Gibson v. Clean Harbors Environmental Services, Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 19073

Background

Respondents filed a putative class action in Arkansas state court alleging torts from a chemical release; they estimated up to 400 class members in the complaint and stipulated aggregate damages would not exceed $5,000,000 (to avoid federal CAFA jurisdiction).
In March 2016 respondents’ counsel sent a settlement-demand letter recommending a $6,500,000 resolution and describing various (shifting) estimates of affected residents and potential claimants; the letter relied on contacts counsel had received and conjecture about the impacted area.
In April 2016 respondents served an expert report setting out a scientific methodology for identifying the geographic impact area and, thus, an objective basis for class size and damages estimates.
Clean Harbors removed under CAFA on May 9, 2016, asserting the April expert report was the first document from which removability could be ascertained and that removal was therefore timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3).
The district court granted respondents’ motion to remand as untimely, treating the March 11 settlement letter as “other paper” that triggered § 1446(b)(3)’s 30‑day removal window; Clean Harbors appealed under § 1453(c)(1).
The Eighth Circuit majority reversed, holding the § 1446(b)(3) clock in CAFA cases begins to run only when the defendant receives an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper from which it can unambiguously ascertain CAFA requirements are met; here that occurred with receipt of the April expert report, so removal was timely.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does § 1446(b)(3)’s 30‑day removal period begin in CAFA cases?	March 11 settlement letter was an "other paper" that clearly demanded $6.5M, so clock began then.	Clock begins only when defendant receives a document from which CAFA jurisdiction can be unambiguously ascertained; speculative/indeterminate papers do not trigger it.	The clock runs when defendant receives an amended pleading/motion/order/other paper from which CAFA jurisdiction can be unambiguously ascertained; adopt a bright‑line standard.
Whether the March 11 settlement letter triggered § 1446(b)(3)	The letter expressly demanded $6.5M; thus removability was ascertainable and removal was untimely.	The letter was speculative, shifted class estimates, and lacked objective support; it did not allow unambiguous ascertainment of CAFA jurisdiction.	March 11 letter did not unambiguously establish CAFA jurisdiction and did not trigger the 30‑day period.
Whether the April expert report triggered § 1446(b)(3)	N/A (plaintiffs argued earlier letter sufficed).	The expert report was the first objective, scientific basis to determine class size and aggregate damages, so it triggered the clock.	The April expert report provided the requisite unambiguous basis; the 30‑day period began on its receipt and Clean Harbors’ May 9 removal was timely.
Proper remedial outcome	Remand should be affirmed.	Remand should be vacated and case stay or proceed in federal court.	District court’s remand order vacated; case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Key Cases Cited

Graiser v. Visionworks of Am., Inc., 819 F.3d 277 (6th Cir. 2016) (adopts unambiguous‑ascertainment standard for § 1446(b)(3) in CAFA cases)
Cutrone v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 749 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2014) (defendant need not perform independent investigation; removability must be apparent from plaintiff’s paper)
Romulus v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 770 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2014) (§ 1446(b) begins when plaintiff’s paper includes clear damages statement or sufficient facts for simple calculation)
Walker v. Trailer Transit, Inc., 727 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2013) (other paper must affirmatively and unambiguously reveal amount of monetary damages)
In re Willis, 228 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 2000) (initial complaint triggers removal only if it explicitly discloses damages exceeding federal jurisdictional amount)
Dahl v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 478 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 2007) (post‑complaint demand letters can be “other paper” under § 1446(b))
Addo v. Globe Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 759 (5th Cir. 2000) (post‑complaint demand letter seeking damages above jurisdictional amount triggered removal period)
Atwell v. Boston Scientific Corp., 740 F.3d 1160 (8th Cir. 2014) (oral statements transcribed from court hearing can be “other paper” for § 1446(b)(3) purposes)
Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013) (pre‑certification stipulation cannot bar CAFA removal)