Gestamp South Carolina, L.L.C. v. National Labor Relations Board
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 19194
| 4th Cir. | 2014Background
- Gestamp acquired an automotive parts plant in Oct 2009 and retained LSP’s handbook and personnel; two employees (Kingsmore and Alexander) engaged in a short-lived union organizing effort in late 2009–Feb 2010.
- Kingsmore was suspended (Feb 17, 2010) and later discharged after HR investigated why BMW had barred him from its premises; Gestamp cited falsification of prior work history and failure to provide documentation.
- Alexander was discharged (Feb 19, 2010) for falsifying a weekly timesheet (omitting a late arrival). Both had participated in union organizing and were known to some supervisors.
- An ALJ found Gestamp violated NLRA § 8(a)(1) and (3) by suspending/firing Kingsmore and firing Alexander because of protected union activity, and also found a supervisor (Fink) unlawfully threatened Kingsmore; the NLRB panel affirmed.
- Procedurally, Gestamp petitioned for review; the Fourth Circuit previously vacated the Board’s order based on Becker’s recess appointment (per prior circuit precedent), but after the Supreme Court’s Noel Canning decision the Fourth Circuit revisited and held Becker’s March 2010 recess appointment valid and decided the substantive claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of Board Member Becker’s recess appointment | Gestamp argued Becker’s appointment during an intra-session recess was invalid under the Recess Appointments Clause | Board argued the March 2010 intra-session recess (two weeks) was sufficient under Noel Canning | Becker’s appointment was valid (two-week intra-session recess falls within Clause as interpreted in Noel Canning) |
| Whether General Counsel proved employer knowledge for discharge claims | General Counsel: supervisors’ knowledge and circumstantial evidence suffice to impute knowledge to the decisionmaker | Gestamp: Board/ALJ failed to show the actual decisionmaker knew of union activity; mere supervisor knowledge is not automatically imputed | Reversed as to discharge claims — ALJ never found the actual decisionmaker knew of protected activity; GC bears burden to prove decisionmaker knowledge, and record lacked such finding |
| Whether Fink’s statement to Kingsmore was an unlawful threat under § 8(a)(1) and whether Fink was a supervisor | General Counsel: Fink’s statement reasonably conveyed reprisal risk; Fink had supervisory authority over BMW-site employees so his statements bind employer | Gestamp: Fink lacked supervisory authority and the ALJ credited Fink’s testimony over Kingsmore’s, so no threat was established | Affirmed as to threat claim — substantial evidence supported that Fink was a supervisor and that his warning reasonably could have coerced employees; NLRB’s finding sustained |
Key Cases Cited
- NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (limits and explains Recess Appointments Clause; establishes presumptive time thresholds and treatment of pro forma sessions)
- NLRB v. Enterprise Leasing Co. Southeast, 722 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 2013) (precedent on invalidity of short intra-session recess appointments relied on earlier by this court)
- NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab., LLC, 719 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2013) (similar treatment of intra-session recess appointments)
- Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1976) (places burden on General Counsel to prove decisionmaker knowledge of protected activity)
- Transp. Mgmt. Corp. v. NLRB, 462 U.S. 393 (1983) (endorses Wright Line test for mixed-motive unfair labor practice cases)
- Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc. v. NLRB, 142 F.3d 733 (4th Cir. 1998) (explains burden-shifting and proof elements for discriminatory discharge under NLRA)
- Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (standard of substantial evidence review of NLRB factual findings)