Golden v. Puccinelli
2016 IL App (1st) 150921
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- 1993: Plaintiff John Golden obtained a $162,746 judgment against Sean Puccinelli. Wage deductions were later entered against Puccinelli’s employer (1999) and wages have been continuously deducted since.
- 2005: Golden filed and the circuit court entered an order reviving the judgment. No further revivals were sought after 2005 and the judgment was not satisfied.
- 2014: Puccinelli moved to terminate the wage-deduction proceedings and declare the 1993 judgment lapsed, arguing revival deadlines had passed (7-year enforcement rule and 20-year revival limit).
- Golden relied on an August 2013 amendment adding 735 ILCS 5/2-1602(h) (effective Jan. 1, 2014), arguing it permits court-supervised wage-enforcement to continue to conclusion without a revival even if more than 20 years have passed.
- The circuit court denied Puccinelli’s motion; this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does §2-1602(h) permit wage-deduction enforcement to continue until the judgment is satisfied even after the 20-year revival period expired? | Golden: §2-1602(h) allows enforcement to continue to conclusion without revival when enforcement is court-supervised and against an employer/third party. | Puccinelli: §2-1602(h) does not defeat the 20-year revival limit; the amendment cannot extend revival beyond statutory limits. | Held: §2-1602(h) does not override the 20-year revival limit; it merely waives the need to renew revival every 7 years while a qualifying wage-enforcement proceeding is pending. |
| If §2-1602(h) were read to permit enforcement past the 20-year limit, would it apply retroactively or raise equal protection concerns? | Golden: (implicit) application would validate continued deductions. | Puccinelli: statute cannot be applied retroactively; applying it differently to wage-enforcement debtors may raise equal protection issues. | Held: Court deemed the retroactivity/equal protection issues moot because §2-1602(h) does not authorize enforcement beyond the 20-year limit; therefore it did not address the equal protection claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Brunsmann, 77 Ill. App. 2d 219 (1966) (pre-2013 rule that revival cannot toll the 20-year limit)
- Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414 (2002) (statutory construction principles; read statute as a whole)
- People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499 (2002) (avoid rendering statutory terms superfluous)
- People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311 (2010) (reviewing court may correct clear and obvious trial-court error)
- Doe A v. Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill. 2d 393 (2009) (prospectivity as default rule)