Grand Canyon Trust v. Heather Provencio, 26 F.4th 815

Canyon Mine is a breccia-pipe uranium mine in the Kaibab National Forest operated by Energy Fuels; initial Forest Service approval and surface development occurred in the 1980s, operations were suspended in 1992, and the site was later acquired by Energy Fuels.
The Department of the Interior issued a 2012 withdrawal of ~1 million acres (including Canyon Mine) from new uranium claims but preserved "valid existing rights."
Energy Fuels sought to resume mining; the Forest Service conducted a 2012 Valid Existing Rights (VER) determination concluding (a) a discovery of a "valuable mineral deposit" existed as of the 2009 segregated withdrawal and (b) the deposit could be mined profitably as of the 2012 mineral exam.
The Forest Service mineral examiners treated pre-1992 development expenditures as sunk costs and excluded them from the discounted cash-flow profitability analysis, which still showed a substantial net present profit.
The Havasupai Tribe and Grand Canyon Trust challenged the VER Determination under the APA, arguing the agency erred by excluding sunk costs (and other costs); the district court granted summary judgment to defendants, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Article III standing to challenge VER Determination	Trust: VER was required for resumption; injury is traceable and redressable by setting aside VER	Forest Service: VER was not required for operations, so no traceability/redress	Law of the case: Trust has standing; prior Ninth Circuit ruling controls
Whether sunk costs must be considered in determining a "valuable mineral deposit"	Trust: sunk (already-incurred) costs should be included in profitability analysis	Forest Service/DOI: sunk costs are excluded per long-standing DOI/IBLA practice; Forest Service acted reasonably to follow that rule	Court: DOI's exclusion of sunk costs is a permissible interpretation under Chevron and not arbitrary or capricious; Forest Service properly relied on it
Proper standard of review for Forest Service reliance on DOI precedent	Trust: DOI's interpretation is a pure legal question warranting de novo review	Forest Service: review is whether its reliance on DOI was arbitrary and capricious	Arbitrary-and-capricious standard applies when one agency relies on another; DOI's interpretation is reviewable under Chevron framework
Harmlessness of any omitted costs (e.g., monitoring, mitigation)	Trust: omission of other costs could change profitability finding	Forest Service: plaintiffs offered insufficient evidence that omitted costs would alter result	District court found any omission harmless; appellate court affirmed (no reversible error shown)

Grand Canyon Trust v. Provencio, 467 F. Supp. 3d 797 (D. Ariz. 2020) (district court decision granting summary judgment to defendants)
Havasupai Tribe v. Provencio, 906 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2018) (prior Ninth Circuit ruling on VER reviewability and standing)
National Mining Ass'n v. Zinke, 877 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2017) (upholding Grand Canyon withdrawal)
United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968) (approving the Secretary's marketability/prudent-person test for "valuable mineral deposits")
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to reasonable agency statutory interpretations)
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211 (2016) (agencies must provide adequate reasons for rule changes/interpretations)
Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36 (1983) (citing the prudent-person standard)
Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313 (1905) (early articulation of the discovery requirement for mining claims)