Gray v. D & G, INC.
2010 Ind. App. LEXIS 2251
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2010Background
- Gray visited the Sandstone Bar & Grill, drank heavily, and remained there until closing at about 1:00 a.m.
- Gray was accompanied by his girlfriend, Vanessa Jave, the bartender on duty that night.
- Near closing, Gray decided to drive his motorcycle with Diaz present, against Jave’s initial plan.
- Gray rode the motorcycle, hit a curb at an intersection, and sustained injuries with no other party harmed.
- Gray filed a Dram Shop Act claim against Sandstone on January 17, 2008; Sandstone moved for summary judgment, asserting lack of actual knowledge, lack of proximate causation, and Gray’s voluntary intoxication.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in Sandstone’s favor, but acknowledged genuine issues of material fact remained regarding Sandstone’s knowledge and proximate causation; the court nevertheless addressed voluntary intoxication as a bar to recovery, leading to appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether voluntary intoxication bars Gray’s Dram Shop claim | Gray may recover if Sandstone knew he was visibly intoxicated and his intoxication proximately caused the injury | Voluntary intoxication precludes recovery under the Dram Shop Act | No; reversed and remanded to consider knowledge and proximate causation under the Act |
| Whether Sandstone had actual knowledge of Gray’s visible intoxication | Issues of fact exist regarding Sandstone’s knowledge | Summary judgment appropriate if no knowledge shown | Remanded for trial on knowledge issue |
| Whether Gray’s intoxication was the proximate cause of his injuries | Intoxication contributed to the accident | Sandstone not liable absent knowledge and proximate causation | Remanded for trial on proximate causation |
| Whether statutory interpretation of Indiana Dram Shop Act favors recovery for a voluntarily intoxicated adult | Act allows recovery if (b)(1) knowledge and (b)(2) proximate cause exist | Public policy should limit recovery for intoxicated individuals | Statute unambiguous; Gray may recover if knowledge and proximate causation are shown |
| What standard of review applies to the grant of summary judgment when statutory interpretation is at issue | De novo review for statutory interpretation; deference to trial court on factual disputes |
Key Cases Cited
- Florian v. GATX Rail Corp., 930 N.E.2d 1190 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (de novo review applies to questions of law in summary judgment")
- Dugan v. Mittal Steel USA Inc., 929 N.E.2d 184 (Ind. 2010) (de novo standard for legal questions in summary judgment")
- Cotton v. Ellsworth, 788 N.E.2d 867 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (statutory interpretation framework; plain meaning governs)
- Nieto v. Kezy, 846 N.E.2d 327 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (interpretation when legislature spoke clearly)
- Hannis v. Deuth, 816 N.E.2d 872 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (presumption of logical application of language in statutes)
- National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Everton, 655 N.E.2d 360 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (public policy considerations not controlling where statute speaks)
- Booker Inc. v. Morrill, 639 N.E.2d 358 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (public policy arguments rejected against comparative fault)
- Bailey v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 881 N.E.2d 996 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (public policy concerns addressed under common-law negligent entrustment, not Dram Shop Act)