2022 Ohio 4328
Ohio Ct. App.2022Background
- Rachel Georgin and Andrew Georgin were divorced; Andrew later married Marjorie, whose son Brendan was a protected person under an ex parte civil protection order (CPO) obtained against Rachel.
- The ex parte CPO (July 2020) barred Rachel from entering Brendan’s workplace, contacting him, and required her to leave immediately if accidental contact occurred.
- On October 2, 2020, Rachel unknowingly entered a wine store where Brendan (then 18) was working, interacted briefly at checkout, then left; Brendan recognized her, called his mother, and called police reporting a CPO violation.
- A municipal charge for violating the ex parte CPO was filed; Rachel was acquitted at bench trial (court found probable cause existed to file the charge but that Rachel was unaware Brendan worked there). The ex parte CPO was later vacated by the magistrate.
- Rachel sued Andrew, Marjorie, and Brendan for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and civil conspiracy; the trial court granted summary judgment to Brendan after refusing to consider an unauthenticated police report.
- On appeal the Twelfth District affirmed: it reviewed summary judgment de novo and found no genuine issues of material fact on each claim (probable cause existed; no evidence of malice or ulterior motive; conduct not extreme; conspiracy fails without an underlying tort).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious prosecution — did Brendan initiate/act with malice or lack probable cause in reporting CPO violation? | The police report and context show Brendan instigated charges and acted to aid Andrew in custody dispute; trial court erred excluding the police report. | Brendan acted out of fear for his safety, called his mother then police; probable cause existed to report a CPO violation. | Summary judgment for Brendan. Probable cause existed; no evidence of malice; exclusion of unauthenticated police report was proper. |
| Abuse of process — was the legal process perverted for an ulterior purpose? | Brendan reported the CPO in the context of the custody fight and after consulting Marjorie, evidencing an ulterior motive to disadvantage Rachel. | Brendan made one call to police for protection; no evidence he shared or acted on any ulterior motive. | Summary judgment for Brendan. No competent evidence of an ulterior motive or concerted scheme. |
| IIED — was Brendan’s conduct extreme/outrageous and did Rachel suffer serious emotional distress? | Reporting and pursuing CPO violation shortly before custody hearing was outrageous and caused severe distress. | Brendan was legally entitled to report the violation; a single lawful report is not extreme and outrageous; no proof of severe emotional injury. | Summary judgment for Brendan. Reporting a CPO was not extreme conduct; Rachel offered no admissible evidence of the required serious emotional injury. |
| Civil conspiracy — was there a malicious combination to injure Rachel? | The calls and prosecution show a concerted effort by family to harm Rachel. | There is no underlying tort by Brendan to support a conspiracy claim. | Summary judgment for Brendan. Conspiracy fails because no underlying actionable tort by Brendan was shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367 (1998) (sets summary judgment standard under Civ.R. 56)
- Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (1996) (outlines moving party and nonmoving party burdens on summary judgment)
- Yaklevich v. Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., L.P.A., 68 Ohio St.3d 294 (1994) (defines abuse of process elements)
- Reamsnyder v. Jaskolski, 10 Ohio St.3d 150 (1984) (explains "extreme and outrageous" standard for IIED)
- Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St.3d 72 (1983) (defines "serious emotional distress" requirement)
- Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St.3d 369 (1983) (addresses evidentiary showing needed for emotional distress claims)