statute). purposes adopt For this case (Colo. Auto Ins. remedy. Wé therefore read the 1992). Thus, of use contained the definition provide per policy to provides starting point from which in Kohl missive users of covered autos accordance interpret 10-4-609(1). the mandate of section B. V. we must determine is that the Aetna The first issue

Because we have decided an insured to whether McMichael vehicles, foreign in a manner that was permissive users of insured resolu- vehicle acci purpose at the time of the depends on MeMi- its inherent tion of this case whether could argues that McMichael using an vehicle at the dent. Aetna chael was insured court, truck been Jensen’s because accident. The trial not have time of the of the truck. summary judgment, distance front resolving this case on he was some disagree. question reach the of whether McMi- We did not 4, 42-7-413, § § Colo.Sess.Laws presently at 42-

8. Section 42-7-413 is codified 7-413, (1995 Supp.). See ch. 17 C.R.S.

102

Although, general, operation pursue sport in a their is conceivable use of four- vehicle). wheel-drive transportation purposes motor for vehicle use, would constitute our demonstrate cases Although we have never considered wheth may a meaning. that use broader a a warning er vehicle used as barricade or injuries occurring during have held that pur device could be considered “in use” for loading unloading of a vehicle benefits, involve the poses of automobile insurance other See, Kohl, e.g., use. jurisdictions vehicle’s 731 P.2d at have addressed this issue. For (injury resulting example, 135-36 from accidental dis in Great American Co. v. Insurance Cassell, 421, charge 239 Va. 389 476 a of rifle that when rifle S.E.2d occurred was fighter injured filling fire was while out a gun from removed vehicle rack arose out of report approximately twenty-five away vehicle); feet Nolf, use Titan Constr. Co. v. 183 Supreme from fire truck. The his Court 194, (1973) 188, 1123, Colo. 1126 Virginia agreed finding with the trial court’s (injury unloading ready-mix received while fighter using fire was the fire truck concrete truck hose truck when connected to scope within the of his duties at the time of knocked brick off roof out of arose use stated, the accident. The court “Use of the vehicle). These cases did not turn on the fire, extinguish fire truck to traf control proximity the claimant to vehicle at protect fighters, including fic and the fire but, rather, the time of the accident Cassell, integral part fight anwas of the fire activity particular in which the claimant was ers’ Id. mission.” at 477. The court then engaged. fighter held that because the fire en was Similarly, Trinity in Universal Insurance gaged in a “transaction” essential to the use plaintiff injured v.Co. Hall the was when a killed, of the fire truck when he was collapsible awning permanently side attached insurer was to insurance a truck used a as refreshment stand fell coverage. Id. buying and struck her as was head she re- jurisdictions Other on have also focused (Colo.1984). freshments. 690 P.2d 227 Be- purpose whether the insured vehicle’s injuries cause we concluded that arose finding connected to its use as a in barricade out of the use of truck a refreshment See, coverage for the accident. stand, plaintiff qualified we held that the e.g., Campos, Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. injury protection personal benefits under the (tow 865, (Ind.Ct.App.1991) N.E.2d truck liability policy. truck’s automobile Id. at 231. injured operator walking while police We stated: engaged activity vehicle to tow truck was towing process essential thus A vehicle be used sell food and purposes tow truck for of insurance Here, drink. pickup where the truck had Burton, coverage); Thibodeaux v. 538 So.2d factory-modified been catering for use as a 1001, (La.1989) (construction 1004-05 worker stand, truck and mobile refreshment lan- injured working utilizing while road guage referring its use as motor vehi- yellow flashing instructing truck with sign necessarily cle does exclude oncoming cars to detour was truck this case. The use of a motor vehicle as purposes coverage); of insurance Oberkram contemplated in the insurance de- 300, er Reliance Ins. 302- S.W.2d pends upon the factual each context of (Mo.Ct.App.1983) (police injured officer case. twenty-five fifty police feet from car was Id. at 231 n. 4. implied that when using police purposes car as road block for determining meaning of the term “use” coverage). Hawkeye-Se But see an Gilbert, automobile insurance a court curity Ins. Co. v. 124 Idaho must look (1994) (motorist’s to the factual circumstances use of his ease, each including particular character- bicy automobile as a barricade to block a istics of the vehicle the intention of the clist’s avenue movement was not a use parties Kohl, to the insurance contract. reasonably related to the inherent na car’s (transportation vehicle); P.2d at 136 of hunters ture as a see also Insurance Co. of and their weapons they Perry, to areas can where North America v. 204 Va. evaluating (1964) when use of the insured vehicle (police officer who left S.E.2d automobile insurance benefits. using car claims for warrant was not police car to serve Kohl, 135; generally Larry accident). P.2d at see at time of Annotation, Scheafer, Automobile Liabili D. that McMi- In the record reflects Inju ty Are Accidents or Insurance: What truck at the time the insured chael was Ownership, “Arising Mainte ries Out of truck McMichael left the accident. of the Vehicle, nance, Insured or Use” of in front some distance running as he worked (1982) (cases agree that A.L.R.4th specially equipped with of it. The truck was connection must exist be causal relation or flashers, emergency an overhead beacon injury ownership, and the tween accident or on at the time of both of which were vehicle). maintenance, of the or use modi- fact that the truck was accident. The requirement causal is to en reason for this suggests that the warning devices fied with that is some nexus between the sure there protective intended to be used as truck was injury. use and the This nexus vehicle’s protective carried The truck also device. guarantees that the accident is within the placed that to the work site were barriers kind of risks that the automobile pro- and in the median for around the truck to cover. contract was meant Furthermore, given the involvement tection. Jensen, employer McMichael’s and the Kohl, in explained we that order In policy, in con- on the Aetna named insured relationship requisite causal to establish the activities, use of tracting and construction injury, vehicle and the between the use of the conjunc- warning purposes the truck show that the accident the claimant must such activities was both conceivable tion with not occurred but for the vehicle’s would have parties en- and foreseeable at the time the 135; 731 P.2d at Titan Constr. use. factors the insurance contract. These tered Although 515 P.2d at 1126. Colo. at was us- adequately establish that McMichael suggests terminology that use of “but for” foreign ing in a manner not to its the truck vehicle must be the cause the use of the purpose at the time of the accident. inherent injuries, have utilized a more liberal we that McMichael was some distance The fact in our cases. We have not interpretation injury at the time of in front of the truck moving at required the vehicle be proximity may indi- dispositive. While be the of the accident or that the vehicle time use, only weighed to be cate it is one factor fact, In we have cause of the accident. sole totality of the circumstances as plaintiff requiring as interpreted the test present the case. in, injury originated only that to show of, from a use of a vehicle. grew out or flowed

C. Kohl, at 136. the causation if argues next that even require that the insured vehicle test does not time of the truck at the injury, only be the source of the itself causally related this use was to the claimant’s integrally use be related injuries. particular, claims to his injury at the time of the activities and the automobile that caused that because the accident.9 injuries opposite from the

MeMichael’s came reasoning, have with this we In accordance and struck him front direction only relationship rejected claims where truck, a “but the truck could not have been injury and the vehicle is that the between the of the accident. for” cause so, doing injury in the vehicle. occurred “injuries that distinguished between majority jurisdic we have of other As automobile, of an tions, are related to the use some causal relation an automobile injuries injuries that are related to and the ship between the claimant’s Kohl, Id. causally to the use of the car. example, in- were related the claimant was 9. As an intimately gun actions were lifting We stated: “Weaver’s jured out of his car's while a rifle transportation to his use of the vehicle The car could not have related rack. 731 P.2d at 137. hunting gun discharging. and his rifle from a mountain prevented for himself caused Nevertheless, City.” Canon Id. injuries area to his home in that the claimant's we held they coincidentally only implicate coverage occurred in poli- because under the insurance Kohl, see, 136; e.g., cy. at present the vehicle.” In the McMichael’s acci- Colo, Azar, (injury integrally at 495 P.2d at 555 dent was related to his work on road, passenger shotgun expected caused to when dis- the where it was that he charged pulled weapon put danger as driver back into would be in from other motorists. reason, preparing ear after to shoot at rabbit from specially For the truck was auto); equipped protective gear ear not arise out of use of warning window did and Colo, Mason, positioned at 423 P.2d at 25 provide devices and was to a bar- (death occurring discharge pistol from rier. at the time of the youths toying while three were with the protec- McMichael was the truck for tion, weapon in did not merely physical insured’s vehicle arise out the truck was not the vehicle). cases, of a covered use of In these location where the accident occurred. injury any the could have occurred in loca-

tion and had no connection to the use of the VI. vehicle. conclusion, In we hold that section 10-4- ease, present injuries In the McMichael’s 609(1), (1994), required 4A C.R.S. Aetna to arose out of his use of the truck as a barri- coverage to the same class warning and device. cade McMichael was persons covered provi- under the dangers posed roadway aware of the to liability pro- sion of the Because the by passing Accordingly, workers cars. he users, permissive vision of the covered begin roadway did work or enter the area statutory read mandate of section 10- positioned until he had the truck to serve as 4-609 into the warning presence. of his McMichael relied provides and hold that it UM/ flashing lights warning on the truck’s and permissive UIM users. Further- protect oncoming beacon to him from more, traffic. we hold that the trial court erred in supports This reliance the conclusion that entering summary judgment for Aetna. truck, particular- McMiehael’s use and facts, undisputed Based on the McMichael features, ly specifically safety designed its has established that he was an insured integral part was an of his work on the vehicle at the time of the accident and that roadway. Accordingly, McMichael’s use of causally the use of this vehicle was related causally the truck ensuing related to the Therefore, judg- accident. we affirm the accident. fact that the driver who hit appeals. ment of court have been at fault does not change ERICKSON, J., supra, p. our conclusion. See at part & concurs in J., apparent part, KOURLIS, joins n. 13. The truck’s in failure serve dissents in protective its function did not make the the concurrence and dissent. any integral truck’s use less to McMichael’s VOLLACK, C.J., dissents. roadway.

work at the time he entered the ERICKSON, concurring part in Justice distinguishable McMichael’s case is from dissenting part: the cases where we have denied on merely that, Although agree majority basis that the vehicle was I with the at cases, situs for accident. injury, Phillip the situs the time of his McMichael was “using” accident was unrelated to the use of the the truck as that term is used Casualty vehicle because the accident could oc- Surety issued & (Aetna) anywhere. example, here, curred Company For Mason which is at issue see (Colo. youths toying three pistol were with a in the Kohl v. Union Ins. 731 P.2d 134 1986), pistol discharged insured’s vehicle agree when the I with Chief Justice Vollack that Colo, injured 4-609(1), (1994), one of them. 161 4A C.R.S. does 10— compel 423 P.2d at 24. This event could have oc- not insurers to offer Uninsured Mo street, (UM/UIM) house, curred on the in a or on a Motorist torist/Underinsured porch. sitting persons Just in the vehicle did all and entities covered the liabili relationship necessary ty provisions create the causal of an automobile more than 609 because Vollack agree with Justice I also eighty vehicles.1 language of section plain in this policy at issue exempts the and dissent Accordingly, I concur 10-4- compliance with section case view, my the trial court did not part. 609(1). why clarify separately to I write summary judgment for the granting err differs from that in this case situation defendant, Aetna, appeals court of and the v. Passamano we were confronted which reversing judgment. that erred P.2d 1312 Indemnity Travelers say that Justice KOUR- I am authorized (Colo.1994). joins in and dissent. this concurrence LIS Passamano, legislative histo- on based “poli- of that the definition ry, we determined VOLLACK, dissenting: Chief Justice (1994), 10-4-601, did 4A C.R.S. cy” in section 10—4— majority holds that section The 10-4-609, the scope of section not limit the (1994), 609(1), requires that Passamano, provision. motorist uninsured (Aetna) Company pro- Casualty Surety and making that at 1318-22. Before Mo- vide Uninsured Motorist/Underinsured determination, however, we stated: (UM/UIM) coverage to the same class torist language to the give full effect [W]e liability provi- persons of covered under in- Assembly requiring all of the General Irving issued to the sion of the motorist cover- to offer uninsured surers (Jensen). ma- Company, Inc. The F. Jensen 10-4-609, as age, as set forth section 10-4-608, jority that section also concludes provisions of sec- well as the definitional (1994), exempts policies in- which 4A C.R.S. 10-4-601(2). However, we must also tion the re- suring four vehicles from more than introductory language to the consider 6,1 apply to part does not quirements of provisions section definitional of 10-4-609(1). Finally, majority section contexts the provides that some which (McMi- Phillip McMichael determines that therein, including the contained definitions chael) at the using the insured vehicle was might not “policy,” definition of the term use of the and that the time of the accident applicable. be causally the accident. related to vehicle was legislative histo- thus consider the plain language of I dissent because ry.... exempts policy at issue section 10—M>08 at 1319. Id. 10-4-609(1) as compliance with section from ease, a confronted with In this we are not four automo- more than insured applicability of a statu- in which the situation majority’s disagree I with the biles. also by its context. tory provision is determined 10-4-609(1) mandates holding that section unequivocally 10-4-608 Because must offer that insurers “[tjhis apply ... 6 shall states liability provisions to all those covered insuring than four auto- any policy more the ma- Finally, I from a dissent of added), mobiles,” a resort to the (emphasis using the holding that McMichael was jority’s statutory construction” “interpretive rules of the accident at the time of insured vehicle Elec. Co. inappropriate. See General causally was that the use of the vehicle (Colo.1994). Niemet, P.2d to the accident. related given “statutory should be effect terms ordinary according plain and mean- to their I. County v. Board ing.” See Bertrand McMichael, (Colo.1994). 1, 1990, an em- Comm’rs, February On Jensen, con- assigned to saw ployee was policy at issue exempts 10-4-608 Section high- joints in the median of a divided crete of section 10-4- requirements from the here (titled Policy— Insurance applicability § 1. Part 6 “Automobile potential 10-4- noted the 1. We through §§ 10- Regulations”) 4-613, 10-4-601 refers involving § in Passamano. 10^1-609 608 to cases (titled of Article 4 4A C.R.S. n. 6. 882 P.2d at 1318 Insurance”) “Property Casualty of Title 10 of Revised Statutes. the Colorado McMichael, accompanied by way. another at the time of the as was pickup one of Jensen’s employee, drove the Aetna (the truck”) trucks “Jensen westbound granted The district court Aetna’s motion per- the work was to be location which summary judgment, concluding that the parked facing west formed. The truck plain language precluded the Aetna highway, warning on the side of the coverage, as McMichael’s he was not a signals on the truck were turned on. McMi- not occupying named insured and was then removed a cement saw from the chael vehicle at time of McMi- the accident. began sawing sev- truck concrete about appealed grant chael then the district court’s enty-five front feet in of the truck. As he summary judgment Colorado Court working, approaching car Appeals. appeals court reversed into the west swerved median and struck holding trial ruling, the court’s that automo- any There never contact him. was between not, policy, a of bile insurers as matter the car that struck McMichael and eastbound an policy issue automobile insurance that in- seventy-five parked Jensen’s truck which was cludes coverage covering a class of UM/UIM feet of the accident. east individuals narrower than the class covered pursuant Jensen truck was to The insured by liability provision policy. the of the As Coverage Policy through a Business Auto provided policy liability coverage the Aetna (the Casualty Surety Company Aetna vehicle, “using” provided only for those a but policy). policy The Aetna Aetna insured “named insureds” and UM/UIM eighty than of more Jensen’s vehicles. Addi- vehicle, “occupying” those a covered the tionally, policy specifically provided the UM/ policy court held that the Aetna was violative a UIM to limited class of individu- public policy behind section 10-4- filed an motor- als. McMichael underinsured 609(1). court the thus construed UM/ policy ist claim under the Aetna to recover provision policy protect UIM of the Aetna to injuries, his compensation for as the motorist injured “using” all individuals while cov- did who struck him not maintain sufficient appeals ered vehicle. The court of also con- coverage to compensate cluded that McMichael the was Jensen fully. him truck the time of accident and was the policy. Aetna denied and filed a motion thus covered the summary judgment, arguing that McMi- chael could not recover because he not a was II. insured under the as- named 10-4-608, plain language of section 4A that serted McMichael was not entitled to (1994), exempts policy C.R.S. the Aetna policy language speci- the benefits because provision the of UM/UIM fied that an who named individual was not a (1994). Thus, I would hold that only they if insured could recover were occu- provision policy the of the Aetna UM/UIM vehicle, pying an insured was McMichael written, be as and I should read would there- occupying Jensen the truck when he was deny coverage fore to he McMichael as injured. occupying the truck at Jensen the time of response to Aetna’s motion for sum- the accident. mary judgment, argued, inter McMichael alia, states, of pertinent part: that the UIM Section 10-4-608 extended, “Exemptions. should part apply be a matter of This 6 shall not public policy, any policy cover insuring the same class ... more than auto- four ” added.) (Emphasis individuals .... mobiles The ma- jority analysis McMichael asserted that relies on the extensive UM/ history UIM legislative thus be 6 in should extended Passamano v. permissive Indemnity Company, an users of insured vehicle rather Travelers P.2d just (Colo.1994), than the named occu- legislature insured those to find that the pying an modify insured vehicle. also did not McMichael intend section 10-4-608 argued “using” interpre- that he was the Jensen truck or otherwise affect the substantive vehicles, I it is provi- eighty would hold that of section 10^-609’s tation provision I in Passa- of sec- Maj. op. exempt at 97. dissented from the sion. analysis in- statutory Because I believe that such tion 10-4-609. do not mano because facially un- provision when the statute is to the Aetna appropriate applies the UM/UIM I that view here. ambiguous, policy, reiterate I as it was would construe the that, It established law initially agreed upon by parties: is well statutes, pri- covers construing this court’s [i]n give only effect to if he is insured or if mary task is to ascertain and a named so, legislature; occupying to do vehicle at the the intent of the he was insured language must first look accident. McMichael is not a court time of the As language of the itself. When the on the and he statute named insured legislature’s clear so seventy-five statute is feet from truck the Jensen occurred, can be with reasonable intent discerned I would hold when the accident no certainty, by reversing there is need to resort appeals that the court of erred statutory interpretation. other rules summary judgment trial court’s order of favor. Court, Aetna’s 739, 742 People v. District (Colo.1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis add- III.

ed). view, if I clarify man- further to that even my statutory language the is I write arguendo, majority’s my accept, the unequivocal. upon Based read- were to ifest and 4-609(1) language holding applies, that section and ing plain the of sections 10-4-608 of 10— coverage I that the must be coexten- and conclude that the UM/UIM by apply not automobile the afforded the liabili- does to an sive with insuring policy,21 still policy ty provision than four ve- of the Aetna would more in because policy As the Aetna insured excess hold that should be denied hicles. Salvo, clarify my disagreement 174 here to Mut. Ins. Co. v. De I elaborate Massachusetts Life that, 120, 380, (1971). 115, majority's holding of with the as a matter Colo. 482 P.2d 383 contractually policy, may acknowledges language public majority an insurer not of the that the unambiguous, agree policy insured to restrictive and then with its offer more is clear but portion plain language by attempting the the insur- under of deviates from this policy impose perceived ance than is offered under the As- its view of the General states, 10-4-609(1) pertinent portion. sembly’s public policy provisions Section on the intended part: policy. of the Aetna view, my § it is far that 10-4— from clear policy automobile ... ... shall No 609(1) public policy. a It is true evinces such ... issued ... in this state ... unless cover- be Act, that, inception of the at the the UM/UIM age provided supplemental therein there- is or public poli- Assembly articulated a clear General protection persons the insured to ... for of injured financially cy protect by irre- those legally thereunder who are entitled to recover 30, Apr. sponsible approved drivers. Act damages operators from owners of unin- or 1965, 91, 1-8, therefrom; secs. Colo.Sess.Laws ch. 1965 resulting vehicles sured motor ... mandate, sweeping is not a 333-58. This such except may reject that the named such insured however, may broadly, it in the writing. that be used coverage in statutory language, the clear to alter My disagreement majority’s absence of with the view stems parties interpretation original of the to an insurance phrase the intent its of the “for 609(1) § that persons does mandate protection thereunder’’ as re- While of insured 10^1— persons lating those covered be offered to those back to all who could be UM/UIM insured policy, expressly liability portion policy. I under the it does not under the of the believe majority paints by persons a the different of to whom the utilizing too broad brush define classes fact, construction, thereby the last a makes is to be extended. In such and such section, public policy phrase left within that “the named insured a decision of that is best of legislature. coverage writing,” implies province reject that the the such that, only long protected the named been the in Colorado class to be includes It has law [wjhere insured, provisions of are and does not extend to all those an insurance plain language unambiguous by the Because couched in ambiguous, principle hold that it and do not some the statute is I would contravene right by principle public public a a not manifest a court has no does enough interpretation compelling construction to re- force a construction forced contracting by quire not contract- not intended a result intended ing parties. parties. “using” Additionally, I that accepting proposi- do believe McMichael was even not “using” at the time tion that truck accident McMichael was the truck as Jensen a interpreted barricade at the time of the I prior cases have that as our would hold that he the truck a word. foreign purpose. manner its inherent In Trinity Universal Insurance v. Co. pick- truck ordinary insured Aetna was an Hall, (Colo.1984), 690 P.2d held up truck. Common sense dictates that the “ a relation or ‘there be causal connec- purpose pickup inherent of a commercial injury tion between the use of the transportation truck is the workers injury vehicle order to come within It materials. true that our cases have meaning phrase “arising out unloading loading extended this to a ” a at (quoting use of’ vehicle.’ Id. Azar Colo, truck, 194, Constr., see Titan Co., 58, 61, Employers Casualty v. 178 Colo. uses, 1126, peripheral P.2d at and other but (1972)). 554, 495 P.2d In Titan Con- credulity it strains to hold that the inherent Nolf, Co. struction 188 Colo. 515 P.2d purpose of pickup truck is to be as a used we stated that the test to deter- protect oncoming barricade to workers from mine the existence of such causation awas placed traffic. Our on cases have the burden “but for” test which was satisfied when “the the claimant to establish that he except accident would not have occurred foreign the vehicle a manner its the [use] of the insured vehicle.” Id. at See, purpose. e.g., Cung inherent La v. State 515 P.2d at 1126. In Kohl v. Union Insur- Co., Farm Auto. Ins. (Colo.1986), ance 731 P.2d 134 we set (Colo.1992). I would hold that McMichael requirement forth the additional burden, has failed to meet this and thus was “prove claimant must that the accident would “using” the Jensen truck at the time of not have occurred but for a conceivable use the accident as we have defined that term foreign the vehicle that is not to its inher- our cases. purpose.” ent 2 (emphasis Id. at 135-36 n. added). IV. In the instant for” “but test of conclusion, I would hold that section 10- satisfied, causation is not I and would there- 4-608, by unambiguous plain its lan- fore hold that “using” McMichael was not guage, precludes application of the UM7 Jensen truck at time 10-4-609(1) UIM of section majori- interpreted we have that term. The policy. Alternatively, I would hold ty an variety cites assortment from a of eases that, 10-4-609(1) were apply, jurisdictions proposition for the that the “using” McMichael was not the Jensen truck use of a as a vehicle barricade constitute the time of the accident as “use” for purposes. On these by the Aetna I also write facts, however, McMichael’s use the Jen- express my majori- dissatisfaction with the sen truck was not the “but for” cause of the ty’s sweeping, public policy based decision Although might accident. requiring that the UM/ barricade, been the truck aas McMi- UIM coextensive with the seventy-five chael was feet from the truck provided liability provisions of that Moreover, when the accident occurred. policy. Accordingly, I dissent. ap- automobile that struck McMichael proached opposite from the direction from parked.

where the Jensen truck was As record,

reflected the accident occurred traveling

because motorist opposite parked

direction from where McMichael had

the truck fogged could see out of his median, striking

windshield and entered the

McMichael.

Case Details

Case Name: Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. McMichael

Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado

Date Published: Oct 30, 1995

Citation: 906 P.2d 92

Docket Number: 94SC225

Court Abbreviation: Colo.