Great Divide Insurance Company v. Alcus Reshod Fortenberry
05-19-01541-CV
| Tex. App. | Jul 26, 2021Background
- Fortenberry, an NFL player under contract with the Dallas Cowboys, injured his knee while practicing in Oxnard, California on August 2, 2015; Cowboys provided temporary hotel accommodations for players without a permanent Dallas residence.
- DWC administrative process: an ALJ denied Fortenberry’s workers’ compensation claim; the DWC appeals panel adopted the denial; Fortenberry sought judicial review in Dallas County.
- Fortenberry filed an affidavit asserting he resided at a Residence Inn in Irving (Dallas County) at the time of injury and pointed to an NFL contract addendum designating Dallas County as venue.
- Great Divide (foreign insurer) moved to transfer venue to Travis County, asserting Fortenberry’s Mississippi residence and that Great Divide’s statutorily designated Austin law firm acts as its DWC agent; it also showed Fortenberry’s W-2 listing a Mississippi address.
- Trial court denied transfer; after a jury verdict finding a compensable disability, the trial court awarded temporary income benefits to Fortenberry; Great Divide appealed the venue ruling.
- Court of Appeals held neither party made the required prima facie showing of proper venue (no proof Fortenberry resided in Dallas County at the injury time; no proof Great Divide had a principal office in Travis), reversed the judgment, and remanded for further venue proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Fortenberry) | Defendant's Argument (Great Divide) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether venue was proper in Dallas County under Tex. Lab. Code §410.252(b)(1) (employee residence at time of injury) | He resided at Residence Inn in Irving at injury time; NFL contract clause designates Dallas County venue | Residence Inn was temporary hotel lodging; records show Mississippi address and injury occurred in CA | Not prima facie proven; hotel stay was transient and affidavit was conclusory — Dallas not proper venue |
| Whether Dallas County was permissive venue as defendant’s principal office | NFL contract and a claims letter with Irving address indicate Great Divide’s presence | Letter shows only an agent/representative, not company decision-makers | Insufficient to show Great Divide’s principal office in Dallas |
| Whether Travis County was proper because Great Divide designated an Austin law firm as DWC representative | N/A (Fortenberry disputed) | The Austin law firm is Great Divide’s statutorily designated DWC representative; notices filed from Austin | Evidence only shows an agent for DWC notices, not principal decision-makers — no probative evidence Travis is principal office |
| Remedy if neither county has probative evidence of proper venue | Trial court’s judgment should stand | Remand or transfer as appropriate | Reverse and remand to trial court to conduct further venue proof proceedings (per Tex. R. Civ. P. 87(3)(d)) |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 998 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1999) (plaintiff must make prima facie venue showing; principal office requires decision-makers conducting daily affairs in county)
- In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1999) (burden shifts to plaintiff to provide prima facie proof of venue when challenged)
- Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1993) (on appeal court considers entire record to determine venue and directs remand/transfer if probative evidence exists)
- Ford Motor Co. v. Johnson, 473 S.W.3d 925 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (principal office inquiry requires proof that county employees are decision-makers with substantial authority)
- Snyder v. Pitts, 241 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1951) (elements for residency: fixed abode in possession, consistent occupation over substantial time, intent of permanence)
- Warehouse Partners v. Gardner, 910 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, writ denied) (hotel/motel stays are temporary and not a residence for venue purposes)
- Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 372 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. 2012) (law-of-the-case doctrine binds venue determinations in subsequent proceedings)
