Green v. Oklahoma Board of Bar Examiners, 381 P.3d 754

Background

Applicant Major James M. Green is a U.S. Marine JAG officer admitted in Florida (2007) and Virginia (2014); he has practiced military law continuously since 2007 and sought admission to the Oklahoma Bar without examination under Rule 2.
Board of Bar Examiners denied his application because he had not practiced in a "reciprocal state" for five of the seven years before application; the Board construed Rule 2 to require practice in a reciprocal state (not a federal or military jurisdiction).
The Board conceded Green satisfied the five-of-seven-years practice requirement but concluded military service does not qualify as practice in a reciprocal state; Green requested and received a hearing, which resulted in denial.
The Supreme Court majority held that Rule 2’s language contemplates "reciprocal jurisdictions" (including federal and military practice) and that Green’s military practice qualifies; the Court admitted him to the Oklahoma Bar immediately.
The majority noted inconsistencies in Rule 2 terminology (state vs. jurisdiction), invoked practical and fairness considerations (including treatment of military spouses), and relied on 10 U.S.C. § 827(b) as demonstrating reciprocity for military service.
A dissent argued the majority disregarded the plain language of Rule 2, existing precedent, and the Board’s proper application of the rule; the dissent warned the decision effectively rewrites Rule 2 to grant broad reciprocity to all JAG officers.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether military practice qualifies as practice in a "reciprocal state/jurisdiction" under Rule 2	Green: Rule 2 refers to "reciprocal jurisdictions"; military practice is explicitly listed in the Rule's definition of "practice of law" and military admission standards give reciprocal rights	Board: "reciprocal state" means a state; military/federal authority depends on prior state bar admission and is not a primary licensing jurisdiction	Held for Green: Rule 2 should be read to permit reciprocal "jurisdictions" including military service; Green meets Rule 2 and is admitted without exam
Whether Rule 2’s inconsistent use of "state" vs "jurisdiction" requires strict textual application	Green: Inconsistent terms produce absurd results (e.g., permitting a military spouse licensed in a territory but denying active military lawyer) and the Rule’s examples include non‑state jurisdictions	Board: Plain language requires a state; Court should enforce Rule as written and longstanding Rule Two jurisprudence	Held for Green: Court interprets Rule to mean "reciprocal jurisdiction," avoiding absurd results and aligning examples with purpose of Rule 2
Whether Board’s denial procedures satisfied due process (vote recording/transparency)	Green: Board did not include votes in written decision; procedural irregularity noted	Board: Denial occurred after deliberation; no claim board acted outside its authority	Court criticized lack of recorded vote and recommended best practice that the Board record/disclose individual member votes in written decisions (not outcome-altering here)

Key Cases Cited

Arbuckle Simpson Aquifer Protection Fed’n v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 343 P.3d 1266 (Okla. 2013) (administrative boards acting adjudicatively are bound by minimum due process standards)
R.J. Edwards, Inc. v. Hert, 504 P.2d 407 (Okla. 1972) (definition and scope of the "practice of law")
Keating v. Edmondson, 37 P.3d 882 (Okla. 2001) (rules of statutory construction and when plain language controls)
In re Application of Bodnar, 367 P.3d 916 (Okla. 2016) (Supreme Court control over attorney licensing and application of admission rules)
Archer v. Ogden, 600 P.2d 1223 (Okla. 1979) (constitutional allocation of judicial and adjudicative authority)