383 P.3d 740
Mont.2016Background
- Granite County (successor to Montana Water, Electric & Mining Co.) stores Flint Creek water in Georgetown Lake reservoir and operates a hydroelectric facility; County claims 1,200 miner’s inches (≈30 CFS) from Flint Creek, some rights traced to the 1906 Schuh Decree.
- Esther McDonald (successor to a Schuh defendant) diverts Flint Creek below Georgetown Lake and claims senior natural-flow rights; she objected to three County water-right claims in Water Court.
- McDonald sought an "information remark" requiring the County to release not less than 1200 miner’s inches (30 CFS) into Flint Creek "at all times during the irrigation season."
- County argued the Schuh Decree protects downstream users only to the extent of natural inflow; it is not required to release stored water when natural flow drops below 30 CFS.
- The Water Court construed the Schuh Decree to limit downstream users to the natural flow and granted summary judgment to Granite County; McDonald appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (McDonald) | Defendant's Argument (Granite County) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Interpretation of the Schuh Decree: Does it require continuous release of 1200 miner’s inches during irrigation season? | Schuh Decree mandates constant 1200 miner’s inches release during irrigation season regardless of natural inflow. | Decree protects downstream users only to the extent of natural inflow; County need not release stored water when natural flow < 1200 miner’s inches. | Court held Schuh protects natural flow only; County not required to release stored water to maintain 30 CFS when natural inflow is below that amount. |
| Ambiguity and use of original pleadings/record in construing decree | Decree ambiguous; original pleadings show intent to quantify mandatory flow release. | Decree must be read in light of prior-appropriation law; its language constrains downstream users to natural flow. | Court found the Water Court’s construction consistent with law and Schuh’s context; no reversible error. |
| Preclusion (res judicata / collateral estoppel): Can County be estopped from reinterpreting Schuh? | Prior proceedings and statements by County preclude it from taking a contrary position now. | Interpreting a decree is not relitigation; prior proceedings involved different parties and legal positions on law. | Court held res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar County from arguing interpretation of the Schuh Decree. |
| Judicial estoppel / abuse of process: Do prior County positions prevent current argument? | County’s past positions (e.g., in FERC) judicially estop County here. | Prior positions were about legal interpretation, not facts; no intent to perpetrate fraud. | Court held judicial estoppel inapplicable because positions involved law (not facts) and no evidence of fraud; County’s current position allowed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Harland v. Anderson Ranch Co., 92 P.3d 1160 (Mont. 2004) (standard for reviewing interpretation of a prior decree)
- Beaverhead Canal Co. v. Dillon Electric Light & Power, 85 P. 880 (Mont. 1906) (appropriator rights tied to natural stream conditions at time of appropriation)
- Kelly v. Granite Bi-Metallic, 108 P. 785 (Mont. 1910) (stored water not available to satisfy downstream rights)
- Donich v. Johnson, 250 P. 963 (Mont. 1926) (downstream users entitled to natural flow to extent of their appropriations)
- Federal Land Bank v. Morris, 116 P.2d 1007 (Mont. 1941) (water released from artificial impoundments is not part of natural flow)
- Watkins Trust v. Lacosta, 92 P.3d 620 (Mont. 2004) (principles and purpose of judicial estoppel)
- Gwyn v. City of Philipsburg, 478 P.2d 855 (Mont. 1970) (city’s dam required to release natural flow up to amount needed for downstream rights)
- Gans & Klein v. Sanford, 8 P.2d 808 (Mont. 1932) (interpretation of decrees: adopt interpretation that harmonizes with facts and law)