Golden v. Puccinelli
64 N.E.3d 1122
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff John Golden obtained a $162,746 judgment against defendant Sean Puccinelli on April 2, 1993, and secured a wage-deduction order against Puccinelli’s employer (entered Aug. 24, 1999).
- Golden revived the judgment once on Aug. 25, 2005; wages have been deducted periodically and the judgment remains unsatisfied.
- Puccinelli moved (Nov. 10, 2014) to terminate wage-deduction proceedings and declare the 1993 judgment lapsed, arguing the 20-year revival period had expired.
- Golden relied on an August 2013 amendment to 735 ILCS 5/2-1602 (subsection (h), eff. Jan. 1, 2014) to argue that ongoing, court-supervised wage-enforcement may continue to conclusion without revival, even if the 20-year revival window has passed.
- The trial court denied Puccinelli’s motion; the appellate court reversed, holding §2-1602(h) does not extend the 20-year revival limit and thus the judgment had lapsed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Golden) | Defendant's Argument (Puccinelli) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does §2-1602(h) allow pending, court-supervised wage-enforcement to continue past the 20-year revival limit? | (1) §2-1602(h) permits enforcement to continue to satisfaction even if 20 years elapsed. | (1) §2-1602(h) cannot revive or extend enforcement past the statutory 20-year revival period. | Held: §2-1602(h) does not override the 20-year revival limit; it merely avoids repeated 7-year recertifications during a pending wage enforcement proceeding. |
| If §2-1602(h) did allow enforcement beyond 20 years, could it be applied retroactively to judgments that lapsed before the statute took effect? | (2) §2-1602(h) applies to ongoing enforcement and thus to this case. | (2) The amendment cannot be applied retroactively to revive a judgment whose 20-year period already expired. | Moot after primary statutory construction; appellate court did not reach retroactivity in substance because it construed (h) as not extending the 20-year rule. |
| Does application of §2-1602(h) (as the trial court construed it) raise equal protection concerns by treating wage-deduction debtors differently? | (3) Not addressed as necessary if (h) permits continuing enforcement. | (3) Would be unconstitutional disparate treatment. | Not reached: claim depends on an interpretation of (h) the court rejected. |
| What relief should follow if (h) does not extend the 20-year limit? | — | (4) Termination of wage-deduction proceedings and declaration judgment lapsed. | Held: Reverse trial court; judgment lapsed; remand for orders terminating wage deductions (majority remanded; concurrence would directly enter termination). |
Key Cases Cited
- Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Brunsmann, 77 Ill. App. 2d 219 (1966) (20-year revival window is not tolled by a judgment of revivor once the period has expired)
- People v. Amigon, 239 Ill. 2d 71 (2010) (apply plain meaning when construing statutes)
- Land v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414 (2002) (statutory sections construed in pari materia to produce harmonious effect)
- John Doe A v. Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill. 2d 393 (2009) (prospectivity is the default rule for statutes)