Gorman v. Bail, 947 F. Supp. 2d 509

Background

Plaintiff Robert Gorman, a Chester police officer, filed a Second Amended Complaint asserting §1983 and state-law claims arising from an alleged conspiracy to arrest him and terminate him from the Chester Police Department.
Defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, and plaintiff responded; the court granted in part and denied in part the motion.
The Crown Chicken Incident (October 11, 2008) at Crown Chicken led to Fowler’s private criminal complaint and multiple investigations by Worrilow; ultimately no charges were filed.
In January 2009, a meeting involving the Mayor, Chief of Police, Major Bail, Major Alston, and City Solicitors discussed continuing to investigate and prosecute plaintiff; Bail was assigned to pursue a warrant.
Between August 2009 and November 2010, Worrilow conducted a re-investigation, Bail obtained an arrest warrant, and plaintiff was arrested on November 11, 2010; he was suspended without pay and then terminated after hearings controlled by city officials.
Plaintiff was reinstated after arbitration and ultimately acquitted on the criminal charges; the court addresses the sufficiency of the alleged misconduct and the availability of remedies in light of improper procedures and constitutional rights.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Bail had probable cause to arrest Gorman	Gorman argues Bail knowingly misstated or omitted material facts.	Bail’s affidavit contained sufficient facts to establish probable cause.	Probable cause existed; self-defense defenses do not negate probable cause.
Whether self-defense can negate probable cause	Self-defense negates the existence of probable cause.	Self-defense is not a legally required consideration for probable cause.	Self-defense cannot negate probable cause under the circumstances.
Whether plaintiff stated a First Amendment retaliation claim	Defendants retaliated against plaintiff for truthful courtroom testimony.	There is no adequate basis to tie retaliation to the specific testimony.	Claim fails due to lack of plausible causal link and awareness by defendants.
Whether plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights were violated	Plaintiff was suspended without pre-suspension hearing and denied post-suspension pre-termination process.	Existing procedures or post-deprivation remedies suffice or attendance disputes exist.	Counts survive as to due process; pre-suspension hearing may be unnecessary absent extraordinary circumstances.
Whether Chester can be held liable under Monell for the alleged constitutional violations	Chester policymakers caused the alleged due process violations.	Municipal liability requires a final policy or custom.	Chester may be liable; mayor and chief of police are capable municipal decisionmakers.

Key Cases Cited

Holman v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 225 (3d Cir.2009) (affirmative defenses need not be resolved at the probable-cause stage; not all defenses negate probable cause)
Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir.1989) (defense considerations may negate probable cause under reasonable-officer standard)
Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781 (3d Cir.2000) (materiality of information and omissions in an affidavit for probable cause)
Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128 (2d Cir.2003) (self-defense can negate probable cause in some circumstances)
Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir.2008) (truthful in-court testimony as protected speech; need for causal link)
Schmidt v. Creedon, 639 F.3d 587 (3d Cir.2011) (procedural due process in police suspension cases; pre-deprivation hearing principles)
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (probable-cause standard and affidavits; reckless disregard)
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (arrest validity independent of actual crime guilt)
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (standard for pleading plausibility in civil actions)
Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standards; no bare conclusions)