Gould v. Morgan
907 F.3d 659
1st Cir.2018Background
- Massachusetts law (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131) requires a license to carry a firearm in public and permits licensing authorities to issue unrestricted licenses only to applicants who show "good reason" to fear injury or for other specified reasons; authorities may issue restricted licenses for specific activities.
- Boston and Brookline implement the statute by denying unrestricted licenses to applicants who offer only a generalized desire for self-defense; they issue restricted licenses (e.g., employment, sport, hunting, transport) or unrestricted permits in some cases.
- Plaintiffs (individuals and Comm2A) obtained restricted licenses and sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing the "good reason" requirement as applied by Boston and Brookline violates the Second Amendment by denying the right to carry in public for self‑defense.
- The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, applying intermediate scrutiny and finding the regime substantially related to important interests in public safety and crime prevention.
- The First Circuit affirmed: it assumed (for argument) the policies burden the Second Amendment right to carry in public, held that the core Second Amendment right is defense of the home, applied intermediate scrutiny to non‑core public‑carry regulations, and found the Massachusetts regime permissible under that test.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the Second Amendment protect carrying a firearm in public for self‑defense? | Yes; public carry for self‑defense is protected and is central to the Amendment. | Even if some public carry is protected, the core Second Amendment right is defense of the home; public carry is peripheral and regulable. | The court assumed public carry may be covered but held the core right is use of arms in defense of hearth and home; public carry lies outside that core. |
| If public carry is protected, what level of scrutiny applies to restrictions? | Strict scrutiny should apply because the right is enumerated and fundamental. | Intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for regulations that burden the right outside the core. | Intermediate scrutiny governs regulations burdening non‑core Second Amendment interests. |
| Does Massachusetts' "good reason" licensing regime (as applied by Boston and Brookline) survive constitutional review? | The regime is an unconstitutional barrier to public carry for self‑defense and fails any level of scrutiny. | The statute substantially relates to important governmental interests (public safety, crime prevention); the licensing regime and restricted permits are reasonable and not a ban. | The regime passes intermediate scrutiny: there is a substantial relationship between the "good reason" requirement and the government's public‑safety and crime‑prevention interests. |
| Are Boston and Brookline policies effectively a ban on public carry? | Plaintiffs argued policies operate like a ban by routinely denying unrestricted permits. | Defendants pointed to availability of unrestricted and restricted licenses, administrative and judicial review, and empirical support for safety benefits. | The court found the policies do not effect a total ban and are materially less restrictive than regimes struck down in other circuits. |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (Sup. Ct.) (recognizes individual right to possess firearms for home defense; right not unlimited)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (Sup. Ct.) (incorporates Second Amendment against the states)
- Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61 (1st Cir.) (identifies core Second Amendment interest as possession of firearms for home defense)
- Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.) (upholds "good cause" restrictions under intermediate scrutiny)
- Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir.) (upholds "good reason" licensing under intermediate scrutiny)
- Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir.) (upholds similar handgun‑carrying restrictions as substantially related to public safety)
- Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir.) (applies means‑end scrutiny to non‑core Second Amendment regulations)