Greer v. Board of Trustees University of District of Columbia
113 F. Supp. 3d 297
D.D.C.2015Background
- Plaintiff Billy P. Greer, a 53‑year‑old African‑American UDC police officer since 1988, alleges race, gender, and age discrimination and retaliation based on repeated non‑promotions to lieutenant-level positions.
- Greer filed EEOC charges (including an August 14, 2012 charge that led to a right‑to‑sue letter dated July 30, 2013) and sued in federal court on November 1, 2013.
- The First Amended Complaint alleges multiple non‑promotions (some in 2010, several in 2012) and a practice of favoring non‑UDC or less‑qualified candidates; it does not expressly invoke the ADEA.
- Defendant moved to dismiss for untimeliness, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and failure to state a claim; prior counsel and procedural delay complicated the record.
- The court treated ADEA issues on the merits despite the omission in the complaint, found the 2010 claims time‑barred under Morgan, held that many 2012 claims suffer exhaustion and pleading defects, dismissed the First Amended Complaint, and granted leave to move to file a Second Amended Complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of suit after EEOC right‑to‑sue letter | Greer alleges he received the letter on Aug. 6, 2013 and filed within 90 days | Defendant points to July 30, 2013 letter date and says suit (filed Nov. 1) is untimely | Court accepts plaintiff's allegation of Aug. 6 receipt at motion‑to‑dismiss stage; timeliness not resolved against Greer on face of complaint |
| Statutory basis for age claim (ADEA omitted) | Requests leave to amend to add ADEA; argues pleading rules are flexible | Defendant argues age claims must be dismissed because complaint cites only Title VII | Court declines automatic dismissal; evaluates ADEA claims on the merits and warns Greer to include ADEA in any second amended complaint |
| Exhaustion / scope of EEOC charge (events before Oct. 2011 and discrete post‑charge acts) | Characterizes discrimination as continuing/pattern and seeks to preserve pre‑2011 and 2012 events | Defendant contends 300‑day exhaustion window bars 2010 acts and EEOC charge limits Plaintiffs to the discrete act(s) identified | Court applies Morgan: discrete acts (e.g., failures to promote) before Oct. 2011 are time‑barred; pattern‑and‑practice label insufficient to avoid Morgan; remaining exhaustion questions unresolved but problematic for some 2012 claims |
| Sufficiency of pleadings (discrimination and retaliation) | Alleges more supervisory experience and non‑consideration; claims retaliation for prior EEOC activity | Defendant says complaint lacks allegations that Greer applied for/was qualified for positions, lacks detail, and fails to show but‑for causation for retaliation | Court finds pleading deficient: fails to allege either application/qualification for most positions, insufficient factual detail to infer discrimination, and too large a temporal gap to plead causation for retaliation; dismisses complaint |
| Leave to amend | Seeks leave to file a Second Amended Complaint | Argues procedural defects in Greer’s request but court should permit amendment if not futile | Court grants Greer one more opportunity to move for leave to amend (procedurally proper motion required by deadline) |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must state a plausible claim)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for complaints)
- Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (discrete discriminatory acts are time‑barred if not timely charged)
- Sparrow v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (statement on surviving dismissal by alleging discriminatory non‑selection)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but‑for causation)
- Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (standards for granting leave to amend)