Glenn v. State, 310 Ga. 11

On May 3, 2018 officers detained Christopher Glenn near an elementary school after a "suspicious-person" call; he was handcuffed within minutes and placed in police vehicles and an ambulance.
While in custody Glenn resisted: he struck an officer with his forehead, went limp, repeatedly kicked the patrol-car doors, and damaged a door hinge such that the door would not close properly.
The trial court found by a preponderance that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Glenn for loitering/prowling and thus that the arrest/detention was unlawful, but concluded Glenn committed interference with government property and revoked his probation.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning Glenn’s damage occurred some time after detention and was not an immediate response to resist the arrest.
The Georgia Supreme Court held that Georgia common law recognizes a right to resist an unlawful, warrantless arrest or detention using proportionate force, including force directed at government property, and remanded for the trial court to determine whether Glenn’s force was proportionate.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Georgia common law recognize a right to resist an unlawful arrest/detention?	Glenn: Yes — historic common law permits resisting unlawful arrest/detention.	State: Modern statutes and policy limit or do not recognize such a right for purposes here.	Yes — Georgia retained the common-law right to resist an unlawful, warrantless arrest or escape an unlawful detention.
Does that right permit damaging government property as part of resistance?	Glenn: Yes — proportionate force may be used against objects, not only persons.	State: Damage to government property is not excused by an unlawful arrest.	Yes — the common-law right encompasses proportionate force directed at property when necessary to escape an unlawful detention.
Have Georgia statutes or the Constitution displaced that common-law right?	Glenn: No displacement; common law remains.	State: Statutes (e.g., obstruction, escape) or modern trends restrict the right.	No — relevant statutes and constitutional provisions do not clearly displace the common-law rule in this context.
Was revocation of probation on interference-with-government-property proper here?	Glenn: No — his property damage may have been proportionate resistance to unlawful detention.	State: Yes — trial court found damage was outside bounds of lawful resistance and affirmed.	Reversed and remanded — trial court must determine in the first instance whether Glenn’s use of force was proportionate.

Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529 (recognizing common-law right to resist unlawful arrest)
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (recognizing right to resist unlawful arrest using no more force than necessary)
Bell v. State, 252 Ga. 267 (upholding loitering statute structure and guidance for officers)
Prichard v. State, 160 Ga. 527 (Georgia precedent acknowledging right to resist illegal arrest)
Caldwell v. State, 327 Ga. App. 471 (probation revocation standard: preponderance of the evidence)
Brower v. State, 298 Ga. App. 699 (discussing immediacy in justification defenses)
Hack v. State, 168 Ga. App. 927 (distinguishing statutory self-defense claims from common-law resistance re property damage)
Moore v. State, 234 Ga. App. 332 (jury instruction on justification under catchall where detainee damaged patrol car for urgent medical reasons)
Glenn v. State, 350 Ga. App. 12 (Court of Appeals decision under review)