Greg Hageman v. Dennis Barton, III
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5746
| 8th Cir. | 2016Background
- Hageman incurred a disputed medical debt originally assigned by St. Anthony’s Medical Center to Weiss/CACi; assignment authorized CACi to file suit in its own name and to include other creditors.
- Attorney Dennis J. Barton prosecuted collection: October 2012 collection letter, a Missouri suit (default judgment Dec. 5, 2012 for $1,645.91), then registered the Missouri judgment in Madison County, Illinois and obtained an Illinois wage-deduction/garnishment order (Dec. 4, 2013).
- Some Illinois filings bore an unexplained different caption ("SUNSHINE ENTERPRISES OF MISSOURI D/B/A SUNSHINE TITLE & CHECK LOAN"); Barton also identified St. Anthony’s as his client in letters and filings though Hageman later alleged Barton actually represented Weiss/CACi.
- Hageman sued under the FDCPA and state law on Dec. 19, 2013, alleging: (a) misrepresentations as to the true creditor/attorney-client relationship; (b) improper venue under 15 U.S.C. §1692i; (c) attempts to collect inflated interest and costs in Illinois proceedings; and (d) other abusive practices. Claims premised on pre-Missouri conduct were filed after the FDCPA’s one-year limitations period.
- The district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6): it rejected a broad Rooker-Feldman bar, held pre-Missouri claims time-barred, and dismissed the §1692i venue claim; it applied Rooker-Feldman to some challenges to the state judgment. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Hageman's Argument | Barton/Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Rooker–Feldman bar federal jurisdiction over FDCPA claims arising from state-court collection actions? | Rooker-Feldman should bar federal review because claims attack actions that produced the state judgments/orders. | The FDCPA claims are independent torts arising from misconduct in state proceedings; plaintiff does not seek to overturn state judgments. | Rooker–Feldman does not bar jurisdiction because Hageman seeks statutory relief for independent misconduct, not relief to overturn state judgments. |
| Is the FDCPA’s one-year limitations period subject to equitable tolling so as to reach pre-judgment conduct? | Ongoing collection conduct after the Missouri judgment tolled the limitations period for earlier acts. | The FDCPA limitation is jurisdictional under Mattson and thus not equitably tolled. | Mattson controls: the one-year FDCPA limitation is jurisdictional; claims based on conduct before/through the Missouri proceedings are time-barred. |
| Does 15 U.S.C. §1692i prohibit registering a foreign judgment and pursuing garnishment in an Illinois county unrelated to the consumer’s residence or work? | Registering the judgment and garnishment in Madison County violated §1692i venue limits. | Registering/enforcing a foreign judgment and garnishment under Illinois law targets the employer/trustee, not an action "against the consumer," so §1692i does not apply. | §1692i does not apply to registration of a foreign judgment or Illinois garnishment proceedings because those actions are directed at the employer/trustee, not an action "against" the consumer. |
| Do independent FDCPA claims survive challenge for alleged misrepresentation of creditor/attorney and collection of unauthorized interest/costs in the Illinois proceedings? | Barton misrepresented his client (St. Anthony’s) and sought interest/costs beyond what the Missouri judgment or law authorized, violating FDCPA §§1692e, 1692e(14), and 1692f(1). | Such claims are precluded by state-court judgments or otherwise insufficiently pleaded. | The complaint adequately pleads plausible independent FDCPA violations as to misrepresentation of client/creditor identity and collection of excessive interest/costs in Illinois; those claims survive Rule 12(b)(6). Traditional issue-preclusion defenses remain open but were not decided. |
Key Cases Cited
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (clarifies narrow scope of Rooker–Feldman; federal courts may hear independent claims that do not seek review of state judgments)
- MSK EyEs Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 546 F.3d 533 (8th Cir.) (Rooker–Feldman does not apply where plaintiff asserts independent claims arising from state-court conduct)
- Mattson v. U.S. W. Comm’ns, Inc., 967 F.2d 259 (8th Cir.) (treated FDCPA’s one-year limitations period as jurisdictional)
- Smith v. Solomon & Solomon, 714 F.3d 73 (1st Cir.) (garnishment/trustee-process actions target the trustee/employer and thus are not actions "against" the consumer for §1692i purposes)
- Peters v. Gen. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 277 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir.) (standard for "unsophisticated consumer" in evaluating whether a representation is misleading under §1692e)
- Banks v. Slay, 789 F.3d 919 (8th Cir.) (Rooker–Feldman applies only where federal plaintiff seeks review/rejection of a state-court judgment)