Gordon v. Johnson
300 F.R.D. 31
D. Mass.2014Background
- Plaintiffs are a class of noncitizens detained in Massachusetts under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) after being released from criminal custody, but who were not taken into immigration custody promptly (more than 48 hours, or up to 5 days if a weekend/holiday intervened).
- Named plaintiffs include individuals detained years after criminal-custody release despite living law-abiding lives; they sought habeas relief and class certification challenging application of § 1226(c).
- The court previously granted individual habeas relief to several named plaintiffs, then certified the class of all aliens in Massachusetts detained under § 1226(c) but not taken into DHS custody within the 48-hour/5-day window.
- The central legal question is the meaning of the statutory phrase “when [the alien] is released” in § 1226(c): whether it requires prompt/delayed detention to trigger mandatory no-bail detention.
- The court applied Chevron deference principles, analyzed statutory text, structure, and purpose, and rejected BIA's Matter of Rojas interpretation that § 1226(c) applies regardless of delay.
- The court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, declared § 1226(c) applies only to aliens detained by DHS within 48 hours (or up to 5 days if a weekend/holiday) of release, ordered that others be treated under § 1226(a) (entitling them to bond hearings), and entered a permanent injunction and reporting requirements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of “when ... released” in § 1226(c) | Means prompt/immediate detention; delayed post-release detention falls outside § 1226(c) | Means at any time after release; no temporal limit on § 1226(c) | Court: “when ... released” contains an immediacy requirement; § 1226(c) limited to detention within 48 hours (or up to 5 days) of release |
| Chevron deference to BIA's Matter of Rojas | Statute is unambiguous; no deference; even if ambiguous, BIA interpretation is unreasonable | BIA interpretation entitled to deference | Court: no deference; statutory text, structure, and purpose foreclose BIA reading; BIA's view unreasonable and capricious |
| Availability of class-wide injunctive relief given 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) | §1252(f)(1) does not bar injunctions that require the government to comply with the statute; plaintiffs seek to enjoin unlawful application, not operation, of statute | §1252(f)(1) bars class-wide relief that restrains operation of immigration removal provisions | Court: §1252(f)(1) not implicated because injunction compels lawful application of §1226(a) rather than restraining statute's operation; class-wide equitable relief permitted |
| Appropriate remedy and scope | Class-wide permanent injunction ordering prompt bond hearings under §1226(a); automatic scheduling and reporting; cover current and future class members | Limit remedy to current class members; avoid imposing special procedures beyond existing §1226(a) regulations | Court: Permanent injunction directing Defendants to treat current and future class members under §1226(a) (bond hearings per existing regs), require identification list and compliance report; declined to create superior procedures beyond §1226(a) |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for administrative deference)
- Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) (permissibility of examining merits at class-certification stage)
- Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003) (interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) terminology)
- Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing injunctions that forbid statute’s operation from those barring unauthorized conduct)
- Robbins v. Carey (Rodriguez v. Robbins), 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013) (class injunctive relief for prolonged immigration detention illustrates irreparable harm and implementation burdens)