Ghailani v. Sessions
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10952
| 10th Cir. | 2017Background
- Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, convicted for role in 1998 U.S. embassy bombings, was held at ADX Florence and for years subject to annual Special Administrative Measures (SAMs) that, among other restrictions, barred him from participating in group Islamic (Jumu’ah) prayers.
- SAMs are administrative restrictions authorized by the Attorney General and Bureau of Prisons when an inmate poses a substantial terrorism risk; they must be renewed annually and provide notice and administrative review procedures.
- Ghailani sued pro se challenging multiple SAMs-based restrictions (First, Fifth, Eighth Amendments, Double Jeopardy) and the prison policy banning group prayer, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Constitution and RFRA.
- The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim; on appeal the government allowed Ghailani’s SAMs to expire, though ADX housing rules still preclude group prayer.
- The Tenth Circuit held the SAM-related claims moot (government voluntarily ceased SAMs and cessation was genuine) but reversed the dismissal of Ghailani’s RFRA claim challenging the continuing ban on group prayer, remanding for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are Ghailani’s SAM-related claims moot after expiration of SAMs? | SAMs litigation is capable of repetition yet evading review; case remains justiciable. | SAMs expired and government contends claims are moot; voluntary cessation moots case. | SAM claims are moot: no reasonable expectation of reimposition and government’s cessation deemed genuine. |
| Does voluntary cessation exception save the SAM claims from mootness? | Even voluntary cessation shouldn’t moot if government could reimpose; past practice shows fluctuation. | Government argues self-correction was genuine and effects eradicated. | Voluntary cessation exception not triggered: government met Davis factors; cessation genuine. |
| Was dismissal of First Amendment free-exercise claim proper under Turner/Gee pleading standard? | Ghailani argued prison policy violates his right to Jumu’ah prayer. | Government relied on Turner-related pleading requirement; asserted restriction reasonably related to penological interests. | Dismissal of First Amendment claim affirmed: Ghailani failed to plead facts plausibly showing regulation not reasonably related to penological interests. |
| Was dismissal of RFRA claim proper under same pleading standard? | Ghailani argued RFRA (strict-scrutiny) applies and he need not plead facts negating government’s affirmative defense. | Government argued attachment of SAMs supported its compelling-interest/least-restrictive-means defense and plaintiff should have pleaded around it. | Dismissal of RFRA claim reversed: RFRA imposes the burden on government; plaintiff need not plead facts to negate government’s affirmative defense; remand for further proceedings on RFRA claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (describes inmates’ obligation for Jumu’ah and Turner framework in prison context)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must state a plausible claim to survive dismissal)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard for plausibility)
- Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (prison regulations valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests)
- Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (RFRA requires compelling interest and least restrictive means)
- Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001) (RFRA—not Turner—governs prisoner RFRA claims)
- Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010) (pleading requirement for prisoner First Amendment claims under Turner)
- Al-Owhali v. Holder, 687 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2012) (mootness: SAMs capable of repetition yet evading review in different factual posture)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (defendant bears heavy burden to show voluntary cessation moots case)
- County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979) (conditions for voluntary cessation mootness exception)