George v. McDonough, 596 U.S. 740

Background

Kevin George enlisted in the Marines in 1975, did not disclose prior schizophrenic episodes, suffered a psychotic episode during training, and was medically discharged.
George applied for VA disability benefits in 1976; a VA regional office and the Board denied his claim in 1977, applying a 1961 VA regulation that placed a burdensome construction on the presumption-of-sound-condition statute (38 U.S.C. §1111).
The Board’s 1977 decision became final; George later sought collateral reopening under the statutory "clear and unmistakable error" (CUE) provision (codified in 1997 at 38 U.S.C. §§5109A, 7111).
In the 2000s the VA and the Federal Circuit concluded the 1961 regulation conflicted with §1111 (e.g., Wagner), and the VA amended its regulation going forward.
George asked the Board in 2014 to revise his final 1977 decision as CUE based on the later-invalidated regulation; the Board, Veterans Court, and Federal Circuit denied relief.
The Supreme Court held that invalidation of a VA regulation after a decision became final cannot, by itself, establish CUE because the statutory term was codifying a longstanding regulatory meaning that excludes later changes in law or interpretation.

Issues

Issue	George's Argument	McDonough/VA's Argument	Held
Whether post‑decision invalidation of a VA regulation can constitute "clear and unmistakable error" (CUE) to reopen a final benefits decision	Yes — a later judicial invalidation shows the prior decision violated the statutory command and is CUE	No — historical VA practice (and the statute as codifying it) treats subsequent changes in law/interpretation as outside CUE	Held: No — CUE does not encompass a later change in law or interpretation that invalidates a regulation applied in a final decision
Whether Congress, by using the phrase "clear and unmistakable error" in 1997, imported the preexisting regulatory meaning (including its limits)	Congress did not adopt the change‑in‑interpretation limitation; the statute's present tense contemplates correcting any error shown now	Congress used a term of art with a settled regulatory history; silence as to details means the prior limitations carry over	Held: Court adopts the term‑of‑art approach — Congress codified the VA's preexisting CUE doctrine, including its exclusion of changes in interpretation
Whether a later judicial interpretation that explains what the statute "always meant" makes the earlier application of an invalid regulation CUE	Yes — judicial decisions state what the statute always meant and an unauthorized regulation is a nullity, so the prior denial was always erroneous	No — a later judicial ruling is a change in interpretation for CUE purposes; retroactivity extends only to cases still open on direct review	Held: Court treats a later judicial invalidation as a change in interpretation that does not render the earlier, regulation‑based decision CUE

Key Cases Cited

Taggart v. Lorenzen, 139 S. Ct. 1795 (2019) (when Congress uses a term of art it imports its prior legal meaning)
Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing Codification of the CUE doctrine from agency practice)
Wagner v. Principi, 370 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (invalidating the VA regulation at issue and treating VA's earlier interpretation as incorrect)
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994) (judicial interpretation as statement of what the statute always meant)
Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965) (regulations inconsistent with statute are nullities)
Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010) (statutory silence as leaving pre‑existing administrative practice intact)
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (limits on exceptions to finality)
Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011) (overview of veterans' benefits adjudication and review)