Gregory Esparza v. Ed Sheldon, 765 F.3d 615

Background

Gregory Esparza murdered Melanie Gerschultz during a 1983 Toledo robbery; he was sentenced to death in Ohio.
During penalty phase, defense sought independent expert services; Ohio law provided for indigent and capital-expert services, but the court denied some requests.
Defense presented extensive mitigation: родителей witnesses detailing a chaotic childhood and a large Family File; trial judge noted the mitigating evidence as significant.
Esparza sought post-conviction relief; state courts denied most claims, and the district court later denied relief on remaining claims.
On federal habeas review, the district court granted relief on some issues but the Sixth Circuit later affirmed in part; the Supreme Court reversed on remand and the case proceeded back to the Sixth Circuit.
Esparza argues ineffective assistance of penalty-phase counsel and prejudicial impact of evidence and procedures; the court ultimately affirms state court determinations.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel's performance prejudiced the penalty phase under Strickland.	Esparza argues prejudicial impact from overlong or poor investigation and new affidavits.	State argues preexisting evidence and included affidavits do not show substantial prejudice under Hill.	No prejudice; state courts reasonably denied relief.
Whether new affidavits show Strickland prejudice under Hill standards.	Affidavits reveal new mitigating facts not presented at sentencing.	New evidence mirrors trial record; does not differ in strength/subject matter to show prejudice.	Prejudice not shown; Hill standard satisfied only if new evidence substantially differs.
Whether reliance on a Center for psychological evaluation and its disclosure to the jury was prejudicial under AEDPA.	Center report contained damaging information and should have been handled differently to avoid prejudice.	Center report corroborated mitigation and did not prejudice given jury instruction limiting aggravation.	No undue prejudice; state courts reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent.
Whether the trial court erred by denying a presentence investigation under the same statute.	Investigation would have aided defense by providing more context for mitigation.	Family File already disclosed factors; denial was not prejudicial.	No prejudice; denial not unreasonable.
Whether denial of a continuance prejudiced Esparza at sentencing.	Additional time could have yielded further mitigation evidence.	No substantial undisclosed evidence; the record supports no prejudice from denial.	State courts reasonably rejected continuance claim.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes ineffective-assistance standard)
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (U.S. 2011) (deferential review of state-court decisions under AEDPA)
Hill v. Mitchell, 400 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2005) (new evidence must differ in strength/subject matter to show prejudice)
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (U.S. 2009) (mitigation theory with evidence of abuse and service)
Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259 (U.S. 2010) (limits on prejudice from counsel's mitigation strategy)
Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2006) (antisocial personality disorder evidence and prejudice under AEDPA)
Pinholster v. Supreme Court, 131 S. Ct. 1398 (U.S. 2011) (AEDPA limitations on new evidence in federal habeas review)
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (U.S. 1987) (instructional safeguards and jury considerations)
Holder v. Palmer, 588 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2009) (AEDPA deference and state-court reasoning)