Greene v. Fisher
132 S. Ct. 38
| SCOTUS | 2011Background
- In Dec. 1993 Greene and four co-conspirators robbed a Philadelphia grocery; the owner was killed.
- Two non-testifying codefendants confessed; Greene did not confess but was implicated.
- The trial court ordered redaction of the codefendants’ confessions to remove proper names; jurors saw redacted statements.
- Greene was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy; Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, deeming Bruton limited by redaction.
- Gray v. Maryland (1998) later held redactions can still violate Bruton; Greene’s direct appeal to Pennsylvania Supreme Court was dismissed after merits briefing.
- Greene filed federal habeas under AEDPA; district court and Third Circuit applied §2254(d)(1) using the state-court decision time and pre-gray law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of clearly established law under AEDPA | Greene argues Gray should be considered clearly established law. | FBI and Fisher contend state court precedents govern as of adjudication time. | Backward-looking standard governs; use law as of state-court decision time. |
| Timeliness of Gray as clearly established law | Gray was decided before or after the state court decision? (Greene’s view). | Gray predated the relevant state-court decision; not clearly established at that time. | Gray was not clearly established law for the state-court decision at issue. |
| Proper 'adjudication' for §2254(d)(1) | The relevant decision is the state supreme court’s disposition, even if merits not addressed. | Adjudications on the merits are controlling; later discretionary decisions do not count. | The adjudication on the merits is the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision; later non-merits actions do not count. |
| Teague finality vs. AEDPA retroactivity | Teague timing should inform AEDPA analysis. | AEDPA and Teague inquiries are distinct; finality does not govern §2254(d)(1). | AEDPA’s framework is distinct from Teague; Teague does not govern here. |
| Overall relief under AEDPA | If Gray applies, habeas relief should be granted. | State court decision not clearly established at time of review; relief denied. | §2254(d)(1) bars relief because the state court decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law at the time of adjudication. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (Confrontation Clause prohibits non-testifying codefendant’s statements)
- Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998) (redacted confessions still invoke Bruton rule)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. __ (2011) (AEDPA §2254(d)(1) measures state decisions against this Court’s precedents as of the time the state court renders its decision)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 289 (1989) (new constitutional rules generally not retroactive on collateral review)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. __ (2011) (AEDPA review limited to state-court record; guard against systemic error)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of evidence under habeas review)
- Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (requires comparison to controlling precedents; time-of-decision framing)
- Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163 (1996) (GVR as potential relief mechanism under changing law)