Glenn Lee Thompson v. Nancy J. Gargula, 939 F.3d 1279

Glenn and Heike Thompson filed for bankruptcy (Chapter 13 → Chapter 11 → Chapter 7); Nattco, their company, filed Chapter 11 during the same period.
A former Nattco employee submitted fraud allegations to the Trustee (Oct 2013–Jan 2014), prompting an investigation.
The bankruptcy court granted the Thompsons a Chapter 7 discharge on Feb. 26, 2014.
The Trustee filed an adversary complaint to revoke the discharge (Feb. 25, 2015), alleging fraudulent financial reports and failure to report or surrender estate property.
The bankruptcy court held that § 727(d)(1) was inapplicable because the Trustee had pre-discharge knowledge, but § 727(d)(2) contains no lack-of-knowledge requirement and supported revocation; the district court affirmed and the Eleventh Circuit heard the appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 727(d)(1)’s “did not know” lack-of-knowledge requirement must be read into § 727(d)(2)	Read into (d)(2) based on prior Bankruptcy Act practice, congressional history, and estoppel/laches principles — so revocation barred if Trustee had pre-discharge knowledge	Statutory text is dispositive: Congress included the lack-of-knowledge phrase in (d)(1) but omitted it from (d)(2); courts must not import omitted language	Court refused to rewrite statute; declined to import lack-of-knowledge into (d)(2) and affirmed revocation
Whether Trustee disclosure duties under § 704 require a lack-of-knowledge bar to revocation	§ 704 duties (to disclose trustee knowledge) mean Trustee’s pre-discharge knowledge should preclude later revocation	§ 704 imposes duties but does not alter § 727(d)(2)’s plain terms; disclosure duties do not create a substantive bar to revocation	Court found no conflict and rejected argument; § 727(d)(2) governs independently

Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993) (refusing to read omitted language into adjacent statutory provisions; presumption of purposeful omission)
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (same canon: inclusion in one provision and exclusion in another signals congressional intent)
Villareal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 2016) (when statute is unambiguous, courts end inquiry at the text)
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) (statutory language controls; no need to consult legislative history when text is clear)
Pollitzer v. Gebhardt, 860 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2017) (principle that courts should not read omitted language into a statute)