Geraldine Johnson v. City of Philadelphia
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17138
| 3rd Cir. | 2016Background
- In April 2012 Officer Thomas Dempsey encountered Kenyado Newsuan, a naked man in the street reportedly high on PCP; Dempsey approached alone and ordered Newsuan to "come here."
- Witnesses disagree on the lead-up but agree that Newsuan then rushed and violently grappled with Dempsey, slammed him into vehicles, and attempted to grab Dempsey’s service weapon.
- Dempsey fired a taser at close range first; during the ensuing physical struggle he drew his handgun and shot Newsuan multiple times, killing him.
- The administratrix sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force (Fourth Amendment), and asserted related Monell and state-law claims; the district court granted summary judgment for Dempsey and the City.
- The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that once Newsuan reached for Dempsey’s gun and violently attacked him, deadly force was justified and Newsuan’s intervening violent act was a superseding cause that broke proximate causation from any earlier allegedly unreasonable conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dempsey’s use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment | Dempsey should have awaited backup and de-escalated; initiating a one-on-one encounter made the seizure unreasonable | Once Newsuan violently attacked and tried to take the gun, deadly force was objectively reasonable to defend the officer | Court: Use of deadly force during the struggle was reasonable given the immediate threat; summary judgment for defendants affirmed |
| Whether Dempsey’s initial conduct (approach/tasing) proximately caused Newsuan’s death | Initial approach and taser violated department policy and foreseeably escalated the encounter, so those actions causally contributed to death | Newsuan’s sudden violent assault was an unforeseeable, superseding intervening cause that severed causation | Court: Newsuan’s violent attack was a superseding cause as a matter of law and broke proximate causation |
| Relevance of Philadelphia Directive 136 (policy to wait/ de-escalate with mentally disturbed persons) | Directive shows Dempsey violated training and that escalation was foreseeable | Departmental policy may be considered but does not control; even if violated, causation is lacking | Court: Policies can inform reasonableness but did not overcome the superseding-cause finding here |
| Whether taser deployment was an independent constitutional violation leading to the shooting | Tasing an apparently compliant, unarmed man was unreasonable and caused the subsequent attack | Even if tasing were unreasonable, the attack was not a foreseeable involuntary response and thus did not establish proximate causation | Court: Even assuming taser use unreasonable, no causal link to the later lethal force; the attack was independent and superseding |
Key Cases Cited
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (Fourth Amendment framework for deadly force cases)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (reasonableness is the controlling Fourth Amendment inquiry; no separate magical standard for "deadly force")
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (use-of-force claims analyzed under objective reasonableness)
- Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393 (3d Cir. 1995) (civilian’s intervening conduct can be a superseding cause cutting off § 1983 liability)
- Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2011) (discusses foreseeability and deterrent concerns in superseding-cause analysis)
- Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1999) (events prior to a seizure are relevant to the reasonableness assessment)