63 F.4th 521
6th Cir.2023Background
- Detroit code barred medical-marijuana facilities located within 1,000 radial feet of a "zoning lot" containing sensitive uses (e.g., schools); BSEED screened applications for compliance with locational specs before discretionary review.
- Green Genie applied in 2018 to operate a distribution facility at 16711 Mack Ave.; BSEED denied the application at screening, concluding the site lay within a drug-free zone measured to a tax parcel holding St. Clare of Montefalco.
- Other applicants had mixed outcomes: Detroit Roots was initially approved (a later tax-parcel merger would have put it within 1,000 feet), and Mack Wellness was approved because officials mistakenly overlooked a school-owned parcel; City never revoked those permits.
- Green Genie exhausted state and local challenges (City courts upheld the City’s tax-lot measurement approach) and then sued in federal court alleging procedural and substantive due process and equal protection violations.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the City; on appeal the Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding Green Genie had no property interest in the procedural review and failed to raise a genuine issue of intentional discrimination for its class-of-one equal-protection claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Green Genie had a protected property interest in mandatory transfer to the Medical Marihuana Facility Review Committee | City code’s use of "shall" created an entitlement to committee review | Permit approval is discretionary; procedures alone are not a protected property interest | No property interest; due-process claims fail |
| Whether the City’s actions amounted to a substantive due-process violation (arbitrary/irrational government action) | City arbitrarily applied locational rules and treated Green Genie unfairly | No deprivation of a protected property interest; alleged sloppiness does not rise to substantive-due-process violation | Dismissed for lack of cognizable property interest; no arbitrary-action rule violation established |
| Whether Green Genie can prevail on an equal-protection class-of-one claim (intentional disparate treatment) | City intentionally treated Green Genie differently by applying a different measurement method and favoring Detroit Roots and Mack Wellness | City applied the same tax-lot measurement to applicants; favorable outcomes for others resulted from parcel-mergers or administrative mistakes, not intentional discrimination | No genuine dispute that Green Genie was intentionally singled out; class-of-one claim fails |
| Whether comparators (Detroit Roots, Mack Wellness, and others) were similarly situated such that disparate treatment is shown | Detroit Roots and Mack Wellness were similarly situated and received preferential treatment that permits inference of discriminatory intent | Relevant dissimilarities (timing, parcel status, administrative errors) explain differential outcomes; City applied same test to multiple applicants | Comparators do not establish a "stark outlier" pattern or discriminatory intent; summary judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (distinguishes government "benefits" from protected property interests)
- Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (property interest requires legitimate claim of entitlement)
- Janosek v. City of Cleveland, 718 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2013) (no property right in government procedures)
- Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2002) (due-process property-interest requirement)
- Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (class-of-one equal-protection framework)
- TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 430 F.3d 783 (6th Cir. 2005) (equal-protection class-of-one standards)
- SECSYS, LLC v. Vigil, 666 F.3d 678 (10th Cir. 2012) ("stark outlier" inference for intentional discrimination)
- Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2012) (relevant-similarity inquiry for comparators)
- Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (discriminatory purpose requires more than awareness of adverse effects)