Gregory Mahrt v. Jeffrey Beard, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3696

Background

On Sept. 3, 2012 Sonoma County deputies responded to a report of a man and woman arguing about a gun at property where Mahrt lived in a converted garage room.
Deputies performed a warrantless entry/search of Mahrt’s room described in the report as a “protective sweep,” found ammunition and an apparent AR‑15 replica, then arrested Mahrt as a felon in possession after learning of his prior conviction.
Deputies later obtained what they reported as Mahrt’s consent to a second search and recovered additional ammunition and two firearms; Mahrt contends there was only one nonconsensual search and that consent was coerced via a threat.
Mahrt’s two appointed trial counsels did not move to suppress the seized items; Mahrt pleaded guilty (open plea) and was sentenced to six years. State appellate counsel filed a Wende brief and the conviction was affirmed.
Mahrt later filed state and federal habeas petitions claiming trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress; the federal district court granted relief, and the State appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Cognizability under Tollett: Can Mahrt raise pre‑plea ineffective assistance on federal habeas after pleading guilty?	Mahrt: Tollett’s exception for ineffective assistance covers pre‑plea errors that prevent an informed plea decision, including failure to file a suppression motion.	State: Tollett bars attacks on pre‑plea constitutional errors except where counsel’s advice related specifically to the plea itself.	Court: Tollett’s exception is broad enough to permit pre‑plea ineffective assistance claims that deprived defendant of an informed plea choice.
Deficient performance (failure to move to suppress)	Mahrt: Counsel’s omission was deficient because there was conflicting evidence and a plausible suppression argument.	State: Counsel’s failure was reasonable because the search could be justified (e.g., protective sweep or emergency aid), so a motion likely would have failed.	Court: Trial counsel should have moved to suppress; there was at least a chance of success.
Prejudice (but‑for pleading) under Hill	Mahrt: Had counsel moved and evidence been suppressed, he would have insisted on trial rather than pleading guilty.	State: Even if deficient, there is not a reasonable probability Mahrt would have rejected the plea or prevailed at trial because the search could be justified under exigent‑/emergency‑aid doctrines.	Court: Despite finding deficiency, the state courts reasonably could conclude no prejudice because the emergency‑aid/exigent circumstances doctrine could justify the search.
AEDPA deference to state courts	Mahrt: State courts’ summary denials were unreasonable given the conflicting evidence and likelihood of a successful suppression motion.	State: Summary denials were reasonable because officers had an objectively reasonable basis to search for a potential victim (emergency aid).	Court: Under Richter/AEDPA, the state courts’ denials could be reasonably based on the emergency‑aid justification; reversed district court grant of habeas.

Key Cases Cited

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (guilty plea generally bars collateral attacks on antecedent constitutional errors, but allows challenges for pre‑plea ineffective assistance that vitiate voluntariness)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two‑prong standard for ineffective assistance: deficiency and prejudice)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (prejudice test for guilty plea cases: reasonable probability defendant would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel’s errors)
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (permissible scope of a warrantless protective sweep to ensure officer safety)
Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (emergency‑aid/exigent circumstances can justify warrantless entry when officers reasonably believe occupant needs immediate aid)
Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (pre‑plea ineffective assistance claims can be evaluated on the merits in habeas proceedings)
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (warrantless home searches presumptively unreasonable)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (under AEDPA, courts must consider whether any reasonable basis existed for state court denial)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (unreasonable application standard under § 2254(d)(1))