Goodwin Ex Rel. Nall v. City of Painesville
781 F.3d 314
| 6th Cir. | 2015Background
- Nalls hosted a gathering; police responded to a noise complaint at their apartment building in the early morning hours of July 26, 2010.
- Officers Soto and Hughes returned, confronted Mr. Nall, and tasered him for a total of 26 seconds; he went into cardiac arrest and sustained anoxic brain injury.
- Ms. Nall was arrested for disorderly conduct; both Nalls’ charges were later dismissed for lack of exigent circumstances.
- Officers sought summary judgment on qualified immunity for federal claims and immunity under Ohio law for state claims; district court denied on all contested claims.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed, addressing four asserted constitutional violations and related state-law issues.
- The court viewed facts in the Nalls’ favor for purposes of the qualified-immunity analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excessive force against Nall | Nall suffered prolonged tasering after he ceased resisting. | Prolonged tasering was reasonable given perceived threat and resistance. | Qualified immunity not granted; possible Fourth Amendment violation presented to jury. |
| Failure to protect during tasering | Hughes and Collins failed to intervene to stop excessive force. | No duty to intervene if no obvious risk or opportunity to act. | Qualified immunity denied for Hughes and Collins; jury could find failure to protect. |
| Warrantless entry into the Nalls' home (Rohrig/ exigent circumstances) | Entry was unlawful absent exigent circumstances. | Rohrig exception or exigent-threat theory could justify entry. | Rohrig not satisfied; genuine factual dispute on exigent-circumstances; entry not clearly justified as of summary judgment. |
| Ms. Nall's disorderly-conduct arrest | Probable cause lacked for arrest; language/actions were protective response to unlawful entry. | Probable cause existed based on Ohio 2917.11(A)(2) and perceived nuisance. | Probable-cause determination issue for summary judgment; cannot conclude Ms. Nall's conduct was sufficiently reckless. |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective reasonableness standard for excessive force)
- St. John v. Hickey, 411 F.3d 762 (6th Cir. 2005) (two-tiered qualified-immunity framework)
- Landis v. Baker, 297 F. App’x 453 (6th Cir. 2008) (gratuitous taser use violates clearly established rights)
- Shreve v. Jessamine Cnty. Fiscal Court, 453 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2006) (prolonged force after minimal resistance violates rights)
- Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 1994) (mace deployment and excessive-force principles; failure-to-protect context)
- Cockrell v. City of Cincinnati, 468 F. App’x 491 (6th Cir. 2012) (distinguishes concealed/flight scenarios from home-entry context)
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (home-entry warrants principles; warrantless entry presumptively unreasonable)
- Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506 (6th Cir. 1996) (nuisance/contextualized exigent-entry exceptions; narrowly tailored)
- United States v. Williams, 354 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2003) (recognized exigent circumstances framework)
- DeFillippo v. DeKalb, 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (probable cause standard for arrest)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) (flexible probable-cause inquiry)
