THE STATE EX REL. BELLE TIRE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 2016-1839
Supreme Court of Ohio
June 5, 2018
Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-2122
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 16AP-92, 2016-Ohio-7869. Submitted December 5, 2017.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Belle Tire Distribs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-2122.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-2122
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Belle Tire Distribs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-2122.]
Workers’ compensation—Commission‘s decision to reconsider denial of claim for benefits was an exercise of its continuing jurisdiction—Whether an error occurred that was sufficient to invoke commission‘s continuing jurisdiction is a proper subject matter for an action seeking a writ of mandamus.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Belle Tire Distributors, Inc., filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals challenging appellee Industrial Commission‘s determination that it had continuing jurisdiction to reconsider a previous order denying a claim for death benefits because of a clear mistake of fact regarding how the decedent worker died.
{¶ 2} The court of appeals granted a motion to dismiss filed by appellee Judy Melroy on the basis that Belle Tire had a plain and adequate remedy at law—the right to appeal to a court of common pleas pursuant to
{¶ 3} For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and we remand the matter for that court to address the merits of Belle Tire‘s mandamus claim.
{¶ 4} Herbert Melroy was employed by Belle Tire on November 19, 2014, the day he died. His surviving spouse, Judy Melroy, filed a claim for death benefits with the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. The bureau determined that the decedent‘s death was not work related and denied the claim.
{¶ 5} Melroy appealed the bureau‘s denial to the Industrial Commission. A district hearing officer vacated the order and allowed the claim.
{¶ 6} Belle Tire then appealed. A staff hearing officer vacated the district hearing officer‘s order, finding that Melroy had failed to prove that the decedent‘s death occurred in the course of and arose out of his employment. The staff hearing officer denied the claim, and the commission refused to hear Melroy‘s appeal.
{¶ 7} Melroy then asked the commission to reconsider its order. Pursuant to
{¶ 8} The commission concluded that it had continuing jurisdiction to reconsider the staff hearing officer‘s order because the order had been based on a clear mistake of fact. On reconsideration, the commission allowed the claim for death benefits on its merits.
{¶ 9} Belle Tire filed this mandamus action alleging that the commission abused its discretion when it concluded that the staff hearing officer‘s order contained a clear mistake of fact that justified exercising continuing jurisdiction. Belle Tire alleged that the commission had a clear legal duty to deny the request for reconsideration and to affirm the staff hearing officer‘s order denying the claim.
{¶ 10} Belle Tire also appealed the order granting death benefits to the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, pursuant to
{¶ 11} Melroy filed a motion to dismiss in the court of appeals pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B). Relying on State ex rel. Alhamarshah v. Indus. Comm., 142 Ohio St.3d 524, 2015-Ohio-1357, 33 N.E.3d 43, and State ex rel. Johnson v. Ohio State Univ. Cancer Research Hosp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-430, 2015-Ohio-3249, Melroy argued that Belle Tire had an adequate remedy at law in the form of its
{¶ 12} The court of appeals agreed with Melroy‘s argument and dismissed the action, concluding that the commission‘s decision to exercise its continuing jurisdiction was appealable to the court of common pleas pursuant to
{¶ 13} Belle Tire‘s appeal of the judgment granting Melroy‘s motion to dismiss is now before this court.
Melroy‘s Motion to Dismiss this Appeal
{¶ 14} As an initial matter, we address Melroy‘s motion to dismiss Belle Tire‘s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Melroy maintains that Belle Tire has an adequate remedy at law that it exercised when it filed an appeal in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas in 2016.
{¶ 15} This court has jurisdiction over this appeal of right from the court of appeals’ judgment pursuant to
Merits of the Appeal
{¶ 16} We review the court of appeals‘s decision granting Melroy‘s motion to dismiss the complaint filed below. That court concluded that Melroy had an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal pursuant to
{¶ 17} “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint.” State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548, 605 N.E.2d 378 (1992). A court may grant a motion to dismiss only when the complaint, when construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and presuming all the factual allegations in the complaint are true, demonstrates that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988).
{¶ 18} In its complaint for a writ of mandamus, Belle Tire challenged the final order of the commission, which adjudicated two issues: whether the commission could exercise its continuing jurisdiction pursuant to
{¶ 19} The question whether a party must file an appeal in common pleas court or file for a writ of mandamus is an often litigated one. It is often difficult to distinguish between appealable right-to-participate orders and other orders that are nonappealable. State ex rel. Liposchak v. Indus. Comm., 90 Ohio St.3d 276, 278-279, 737 N.E.2d 519 (2000). The issue is before this court once again—does Belle Tire‘s complaint state a claim for mandamus relief or does Belle Tire have an adequate remedy at law in the form of an appeal pursuant to
{¶ 20} Belle Tire argues that
{¶ 21} Belle Tire maintains that it should have the opportunity to challenge the commission‘s exercise of continuing jurisdiction because, in the event that the commission abused its discretion in doing so, the previous order denying the claim would remain in effect—placing the responsibility for filing an appeal on the claimant without the benefit of receiving ongoing compensation payments from the employer throughout the process. Belle Tire asks this court to overrule Alhamarshah, the decision on which the court of appeals relied, emphasizing that Alhamarshah did not explain why an
{¶ 22} In response, Melroy argues that an
{¶ 23} To understand the issue in this case, it is important to consider the differences between an
{¶ 24}
{¶ 25} In contrast, a mandamus action is appropriate when there is a legal basis to compel the commission to perform its clear legal duty to do so under the law, including when the commission has abused its discretion in carrying out its duties. State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 117 Ohio St.3d 480, 2008-Ohio-1593, 884 N.E.2d 1075, ¶ 9. A court issues a writ of mandamus when a relator demonstrates that it has a clear legal right to the relief requested, the commission has a clear legal duty to provide such relief, and there is a lack of an adequate remedy in
{¶ 26} Thus, the focus of each of these two proceedings differ. An
{¶ 27} Here, Belle Tire‘s complaint for a writ of mandamus alleged that the commission abused its discretion when it determined that the staff hearing officer had based the disallowance of the claim for death benefits on a clear mistake of fact. This question does not involve the right to participate but instead involves whether there was a factual mistake sufficient to invoke the continuing-jurisdiction provisions of
{¶ 28} Although Melroy and the commission argue that the
{¶ 29} The court of appeals relied on this court‘s opinion in Alhamarshah as authority to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction. In Alhamarshah, an employee sought a writ of mandamus after the commission decided that an employer‘s notice of appeal had substantially complied with statutory requirements; the commission subsequently denied the employee‘s workers’ compensation claim. This court held that the employee had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law by way of appeal. Alhamarshah, 142 Ohio St.3d 524, 2015-Ohio-1357, 33 N.E.3d 43, at ¶ 13.
{¶ 30} This court cited Alhamarshah in Carroll. In Carroll, the commission exercised its continuing jurisdiction based on an alleged mistake of fact and vacated the employee‘s workers’ compensation claim. Again, this court found that the employee had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law by way of an appeal. Carroll, 149 Ohio St.3d 326, 2016-Ohio-8117, 75 N.E.3d 140, at ¶ 4.
{¶ 31} In those cases, we did not focus on the differences between a mandamus claim and an
{¶ 32} Belle Tire alleged in its complaint that it was challenging the commission‘s decision to reconsider a previous order. Belle Tire should have the opportunity to challenge the commission‘s decision to exercise continuing jurisdiction. Consequently, we conclude that the complaint does state a claim for relief. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and we remand the case for that court to address the merits of Belle Tire‘s mandamus claim.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and O‘DONNELL, FRENCH, and FISCHER, JJ., concur.
DEWINE, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY, J.
DEGENARO, J., not participating.
DEWINE, J., dissenting.
{¶ 33} I dissent because this is not a case in which a writ of mandamus is appropriate. The Industrial Commission issued a decision that spoke directly to whether Judy Melroy could participate in the workers’ compensation fund. Under our precedent, Belle Tire Distributors, Inc., could challenge that decision by way of an appeal under
An adequate remedy
{¶ 34} The question whether a relator has an adequate remedy at law “goes to the heart of the extraordinary nature of the writ of mandamus.” State ex rel. Kerns v. Simmers, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-256, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 5. Mandamus is to be used not as an alternative to other remedies but only “on occasions where the law had established no specific remedy.” Shelby v. Hoffman, 7 Ohio St. 450, 455 (1857). Thus, “[w]here an appeal is available from an order of the commission, an action in mandamus may not be maintained.” State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 42 Ohio St.2d 278, 280, 328 N.E.2d 387 (1975).
{¶ 35} Here, we have an Industrial Commission order that was issued on a motion for reconsideration of the commission‘s decision denying Melroy the right to receive death benefits. In the order, the commission determined (1) that it had continuing jurisdiction to reconsider the disallowance of benefits because the decision was based on a clear mistake of fact and (2) that Melroy was entitled to benefits. The majority splits the order into two parts—the decision to exercise continuing jurisdiction and the award of benefits—and determines that the first part is reviewable in mandamus because it is not appealable under
{¶ 36} In concluding that the commission‘s decision to exercise its continuing jurisdiction is not subject to appeal under
{¶ 37} Start with the statute.
{¶ 38} Here, the commission exercised its continuing jurisdiction because it determined that there was a clear mistake of fact as to the staff hearing officer‘s finding that Melroy‘s husband had died “while in the process of beginning” to change a semi-truck tire. The court of appeals concluded that the commission‘s decision to exercise its continuing jurisdiction was “essential to the ultimate determination that granted [Melroy] the right to participate in the workers’ compensation system.” 2016-Ohio-7869, ¶ 31. Thus, the court held that Belle Tire had an adequate remedy at law—appeal under
{¶ 39} In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals relied in part on our decision in State ex rel. Alhamarshah v. Indus. Comm., 142 Ohio St.3d 524, 2015-Ohio-1357, 33 N.E.3d 43. There, the commission determined that it had jurisdiction over an employer‘s appeal because the employer had substantially complied with statutory requirements for filing an administrative appeal with the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation. Id. at ¶ 6. When the commission disallowed the claim on appeal, the employee petitioned for a writ of mandamus, challenging the commission‘s exercise of jurisdiction. We concluded that mandamus relief was properly denied because
{¶ 40} Just over a year later, we followed the reasoning of Alhamarshah in State ex rel. Carroll v. Galion Assisted Living, Ltd., 149 Ohio St.3d 326, 2016-Ohio-8117, 75 N.E.3d 140. In Carroll, an employee‘s claim had been initially allowed for a meniscus tear of her knee. Months later, however, a surgeon was able to find no evidence of a tear. Based on the new evidence, the commission exercised its continuing jurisdiction and disallowed the claim. We affirmed the court of appeals’ denial of a writ of mandamus because the employee had an adequate remedy by way of appeal under
{¶ 41} Faced with our two recent decisions, the majority chooses to cast them aside and concludes that the commission‘s decision here is not subject to an appeal under
{¶ 42} In Saunders, an employee sought compensation for a back sprain suffered in the course of his employment. The district hearing officer‘s order, however, listed the injury only as “back.” Saunders at 85. When the employer sought clarification of the allowed condition, a second hearing officer ordered that the condition described as “back” be deleted and that the prior allowance be clarified to “lumbosacral strain with degenerative joint disease of the lumbar spine.” Id. at 85-86. The employee petitioned for a writ of mandamus, asserting that the commission did not have jurisdiction to delete “back” from the allowance. Id. at 86. The court of appeals allowed the writ. This court affirmed, concluding that the jurisdiction of the commission did not extend to the correction attempted by the commission. Id.
{¶ 43} We also addressed whether a writ of mandamus was appropriate:
Appellants also challenge appellee‘s resort to mandamus, contending that the commission‘s * * * order could have been appealed under
R.C. 4123.519 . Appellants, however, misdefine the issue before us. The relevant question here is not one of appellee‘s right to participate in the State Insurance Fund for a “back” injury but is instead whether a mistake sufficient to invoke the continuing jurisdiction provisions ofR.C. 4123.52 existed. We find this latter question to be the proper subject matter for a writ of mandamus.
Id.
{¶ 44} It‘s difficult to see how these lines from Saunders compel the result put forth by the majority. Rather than contradicting our later decisions in Alhamarshah and Carroll, Saunders presages their reasoning. In Saunders, the commission‘s decision to exercise its continuing jurisdiction did not touch upon whether the employee had a right to participate. Thus, appeal was not available under former
{¶ 45} Contrary to the majority‘s assertion, Saunders does not stand for a different proposition than that followed in Alhamarshah and Carroll. Appeal under
{¶ 46} Having concluded that Belle Tire has a remedy available under
{¶ 47} Belle Tire does not argue that appeal under
{¶ 48} Rather than challenging the timeliness of the remedy, Belle Tire‘s argument seems to be that an appeal under
{¶ 49} Belle Tire also protests that the common pleas court would be unable to compel the commission to take action because the commission need not be a necessary party in an appeal under the statute. See
Conclusion
{¶ 50} Because an appeal under
KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
Licata Law Group and David J. Kovach, for appellant.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Eric J. Tarbox, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission.
Emil G. Gravelle III and Megan E. Burke, for appellee Judy Melroy.