Gill v. Mecusker, 2011 WL 609844

Gill was charged with multiple counts of capital sexual battery and related offenses involving two young girls, with trials and retrials over several years in Florida.
Gill motioned repeatedly to substitute or dismiss counsel and to represent himself, culminating in a March 3, 1995 pro se self-representation motion and a March 6, 1995 Faretta-style hearing.
The trial court denied Gill's self-representation request, finding his waiver of counsel not knowing or intelligent; trial proceeded with a hybrid arrangement allowing Gill to participate in strategy with appointed and retained counsel.
Gill and his counsel negotiated further in July 1995, with Judge allowing Gill to act in strategy decisions while counsel conducted witness examinations and arguments; Gill expressed satisfaction with the hybrid approach at times.
Gill was eventually convicted and sentenced; direct and post-conviction appeals followed, including a Florida appellate affirmation and later federal habeas review under AEDPA.
The federal district court denied Gill's habeas petition, and this appeal centers on whether Gill clearly asserted his right to self-representation and whether the state court's Faretta ruling was reasonable under AEDPA.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the state court's Faretta ruling was contrary to or an unreasonable application of law	Gill argues the state court erred by relying on flawed reasoning to deny self-representation.	Gill contends the district court should review the state court’s rationale for denial under AEDPA standards.	No error; decision not contrary or unreasonable under AEDPA.
Whether Gill clearly and unequivocally waived his right to counsel	Gill maintained a clear desire to proceed pro se at certain times.	State court and district court found the waiver equivocal and not knowingly intelligent; hybrid representation allowed.	Gill did not clearly and unequivocally waive; waiver not effective.
Whether the district court erred by evaluating the state court's reasoning rather than the ultimate decision	Gill asserts the district court failed to review the merits of the state court’s rationale.	State court adjudication focuses on the merits; the reasoning need not be explained.	AEDPA review focused on the merits; no error in upholding the state court’s ultimate decision.
Whether the hybrid counsel arrangement violated Faretta	Gill argues hybrid representation undermines Faretta’s guarantees.	The arrangement afforded Gill more rights than required and did not violate Faretta.	Not a Faretta violation; hybrid setup upheld as consistent with Faretta.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (Supreme Court 1975) (establishes right to self-representation and need for knowing, intelligent waiver; Faretta hearing)
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (Supreme Court 1984) (limits on standby counsel participation; waiver implied when defendant consents to counsel's involvement)
Wiggins v. Smith, 465 U.S. 168 (Supreme Court 1984) (standby counsel and pro se balance; capacity to control defense)
Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607 (Former 5th Cir. 1982) (waiver may be inferred from conduct showing vacillation or abandonment)
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (Supreme Court 2011) (AEDPA deference focuses on state court decision's ultimate conclusion; not on opinion's rationale)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court 2000) (definition of unreasonable application under AEDPA; focus on controlling legal principle)
Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2001) (summary state court decisions and deference under AEDPA)
Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2002) (methodology of evaluating state court reasoning under AEDPA)
Orazio v. Dugger, 876 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) (Faretta invocation and equivocal requests)