Godwin v. Facebook, Inc.
160 N.E.3d 372
Ohio Ct. App.2020Background
- On Easter weekend 2017 Steve Stephens posted a threatening message to his Facebook account and minutes later murdered Robert Godwin, Sr.; Stephens later died by suicide.
- Godwin (executor) sued Stephens’s estate (nominal defendant) and Facebook entities, alleging Facebook knew or could have known of Stephens’s violent propensity via data‑mining and failed to warn or report him.
- Claims against Facebook included common‑law negligence (failure to warn/control), statutory negligence under R.C. 2921.22 (failure to report a terroristic threat), civil recovery under R.C. 2307.60 (damages from criminal act), wrongful death, and survivorship.
- The trial court dismissed all claims against Facebook under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and quashed a subpoena to Facebook; Godwin appealed the dismissal and sought review of the quash order.
- The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction to review the quash order but affirmed the dismissal on the merits: no pleaded special relationship/duty to control and the post did not plead the elements of a “making terroristic threat.”
- A concurring opinion urged reconsideration of social media duties but agreed the law did not support liability on the facts pleaded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Facebook owed a duty to control or warn to prevent Stephens’s violence (negligence) | Facebook’s business relationship and data‑mining gave it special knowledge and control over users, creating a duty to act | No special "taken‑charge" relationship with Stephens; foreseeability/ability to control alone do not create duty | No duty as a matter of law; negligence claims dismissed |
| Whether Facebook violated duty to report a "making terroristic threat" under R.C. 2921.22 (civil recovery under R.C. 2307.60) | Stephens’s post constituted a terroristic threat and Facebook’s failure to report caused Godwin’s injuries | Post did not plead elements (intent to intimidate a civilian population; reasonable fear of imminent specified offense) | Post did not allege necessary elements; statutory claim dismissed |
| Appealability of trial court’s order quashing subpoena to Facebook | Quash order harms discovery and should be reviewable now | Quash order is interlocutory; not a final appealable order | Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review quash order |
| Whether discovery could cure pleading defects about Facebook’s relationship/knowledge | Plaintiff should be allowed discovery to prove Facebook took charge or had relevant knowledge | Discovery cannot supply operative facts absent from the complaint; pleading must state claim | Discovery cannot remedy failure to plead a special relationship; dismissal stands |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Belle Tire Distribs. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 154 Ohio St.3d 488 (Ohio 2018) (reciting Civ.R. 12(B)(6) sufficiency standard)
- Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190 (Ohio 1988) (12(B)(6) dismissal principles)
- Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 77 Ohio St.3d 284 (Ohio 1997) (adopts Restatement analysis for "special relation" duty)
- Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 39 Ohio St.3d 86 (Ohio 1988) ("takes charge" special‑relationship principle)
- Simpson v. Big Bear Stores Co., 73 Ohio St.3d 130 (Ohio 1995) (limits business‑owner duty to premises/invitees)
- Gelbman v. Second Natl. Bank of Warren, 9 Ohio St.3d 77 (Ohio 1984) (adoption of Restatement §315 on duty to control third persons)
- Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 17 Cal.3d 425 (Cal. 1976) (psychotherapist duty to protect foreseeable victims)
- Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc., 934 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2019) (failure‑to‑warn claim against social‑media platform dismissed for lack of special relationship)
- Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (invoking a "special relationship" label does not, by itself, create tort liability)