Graham v. Olson Wood Associates, Inc.
150 A.3d 1123
Conn.2016Background
- Decedent John Graham filed multiple asbestos-related workers’ compensation claims; after his 2008 death his widow Carmel Graham joined a dependent-benefits claim and the matter was placed on the commission’s asbestos docket.
- Reliance Insurance (F.D. Rich’s carrier) became insolvent; statutorily its liability transferred to the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association (the association).
- At a January 26, 2011 formal hearing, several employers and the association moved to dismiss for lack of exposure; the commissioner issued a revised finding in June 2011 granting those dismissals with no objection from the plaintiff.
- Later developments (including The Hartford’s motion to dismiss as to a brief 1977 exposure period) led the plaintiff, The Hartford, and F.D. Rich to move to reinstate the association as a defendant; the commissioner granted reinstatement in February 2014.
- The association appealed, arguing the earlier dismissal was a final decision (no timely appeal was taken) and thus barred reinstatement by res judicata and §§ 31-300/31-301(a); it also argued § 31-315 did not permit reopening. The board and Supreme Court affirmed reinstatement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a commissioner may reinstate a party dismissed before final determination of compensability/date of last exposure | Dismissal was interlocutory/provisional; commissioners have broad case-management power under § 31-298 to "cull the herd" and later restore parties when apportionment under § 31-299b depends on date-of-last-exposure | Dismissal was a final award once the 20-day appeal period lapsed (§§ 31-300, 31-301[a]); reinstatement improperly circumvents finality and res judicata | Court held dismissal may be provisional; commissioner may reinstate such parties prior to final adjudication of compensability and apportionment |
| Whether the dismissed order had res judicata effect absent appeal within 20 days | No—because compensability and last exposure were undetermined and no on-record stipulation of no liability existed; dismissals in asbestos docket often lack finality | Yes—the lapse of the statutory appeal period made the dismissal final and binding | Court held no res judicata: the dismissal was not final for preclusion purposes given the docket’s nature and § 31-298 discretion |
| Whether § 31-298 permits provisional dismissals and flexible docket management | Commissioner’s broad equitable and procedural authority allows provisional dismissals and later reinstatement; due process preserved by notice and opportunity to be heard | § 31-298 cannot override statutory finality or appeal rules; parties rely on final orders for planning and reliance interests | Court held § 31-298 grants broad authority to manage multiparty asbestos cases, including provisional dismissals, subject to due process protections |
| Whether § 31-315 (motions to open/modify awards) was required/implicated to reinstate a dismissed party | Reinstatement was properly grounded in case-management discretion and interlocutory nature of dismissal; board need not reach § 31-315 | Association argued reopening must meet § 31-315 standards (changed conditions of fact) | Court affirmed board’s result without resolving § 31-315 claim because dismissal was nonfinal/provisional; thus § 31-315 unnecessary to decide reinstatement |
Key Cases Cited
- Franklin v. Superior Casting, 302 Conn. 219 (discusses § 31-299b apportionment and association liability)
- Green v. General Dynamics Corp., 245 Conn. 66 (characterizes occupational disease claims and remedial purposes of the Act)
- Pietraroia v. Northeast Utilities, 254 Conn. 60 (commissioner’s authority under § 31-298 to dismiss claims when appropriate)
- Marone v. Waterbury, 244 Conn. 1 (distinguishes finality for appeal from finality for res judicata)
- Hunnihan v. Mattatuck Mfg. Co., 243 Conn. 438 (limits on association liability and relation to apportionment)
- Ferraro v. Ridgefield European Motors, 313 Conn. 735 (three-step § 31-299b apportionment process and timing)
- Levarge v. General Dynamics Corp., 282 Conn. 386 (apportionment under § 31-299b requires independent analysis)
- Marandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 294 Conn. 564 (permissive modification/opening of awards consistent with remedial purpose where no prejudice)
- Stickney v. Sunlight Construction, 248 Conn. 754 (§ 31-298 governs procedure and does not itself create independent jurisdiction)