Gorgi Talevski v. Health and Hospital Corporatio, 6 F.4th 713

Gorgi Talevski, a nursing-home resident with dementia at Valparaiso Care (a Medicaid-certified facility), allegedly suffered rapid decline after being given multiple psychotropic drugs and was involuntarily transferred and not timely readmitted.
His wife, Ivanka Talevski, sued Valparaiso Care, HHC, and ASC under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA): unlawful chemical restraints (42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii)) and improper transfers/discharges (42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(2)(A)).
The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, holding FNHRA does not create privately enforceable rights under § 1983.
The Seventh Circuit applied Blessing/Gonzaga’s three-factor test and held that the two FNHRA provisions at issue unambiguously create individual rights for residents.
The court rejected defendants’ argument that FNHRA’s administrative enforcement regime impliedly precludes § 1983 suits, pointing to statutory language preserving other federal remedies.
The court declined to resolve the statute-of-limitations/tolling issue on the pleadings and remanded for factual development regarding tolling for legal disability and accrual dates.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §§ 1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii) & (c)(2)(A) create private rights enforceable via § 1983	Talevski: statute’s “rights of each resident” language unambiguously confers individual rights	Valparaiso: provisions are directives to facilities/states and not individual-rights creating	Held: Yes — language and structure show unambiguous, individual rights under Blessing/Gonzaga
Whether FNHRA’s enforcement scheme impliedly forecloses § 1983 remedies	Talevski: administrative remedies are supplementary; statute preserves other federal remedies	Valparaiso: statutory survey, penalties, and appeal processes constitute a comprehensive scheme that displaces § 1983	Held: No — scheme is not so comprehensive or exclusive; § 1396r(h)(8) preserves other remedies including federal law
Whether Talevski’s claims are time-barred	Talevski: tolling for legal disability (dementia) may extend limitations	Valparaiso: claims accrued when medication list/transfer occurred and are outside Indiana’s two-year period	Held: Undecided on appeal — limitations/tolling require development of the record; remanded to district court

Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (establishes three-factor test for § 1983 rights under statutes)
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (requires unambiguous rights-creating statutory language for § 1983)
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (recognition that private rights may be implied from statute)
Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg’l Centers–Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520 (3d Cir. 2009) (FNHRA provisions can create private rights)
Anderson v. Ghaly, 930 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2019) (interpreting FNHRA rights-creating language as permitting § 1983 suits)
Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320 (2015) (caution on inferring private remedies from Medicaid provisions; requires rights-creating language)
Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara County, 563 U.S. 110 (2011) (refusal to imply private enforcement where statute lacks intent to create a remedy)
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011) (spending-clause statutes do not automatically waive state sovereign immunity)
Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (example of a statute whose comprehensive enforcement scheme precluded § 1983)
City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005) (express private means of redress in statute suggests Congress did not intend § 1983 remedy)