Glisson Ex Rel. Estate of Glisson v. Indiana Department of Corrections
813 F.3d 662
7th Cir.2016Background
- Nicholas Glisson, a former laryngectomy patient with a permanent stoma, G‑tube, neck instability, and other comorbidities, entered IDOC custody in September 2010 and died 41 days later; cause of death: complications of laryngeal cancer with contributory acute renal failure and related conditions.
- While incarcerated at Plainfield, Glisson’s condition deteriorated (weight loss, fluctuating low oxygen saturation, altered mental status, lab abnormalities) and he was transferred to a hospital on September 29 for acute renal failure; he returned and was found dead October 10.
- Plaintiff Alma Glisson sued Corizon (CMS), individual Corizon providers, and IDOC under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference and a Monell claim against Corizon based on Corizon’s failure to implement an IDOC Health Care Service Directive requiring site‑specific chronic disease management protocols.
- Corizon conceded it did not implement the Directive and generally relied on professional standards rather than IDOC directives; it argued it had no obligation to adopt IDOC directives and denied Monell liability absent evidence of an official policy causing constitutional deprivation.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on federal claims (finding no underlying constitutional injury by individual providers and thus no Monell liability) and remanded state claims; the Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Corizon because plaintiff failed to present evidence of a policy or widespread practice linking Corizon’s omission to constitutional violations beyond Glisson’s single incident.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Corizon can be liable under Monell for failing to implement IDOC’s Directive (policy‑omission) | Corizon’s deliberate decision not to adopt site‑specific chronic disease protocols (i.e., a policy of non‑coordination) caused Glisson’s constitutionally inadequate care | Corizon lacked an unconstitutional policy; absence of protocol alone does not establish Monell liability without a series of incidents or widespread custom | Affirmed for Corizon: plaintiff produced only evidence of harm to Glisson, not a series of incidents or other evidence to show Corizon’s omission was an official policy causing widespread constitutional deprivations |
| Whether a single incident (Glisson’s death) suffices to prove a Monell omission claim | Policy decision not to require centralized treatment plans may be proven by official decision or obviousness of risk; single severe harm can demonstrate municipal culpability | Monell requires evidence beyond one incident for omission claims—need proof of a series of similar incidents or widespread practice | Held that a single incident without evidence of a series or municipal decision amounts to insufficient proof for Monell liability (majority) |
| Whether plaintiff waived evidence of other incidents and respondeat superior theory on appeal | Plaintiff attempted to rely on out‑of‑district documents and argue employer liability | District court record and plaintiff’s district court filings waived respondeat superior and did not timely introduce other‑incident evidence | Court deems those arguments/evidence waived; plaintiff conceded she did not pursue respondeat superior in district court |
| Standard of review for summary judgment and burden to survive | Plaintiff must produce specific evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact that Corizon’s policy/omission was the moving force | Corizon argued summary judgment appropriate because no genuine issue of material fact on Monell claim | De novo review; summary judgment affirmed as plaintiff failed to meet evidentiary burden on Monell claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires an official policy or custom causing the deprivation)
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (failure to train/implement procedures can constitute municipal deliberate indifference when need is obvious)
- Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (municipal liability can turn on decisions by authorized policymakers)
- Los Angeles Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29 (2010) (Monell requires a municipal policy or custom; multiple proof paths exist)
- Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 2005) (single incident insufficient to establish municipal liability for omissions; need series of incidents or evidence showing conscious choice)
- Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 2010) (municipal liability may exist even if no individual employee was found to have violated rights)
- Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2014) (pointing to need for evidence that the policymaker had notice of the risk to infer deliberate indifference)