Green
475 Mass. 624
| Mass. | 2016Background
- James Green, previously convicted of multiple sex offenses and confined at the Massachusetts Treatment Center, filed a § 9 petition for discharge after being found sexually dangerous in 2011.
- The Commonwealth requested a jury trial to determine whether Green remained a sexually dangerous person (SDP); the CAB and multiple experts (qualified examiners) testified for both sides.
- At trial, one Commonwealth-qualified examiner (Dr. Connolly) testified Green remained sexually dangerous; three of Green’s experts, including another qualified examiner (Dr. Gans), testified he was not.
- Before trial the judge informed the parties he would instruct the jury that they could not find a petitioner sexually dangerous unless they credited the opinion of a qualified examiner who so opined; the Commonwealth objected and later sought reinstruction during deliberations.
- The jury returned a verdict that Green was not sexually dangerous; the Commonwealth moved for a new trial arguing the qualified-examiner instruction improperly directed the jury on witness weight and prevented full consideration of CAB testimony.
- The trial judge denied the new-trial motion; the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct review to clarify the scope of Johnstone regarding the role of qualified examiners.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Green's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a jury may find sexual dangerousness without crediting a qualified examiner's opinion | The instruction improperly told jurors to credit a specific expert and invaded the jury's province to weigh testimony | Qualified examiner testimony has a central, statutory role; a verdict must be at least partly grounded on it | A finding of sexual dangerousness must be based, at least in part, on credible qualified examiner opinion; the instruction was proper |
| Whether Johnstone only creates a pretrial gatekeeping role for qualified examiners | Johnstone only prevents trial unless a qualified examiner endorses dangerousness; after that, other evidence (e.g., CAB) may suffice at trial | Johnstone gives qualified examiners a central, ongoing role in proving dangerousness beyond merely opening a trial | Johnstone’s gatekeeping is not limited to pretrial; qualified examiners have a central role at trial too |
| Whether instructing jurors they must credit a named qualified examiner violates jury fact-finding | The instruction suggests how much weight jurors should give an expert and is therefore erroneous | The instruction does not assign weight; it tells jurors they must find the qualified examiner credible to convict, preserving jurors’ role | The instruction did not usurp the jury’s role; it required jurors to find the qualified examiner’s opinion credible but left credibility assessment to the jury |
| Whether CAB testimony can, standing alone, support a finding of sexual dangerousness | CAB testimony and reports are admissible and may be persuasive evidence | Reliance on CAB alone would subvert the statutory scheme and the special role of qualified examiners | CAB evidence cannot alone justify a finding; the verdict must be at least partly grounded in qualified examiner opinion |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnstone v. Johnstone, 453 Mass. 544 (clarified gatekeeper and central role of qualified examiners in § 123A proceedings)
- Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (due process standards for civil commitment for sexually dangerous persons)
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (upholding civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons)
- Dutil v. Commissioner of Correction, 437 Mass. 9 (addressing commitment standards under Massachusetts law)
- Souza v. Souza, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 162 (Appeals Court decision questioning a similar qualified-examiner instruction)
- Commonwealth v. Cowen, 452 Mass. 757 (jury determines weight/credibility of witnesses)
- Commonwealth v. Blake, 454 Mass. 267 (factfinder may disregard expert opinion viewed as baseless)