587 F.Supp.3d 939
D. Ariz.2022Background:
- Fabio Evelio Gomez was convicted (2001) of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault; after Ring, he underwent jury resentencings and was again sentenced to death; state courts affirmed.
- Gomez filed a federal habeas intent; the Court appointed counsel and set a filing deadline; respondents moved to (1) bar defense contact with trial/resentencing jurors absent court leave showing good cause, and (2) require defense to route any victim-contact requests through respondents’ counsel.
- Gomez opposed both motions, arguing the restrictions impede investigation (including possible racial bias), lack clear statutory backing, and that ethical rules suffice to protect jurors and victims.
- The Court evaluated Rule 606(b) (no-impeachment rule), Supreme Court precedents on post-verdict inquiries, and the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA) and Arizona victim-protection statute in deciding the motions.
- The Court granted both motions: juror contact is barred absent leave showing extraneous prejudicial information, outside influence, or racial animus; victim contact must be channeled through respondents’ counsel (or victim’s attorney) unless the victim consents or the Court grants leave.
- The Court emphasized concerns about finality, juror harassment, potential tampering, the passage of time since trial, and its duty under 18 U.S.C. § 3771 to protect victims’ dignity and privacy.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gomez) | Defendant's Argument (Respondents) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defense may contact trial/resentencing jurors without court leave | Bar unduly restricts investigation into juror misconduct, racial bias, or tampering; ethical rules suffice | Rule 606(b) and precedent support restricting juror contact absent good cause to protect finality and jurors | Granted: no juror contact absent court leave showing extraneous prejudicial information, outside influence, or racial animus |
| Whether defense must route victim-contact requests through respondents’ counsel | CVRA does not expressly bar direct defense-initiated contact; respondents lack standing to enforce; prior restraint concerns | Routing requests furthers CVRA victim rights to dignity/privacy and avoids harassment; court has duty to ensure victims’ rights | Granted: defense must channel victim-contact requests through respondents’ counsel or victims’ attorney; contact only if victim consents or court permits upon motion |
Key Cases Cited
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (held aggravating factors in capital cases must be found by a jury)
- Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987) (expressing substantial concerns about intrusive post-verdict juror inquiry and protecting finality)
- Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (recognized exception to no-impeachment rule for juror statements showing racial animus)
- Mitchell v. United States, 958 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2020) (discussed limits on post-verdict juror interviews and protecting jurors)
- Bryson v. United States, 238 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1956) (condemned interviewing jurors about deliberations)
- Hard v. Burlington N. R.R., 812 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1987) (cited discouragement of post-verdict juror interviews)