Griffin v. Sirva Inc.
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15986
| 2d Cir. | 2016Background
- Plaintiffs Griffin and Godwin were Astro employees who worked on jobs for Allied; Astro was an Allied agent under an agency contract requiring background checks and adherence to Allied’s adjudication guidelines.
- HireRight performed background checks in 2011 showing both plaintiffs had prior serious sexual-felony convictions; Astro’s president terminated their employment or removed them from Allied jobs.
- Plaintiffs sued Astro, Allied, and Sirva under NYSHRL § 296(15) (prohibiting denial of employment based on criminal conviction); Astro was also sued on other federal and state claims and went to trial separately.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Allied and Sirva, concluding § 296(15) applies only to an aggrieved party’s “employer” and Allied/Sirva were not plaintiffs’ employers.
- The Second Circuit panel found New York law unsettled on three questions—(1) whether § 296(15) is limited to “employers,” (2) scope of “employer” (including joint/single-employer doctrines), and (3) whether NYSHRL § 296(6) aiding-and-abetting applies—so it certified those questions to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 296(15) limits liability to an aggrieved party’s “employer” | § 296(15) is not textually limited to employers; no need to prove Allied/Sirva were plaintiffs’ employers | § 296(15) targets employers only; only an employer can "deny employment" and Correction Law cross-references employers | Panel concluded New York law is unsettled and certified the question to NY Court of Appeals |
| If limited to employers, what is the scope of “employer” (including joint/single employer) | § 296(15) should reach entities that exercise significant control via contracts/agency (e.g., Allied/Sirva) | Traditional NY factors control; Allied/Sirva lacked hiring, firing, payroll, supervision, ownership to be employers | Panel found existing tests ambiguous for § 296(15) application and certified the scope question |
| Whether NYSHRL § 296(6) (aiding and abetting) applies to § 296(15) | A non-employer principal that requires an agent to discriminate can be liable as aider/abettor | Aider-and-abettor standards require actual participation and intent; uncertain whether corporate principals fit | Because New York courts haven’t resolved this in context of § 296(15), panel certified the question |
Key Cases Cited
- Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 673 F.3d 50 (2d Cir.) (principle on certifying unsettled state-law questions)
- Acosta v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 16 N.Y.3d 309 (N.Y. 2011) (discussing Correction Law purposes and § 296 interaction)
- Patrowich v. Chem. Bank, 63 N.Y.2d 541 (N.Y. 1984) (defining when an individual may be liable as an employer under NYSHRL)
- Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir.) (individual liability requires more than carrying out personnel decisions)
- Arculeo v. On-Site Sales & Marketing, 425 F.3d 193 (2d Cir.) (single-employer and joint-employer doctrines in employment law)