Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc.
16 A.3d 261
| Md. Ct. Spec. App. | 2011Background
- Gomez alleged that Hewitt facilitated a Refund Anticipation Loan (RAL) tied to her 2006 tax return and that fees paid included Hewitt's tax preparation fee ($284) via the RAL.
- Gomez claimed Hewitt failed to obtain required licenses and bonds and failed to provide disclosures mandated by CSBA §§ 14-1904 to 14-1906.
- Circuit Court dismissed Gomez's CSBA claim as inapplicable, finding Gomez not a consumer and Hewitt not providing credit services.
- Gomez contends the CSBA applies to loan arrangers and that she is a consumer who indirectly paid Hewitt for credit services via the RAL.
- Issues revolve around whether CSBA covers tax preparers who facilitate RALs and whether Gomez qualifies as a consumer under CSBA definitions.
- Maryland enacted 2010 Md. Laws, ch. 730 to regulate tax preparers involved with RALs, signaling legislative stance relevant to CSBA interpretation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| CSBA applicability to Hewitt | Gomez argues Hewitt is a credit services business under CSBA §14-1901(e)(1). | Hewitt contends plain language excludes such tax preparers; no direct consumer payment to Hewitt and no 'credit services' by Hewitt. | CSBA does not apply to Hewitt as a credit services business. |
| Definition of consumer | Gomez asserts she is a consumer under CSBA §14-1901(c) since she solicited/purchased services in a credit-related arrangement. | Hewitt argues Gomez did not pay Hewitt for credit services and thus is not a consumer. | Gomez is not a consumer under CSBA as framed; payment/relationship to Hewitt does not fit the statute. |
| Legislative history and purpose | CSBA targets credit repair and loan- arranger activities; history supports application to RAL facilitators. | History shows CSBA targeted credit repair, not tax preparers; amendments targeted third-party lenders, not tax preparers. | Legislative history does not support extending CSBA to Hewitt in this context. |
| Effect of 2010 amendments | 2010 amendments show broad aim to regulate facilitators of refunds and credit, aligning with Gomez's theory. | Amendments clarify fees and disclosures but do not render CSBA applicable to tax preparers like Hewitt. | 2010 amendments do not render CSBA applicable to Hewitt here. |
| Administrative advisory notices deference | Advisories by the Commissioner support applying CSBA to RAL facilitators; deference urged under Marriott. | Advisories lack formal rulemaking and conflict with unambiguous statutory language; low deference due. | Circuit court’s failure to defer to the Commissioner’s interpretation was not erroneous. |
Key Cases Cited
- RRC Northeast, LLC v. BAA Md., Inc., 413 Md. 638 (2010) (standard for reviewing dismissal motions; de novo review of CSBA interpretation)
- Herlson v. RTS Residential Block 5, LLC, 191 Md.App. 719 (2010) (CSBA interpretation de novo)
- Midstate Siding and Window Co., Inc. v. Rogers, 204 Ill.2d 314 (2003) (Illinois CSOAct interpretation; payment for credit services required)
- Harper v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., W.Va. , 706 S.E.2d 63 (2010) (broadly holds tax preparers may meet CSOA; legislative context discussed)
- Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Administration, 346 Md. 437 (1997) (agency interpretations deserve deference when consistent and reasoned)
- Downes v. Downes, 388 Md. 561 (2005) (statutory construction; context and legislative history can supplement plain meaning)
- Kramer v. Liberty Prop. Trust, 408 Md. 1 (2009) (statutory interpretation; legislative history considerations)
- Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137 (1993) (contextual approach to statutory interpretation)