Graham v. Pekin Fire Dept., 2022 IL App (4th) 220270

Background

Three consolidated appeals by current or former public employees challenging employer COVID-19 workplace directives that required either vaccination or regular testing as a condition of continued employment.
Employees sought temporary restraining orders (TROs) in Sangamon County against public employers (including municipal and state agencies), the Illinois Department of Public Health, and Governor Pritzker; the circuit court denied the TROs.
Plaintiffs asserted the directives violated the Right of Conscience Act (Conscience Act) (745 ILCS 70/5) by discriminating against conscience-based refusals, and that only the Department of Public Health (under the Health Act) had authority to impose vaccination/testing/quarantine requirements.
The trial court relied in part on a subsequently enacted statutory amendment (Public Act 102-667, effective June 1, 2022) stating that measures to prevent COVID-19 transmission are not violations of the Conscience Act; the majority treated that amendment as an interpretive aid to resolve ambiguity.
Applying the TRO factors and a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, the appellate majority affirmed the denial of TROs, concluding plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits under the Conscience Act or the Health Act; Justice Steigmann dissented, arguing the Conscience Act is unambiguous and the subsequent amendment could not be used to interpret prior law.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Conscience Act: Does conditioning employment on vaccination/testing violate 745 ILCS 70/5?	The policy discriminates against employees who conscientiously refuse vaccination/testing; such penalties are barred by the Act.	The Act does not bar uniform, merit‑based workplace safety rules; recently enacted amendment declares COVID‑prevention measures not violations.	Court: Plaintiffs failed to show likelihood of success; ambiguity in “discriminate” permits resort to legislative amendment as interpretive aid; employers may impose uniform safety rules.
Health Act: Does only IDPH have authority to require vaccination/testing or quarantine?	Such public‑health mandates must come from the Health Department under the Health Act.	Employers retain workplace‑safety authority and may impose vaccination/testing as reasonably necessary to effectuate their duties.	Court: Policy is a workplace safety rule, not a statutory quarantine; Health Act authority over quarantine does not preclude employers from imposing employment conditions.
TRO standard / standard of review	Plaintiffs urged preservation of employment status pending merits.	Defendants relied on circuit court discretion and TRO legal standards.	Court: Applied TRO factors; under highly deferential abuse‑of‑discretion review, denial was not arbitrary or unreasonable.
Use of subsequent legislation (Public Act 102‑667) as interpretive aid	Plaintiffs: Amendment effective later; legislature cannot retroactively change an unambiguous statute’s meaning.	Defendants/court: If original statute is ambiguous, subsequent legislative declaration is entitled to interpretive weight.	Court: Found ambiguity in Conscience Act’s use of “discriminate” and permissibly consulted the later act as extrinsic aid; reliance supported denying TROs.

Key Cases Cited

Jacob v. C & M Video, Inc., 248 Ill. App. 3d 654 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (factors plaintiff must show for preliminary injunctive relief/TRO)
C.D. Peters Constr. Co. v. Tri‑City Reg’l Port Dist., 281 Ill. App. 3d 41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (abuse‑of‑discretion review of injunctive relief)
In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347 (Ill. 2004) (describing highly deferential standard for reviewing discretionary trial court rulings)
Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432 (Ill. 2015) (defining abuse of discretion standard)
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277 (U.S. 2011) (use of ordinary/dictionary meaning for undefined statutory terms)
Taylor v. State Univ. Ret. Sys., 203 Ill. App. 3d 513 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (agencies may take actions reasonably necessary to effectuate statutory powers)
Owens v. Green, 400 Ill. 380 (Ill. 1948) (express grant includes powers reasonably necessary to execute it)
Cassell v. Snyders, 458 F. Supp. 3d 981 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (definition/understanding of "quarantine")
In re MCP No. 165, 20 F.4th 264 (6th Cir. 2021) (discussion expressing concern about requiring permanent medical procedures in workplace mandates)
Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C., 225 Ill. 2d 52 (Ill. 2006) (incorrect legal analysis can remove the usual deference to trial court discretionary rulings)
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (U.S. 1927) (dissent invoked as historical caution about courts deferring to prevailing expert consensus)
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (U.S. 1944) (dissent invoked as historical caution about accepting emergency‑era expert/official judgments without stringent rights scrutiny)