Godin v. Schencks
629 F.3d 79
1st Cir.2010Background
- Godin, former Fort O'Brien Elementary principal, had her employment terminated in Aug. 2008 due to budgetary constraints after an investigation found no abusive conduct toward students.
- Godin sued in March 2009 in federal court, asserting §1983 due process claims against the district and union, plus state-law defamation and interference claims against individual defendants.
- Three individual defendants moved to dismiss under Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 556, arguing their petitioning activities were protected.
- The district court denied the §556 motion, concluding the Maine statute conflicted with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12/56 and did not apply in federal court.
- This appeal concerns (i) appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine for denial of an anti-SLAPP motion in federal court and (ii) whether §556 applies in federal proceedings; the First Circuit held §556 applies and granted appellate jurisdiction.
- The court remanded to adjudicate the §556 motion on its merits in light of the Maine statute’s protections.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the appeal is proper under the collateral order doctrine | N/A | N/A | Appellate jurisdiction exists under collateral order doctrine |
| Whether Maine’s §556 applies in federal court | §556 should apply to protect petitioning rights in federal court | §556 does not apply because Fed. Rules 12/56 govern procedures in federal court | Yes; §556 applies in federal court and is not displaced by Rules 12/56 |
| Whether federal subject-matter jurisdiction over state-law claims exists | Claims against non-diverse defendants arise from a common nucleus with federal claims | No supplemental jurisdiction over non-federal parties | Supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1367(a) exists |
| Whether Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 preempt §556 | Federal rules preempt state anti-SLAPP procedure | Federal rules are broad enough to preempt state statute | Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 are not sufficiently broad to preempt §556; Erie concerns favor applying §556 |
| Whether, on balance, applying §556 furthers Erie’s dual aims | Not applying §556 avoids forum shopping | Applying §556 burdens plaintiffs similarly in state and federal court | Applying §556 in federal court better serves Erie’s twin aims; do apply |
Key Cases Cited
- Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (establishes collateral-order-like interlocutory review by exception; foundational to collateral order doctrine)
- Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (2006) (collateral-order doctrine criteria: conclusive, collateral, important, reviewable later)
- Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (test for whether a federal rule is sufficiently broad to control a state-law issue; esp. when state rule is intertwined with state rights/remedies)
- Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (doctrine governing choice of law between state and federal rules)
- Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (acknowledges broad conflict/compatibility analysis between federal rules and state law)
- Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999) (ant-SLAPP in federal court; discussion of preemption of state provisions by federal rules)
- Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, LLC, 566 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2009) (recognizes enforcement of state anti-SLAPP statute in federal court within some circuits)
- Englert v. MacDonell, 551 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2009) (interlocutory appeal question regarding anti-SLAPP; contrasts Maine approach)