Gordon v. Town of Rye
162 N.H. 144
| N.H. | 2011Background
- Petitioners own six oceanfront properties at Harbor Road end in Rye; disputed 350‑foot Harbor Road segment runs to a gate at the McLaughlin property.
- South of the gate, Harbor Road is admitted to be private; the segment at issue is the access to petitioners’ properties.
- Town historically plowed the disputed section after 1997 based on a Board decision; gate later hindered plowing operations.
- Town notified property owners in 2007 that maintenance could be unlawful absent compensation and that status of Harbor Road would be determined.
- A 2008 hearing determined the disputed section was a private right‑of‑way; petitioners sought certiorari, mandamus, and declaratory relief.
- Trial court ruled board had subject matter jurisdiction under RSA 43:1 and reviewed whether the road became public by prescription; issue of prescription remained for later decision.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the board had subject matter jurisdiction to decide prescription status | Gordon argues board lacks jurisdiction under RSA chapter 43 to determine prescription status. | Rye argues board has broad authority under RSA 41:11 to regulate roads and determine maintenance responsibilities. | Board lacked jurisdiction to determine prescription status. |
| Whether the 1997 plowing decision bars reconsideration of public/private status | Gordon asserts 1997 decision precludes revisiting status of Harbor Road. | Rye contends 1997 action concerned plowing, not establishing road status. | 1997 decision not entitled to preclusive effect. |
| Whether the disputed Harbor Road segment became public by prescription | Gordon contends long public use created a public road by prescription. | Rye maintains no evidence of prescription establishing a town road. | Prescriptive status determination void for lack of jurisdiction; remand for de novo decision. |
| Interpretation of RSA chapter 43 authority regarding road status determinations | Gordon contends RSA 43 governs only layout challenges, not prescription status. | Rye relies on RSA 41:8 and 41:11 to claim broad town board authority without effect on prescription. | RSA Chapter 43 does not authorize board to determine prescription status; remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gray v. Seidel, 143 N.H. 327 (1999) (statutory limits; selectmen cannot resolve property rights beyond their authority)
- In the Matter of Gray & Gray, 160 N.H. 62 (2010) (clarifies subject matter jurisdiction and declaratory relief standards)
- Kerouac v. Town of Hollis, 139 N.H. 554 (1995) (RSA 43:1 governs hearings on rights/claims; scope of jurisdiction)
- Radkay v. Confalone, 133 N.H. 294 (1990) (declaratory actions available to resolve property rights disputes)
- 74 Cox St. v. City of Nashua, 156 N.H. 228 (2007) (preclusion considerations and certiorari standards in municipal actions)
- Hemenway v. Hemenway, 159 N.H. 680 (2010) (subject matter jurisdiction may be raised on appeal)