Gregory Dickens v. Charles L. Ryan
744 F.3d 1147
9th Cir.2014Background
- Gregory Scott Dickens filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition; the Ninth Circuit issued an en banc opinion affirming in part, vacating in part, and remanding.
- Dickens died on January 27, 2014, four days after the en banc opinion was published.
- The State of Arizona moved to stay the mandate, vacate the published opinion, and dismiss the petition as moot based on Dickens’s post-decision death.
- The panel acknowledged it had jurisdiction when it issued its opinion and that death after decision does not retroactively divest jurisdiction.
- The court exercised equitable discretion to deny vacatur, emphasizing lack of prejudice to the State, the adversarial process having reached en banc review, and the value of maintaining precedent for future cases.
- A dissent argued vacatur should be granted, citing uncertainty in the court’s broad reading of Martinez v. Ryan and the lost opportunity for Supreme Court guidance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether post-decision death of petitioner requires vacatur of the court’s published en banc opinion | Dickens (through respondent opposing vacatur) argued no vacatur is required because the court had jurisdiction when it decided the case and equities favor maintaining the opinion | Arizona argued Dickens’s death moots the petition and warrants vacatur and dismissal as moot | Denied vacatur; court retained published opinion because jurisdiction existed at decision, lack of prejudice, and public value of precedent |
| Whether lack of opportunity for further review (e.g., certiorari) warrants vacatur | Dickens: en banc review was completed; discretionary certiorari denial is not a harm justifying vacatur | Arizona: post-decision death deprives Dickens of possible further review, justifying vacatur | Court found no prejudice warranting vacatur since en banc review occurred and certiorari is discretionary |
| Whether prior precedents require vacatur when mootness arises post-decision | Dickens: earlier cases are distinguishable when mootness arose before en banc proceedings | Arizona: cited prior Ninth Circuit vacaturs based on post-decision mootness | Court distinguished prior vacatur cases (mootness before en banc) and held discretion did not compel vacatur here |
| Whether equitable principles favor vacatur | Dickens: equities (lack of state prejudice, value of precedent) favor denying vacatur | Arizona: equitable relief appropriate to avoid a binding precedent decided without live controversy | Court exercised discretion and denied vacatur on equitable grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994) (vacatur requires equitable entitlement to extraordinary remedy)
- Armster v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 806 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir.) (post-decision death does not retroactively divest jurisdiction)
- United States v. Payton, 593 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2010) (vacatur for post-decision mootness is discretionary)
- Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302 (9th Cir. en banc 2014) (en banc decision at issue)
- Farmer v. McDaniel, 692 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (example of vacatur when mootness arose prior to en banc proceedings)
- Griffey v. Lindsey, 349 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2003) (another example of vacatur when mootness occurred before en banc proceedings)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (authority implicated by en banc court’s merits discussion; dissent viewed guidance as important)