242 F. Supp. 3d 1315
S.D. Fla.2017Background
- Plaintiff Juan Carlos Gil is legally blind and uses screen‑reader software; he sued Winn‑Dixie under Title III of the ADA alleging its website is inaccessible.
- Winn‑Dixie operates www.winndixie.com, which provides store locators, prescription refill/ordering for in‑store pickup or delivery, product information, and other customer services.
- Gil alleges the website does not integrate with screen‑reader software and thus denies blind customers full and equal enjoyment of Winn‑Dixie’s goods and services.
- Winn‑Dixie moved for judgment on the pleadings arguing websites are not ‘‘places of public accommodation’’ under the ADA; the DOJ filed a Statement of Interest and Winn‑Dixie moved to strike it.
- The court denied the motion to strike the DOJ’s Statement of Interest and, viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to Gil, found he sufficiently pleaded a nexus between the website and Winn‑Dixie’s physical stores to survive judgment on the pleadings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a website that enables store‑related services is a place of public accommodation under Title III | Website is a public accommodation because it permits store‑related transactions (prescription refills, store locators) and thus is a gateway to physical stores | Websites are not ‘‘places of public accommodation’’ or, at minimum, Gil failed to plead a sufficient nexus to physical locations | Denied judgment on the pleadings: court held Gil sufficiently alleged a nexus between the website and physical stores so ADA claim may proceed |
| Whether the DOJ Statement of Interest should be struck as untimely/unauthorized | DOJ may file statement under 28 U.S.C. § 517 and its filing aids the court | Statement is untimely and filed without leave | Denied motion to strike: § 517 contains no time limit or leave requirement; courts routinely accept such filings |
| Whether the Eleventh Circuit’s Rendon precedent restricts ADA claims to physical access only | Plaintiff: Rendon allows ADA claims based on intangible barriers that deny access to services/privileges even if no physical barrier exists | Defendant: Rendon requires a nexus to a physical place and here plaintiff did not allege inability to access physical locations | Court read Rendon to permit claims based on intangible barriers where a nexus to a physical place is alleged and found the complaint adequate |
| Whether the court must decide if a website alone (without nexus) is an ADA public accommodation | Plaintiff: not necessary here because nexus alleged; alternatively, websites may qualify independently | Defendant: court should decide websites are not covered absent physical place | Court declined to decide whether websites alone qualify; resolved case on alleged nexus to physical stores |
Key Cases Cited
- Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Inc., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002) (intangible barriers to services of a public accommodation can violate Title III)
- Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (website heavily integrated with stores can be subject to the ADA)
- Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2001) (Internet sales can be covered by ADA; site of sale is irrelevant to access concerns)
- Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, 869 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2012) (online services may be covered by ADA independent of a physical location)
- Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000) (statutory list of public accommodations supports view that coverage refers to physical places)
- Ford v. Schering‑Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998) (public accommodation does not refer to non‑physical access)
- Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (public accommodation construed as a physical place)