Gerald Marshall v. Town of Dexter, 125 A.3d 1141

Background

In Sept. 2011 Marshall purchased a former municipal school property from the Town of Dexter for redevelopment; Town initially approved rezoning and permits to move five portable classrooms.
In Oct. 2012 the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer (CEO) approved Marshall’s permit; around the same time the Town issued a tax commitment assessing the property at $1,308,300 (later reduced administratively to $381,500; Marshall appealed that assessment to Superior Court).
In March–April 2013 the CEO posted a "Stop Work" order and a "Notice of Violation/Order for Corrective Action" alleging plumbing and permit violations, although Marshall had not commenced plumbing work and had an existing permit to move the portables.
The CEO’s orders allegedly prohibited all work on the property (including maintenance and moving the portables); Marshall alleges these actions were retaliatory for his tax appeal and caused contractor cessation and risk of property deterioration.
Marshall sought a TRO and preliminary injunction in Superior Court and, while those motions were denied, he filed a civil rights complaint (42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Maine constitutional claims) seeking injunction, damages, and attorney’s fees; he did not first appeal the CEO’s orders to the Dexter Board of Appeals.
The Superior Court dismissed Marshall’s complaint under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, primarily because Marshall failed to exhaust local administrative remedies; the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Municipal liability under § 1983 — whether CEO acts can be imputed to Town as official policy	Marshall argued Town liable under § 1983 for CEO’s actions that deprived him of property/enjoyment and equal protection	Town argued complaint did not allege CEO acted pursuant to any municipal policy/custom or as a policymaking official	Held: Complaint failed to allege linkage to Town policy or custom; dismissal proper for failure to plead municipal policy liability
Exhaustion of administrative remedies — whether Marshall had to pursue Board of Appeals before suing	Marshall contended Board lacked jurisdiction to grant his requested relief and appeals would be futile	Town said Ordinance provided appeal route to Board of Appeals which could correct/withdraw CEO orders and Marshall had to exhaust that remedy first	Held: Marshall was required to use available administrative appeals; failure to exhaust warranted dismissal (no futility shown)
Request for injunctive relief — availability through administrative process	Marshall argued he needed court injunction to prevent ongoing harm	Town argued Board could provide relief by reversing/altering CEO orders, making judicial injunction unnecessary	Held: Administrative process could have provided the relief sought; injunction claim dismissed for failure to pursue that process
Equal protection claim — whether pleaded facts supported selective treatment/class-of-one claim	Marshall alleged retaliatory, arbitrary treatment violating equal protection	Town argued complaint contained no factual allegations showing similarly situated comparators or discriminatory motive	Held: Complaint lacked facts showing disparate treatment or discriminatory purpose; equal protection claim insufficient

Key Cases Cited

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires action pursuant to official municipal policy)
Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipalities not liable under § 1983 absent official policy or custom causing constitutional injury)
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (single decision by a municipal policymaker can constitute official policy)
Town of Shapleigh v. Shikles, 427 A.2d 460 (Me. 1981) (principles on administrative exhaustion and review)
Moreau v. Town of Turner, 661 A.2d 677 (Me. 1995) (when state administrative/Rule 80B remedies are adequate, § 1983 action will not lie without first using them)