Grice v. McVeigh
873 F.3d 162
2d Cir.2017Background
- On June 6, 2011, 16‑year‑old Gregory Grice was observed at a Virginia Road railroad crossing holding electronic devices (a cell phone and a radio scanner) and a camera; a passing motorist called 911 reporting a person "bending down by the tracks with a remote control object."
- Greenburgh Sergeant Anthony McVeigh (lone officer on arrival) handcuffed Grice within minutes, saying he did so "for my safety and your safety" while investigating a possible device; Grice said he was a rail enthusiast and produced a letter from the MTA permitting his photography.
- MTA officers arrived ~15 minutes later, searched the tracks (including with a dog), found nothing, then took custody of Grice, brought him to an MTA facility, and issued a trespass summons; the charge was later dismissed.
- Grice sued for false arrest, failure to intervene, and supervisory liability; district court denied qualified immunity to McVeigh and Lt. Farina; defendants appealed.
- The Second Circuit majority accepted Grice’s version of the facts for the interlocutory qualified‑immunity appeal and held McVeigh’s handcuffing was a constitutionally permissible Terry investigatory detention supported by reasonable suspicion (not an arrest); the majority reversed the district court.
- Dissent (Judge Parker) viewed the detention as a de facto arrest (handcuffs as hallmark of arrest), argued probable cause had dissipated once officers learned Grice posed no threat, and would have left the qualified‑immunity denial intact for jury resolution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Grice) | Defendant's Argument (McVeigh/Farina) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether handcuffing and 33–45 minute detention was an arrest or a Terry stop | Handcuffs, sitting on ground, duration and questioning made the encounter a de facto arrest requiring probable cause | Handcuffing was a reasonable, safety‑driven step during an investigatory stop based on terrorism/sabotage concerns and a 911 description | Terry stop: handcuffing was justified by reasonable suspicion and did not convert the stop into an arrest; qualified immunity granted |
| Whether McVeigh had reasonable suspicion to detain Grice | No: Grice was lawfully present, identified himself as a rail fan, offered MTA letter; report was unreliable | Yes: dispatcher reported someone bending by tracks with a remote; McVeigh had training/briefings about rail sabotage and saw electronic devices | McVeigh had reasonable suspicion to detain for investigation of possible sabotage or trespass |
| Failure to intercede for MTA custody/continued detention | McVeigh/Farina should have intervened when MTA continued detention and charged Grice without probable cause | They lacked authority over MTA officers; no clear constitutional violation by MTA conduct; duty to intervene not clearly established in these circumstances | Qualified immunity on failure‑to‑intercede claim because no clearly established duty under these facts |
| Supervisory liability for Farina | Farina supervised or participated and should be liable if subordinate violated rights | Farina is entitled to immunity unless both subordinate and supervisor violated clearly established law | Farina entitled to qualified immunity because McVeigh’s conduct was not held to violate clearly established law |
Key Cases Cited
- Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271 (2d Cir. 2002) (accepting plaintiff’s factual version for interlocutory qualified‑immunity review)
- Taravella v. Town of Wolcott, 599 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2010) (qualified immunity protects officials unless they violated clearly established rights)
- United States v. Compton, 830 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2016) (distinguishing arrests and Terry stops; reasonable suspicion standard)
- United States v. Bailey, 743 F.3d 322 (2d Cir. 2014) (handcuffing inquiry: whether person posed a present threat and handcuffing was least intrusive means)
- United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659 (2d Cir. 2004) (brief handcuffing may be justified during safety‑driven investigations)
- United States v. Vargas, 369 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2004) (intrusive measures can be reasonable where safety concerns justify them)
- United States v. Tehrani, 49 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1995) (30‑minute detention based on reasonable suspicion not per se too long)
- Sharpe v. United States, 470 U.S. 675 (U.S. 1985) (detention length judged by diligence in pursuing investigation)
- Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2002) (supervisory liability requires both supervisor and subordinate to have violated clearly established law)
- Amore v. Novarro, 624 F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 2010) (qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law)