906 F.3d 295
5th Cir.2018Background
- George Lee Tucker II, an inmate at TDCJ’s Coffield Unit and adherent of the Nation of Gods and Earths, sought permission for Nation-specific communal religious assembly; Texas officials denied the requests and barred Nation congregations statewide in TDCJ.
- TDCJ’s policy guarantees weekly primary communal services for ten enumerated faiths but treats the Nation as nontraditional: congregation only with an approved volunteer and Religious Practices Committee (RPC) approval.
- The RPC’s denial relied on a Chaplaincy Department report compiling internet sources, rap lyrics, and other jurisdictions’ classifications of the Nation as a security threat group; Strategic Threat Group Office and local chaplain/warden had found no security threat.
- Tucker sued under RLUIPA seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to allow Nation assembly and ancillary accommodations (crown, flag, cultural representative, carrying lesson); district court granted summary judgment to defendants on RLUIPA and dismissed ancillary claims as unexhausted.
- The Fifth Circuit vacated summary judgment on the RLUIPA claim and remanded, finding genuine disputes of material fact both (1) whether TDCJ demonstrated a compelling interest with respect to Tucker and his co-congregants and (2) whether the categorical ban is the least restrictive means; it affirmed dismissal of the ancillary requests for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether TDCJ’s ban substantially burdens a sincere RLUIPA-protected exercise and, if so, whether TDCJ demonstrated a compelling interest as applied to Tucker | Tucker: ban substantially burdens Nation religious exercise; TDCJ failed to show the denial was required for security with respect to him and his group | TDCJ: Nation’s teachings are racially supremacist and pose a prison-safety threat warranting a categorical ban | Court: genuine dispute of material fact; TDCJ did not meet RLUIPA’s individualized compelling-interest requirement; remand required |
| Whether the categorical ban is the least restrictive means to further the asserted security interest | Tucker: less restrictive alternatives available (monitoring, content pre-approval, removal of disruptive individuals, supervised meetings) | TDCJ: categorical prohibition necessary to prevent racial supremacist violence and tension | Court: disputed; TDCJ failed to show the ban is the least restrictive means; remand required |
| Whether the Chaplaincy/ RPC evidence (internet sources, other states’ designations) suffices to justify summary judgment for defendants | Tucker: record evidence does not show he or Coffield Nation adherents hold supremacist beliefs; reliance on hearsay/informal sources insufficient | TDCJ: report and other jurisdictions’ classifications justify denial as necessary for security | Court: evidence insufficient and underinclusive; raises genuine factual disputes about risk and motive for denial |
| Whether Tucker exhausted administrative remedies for ancillary requests (crown, flag, cultural representative, carrying lesson) | Tucker: TDCJ had fair notice of ancillary needs via his filings | TDCJ: Tucker did not use the two-step grievance process to exhaust these specific requests | Court: affirmed district court — Tucker failed to administratively exhaust those specific ancillary claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) (RLUIPA requires individualized compelling-interest and least-restrictive-means analysis in prisons)
- Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (RFRA/RLUIPA applies Sherbert/Hobby Lobby strict-scrutiny framework to religious exemptions)
- City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (limitations on Congress’s enforcement power under Fourteenth Amendment; background to RLUIPA’s enactment)
- Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (formulation of compelling-interest test for religious burdens)
- Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (individualized exemption analysis under Sherbert/Yoder line)
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (RFRA least-restrictive-means standard and individualized inquiry)
- Ali v. Stephens, 822 F.3d 776 (5th Cir. 2016) (applying Holt: prison must consider individual low-security status in least-restrictive-means analysis)
- Davis v. Davis, 826 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 2016) (individualized assessment of security risk in RLUIPA context)
- Ware v. La. Dep’t of Corr., 866 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2017) (rejecting post-hoc rationalizations; underinclusiveness undermines asserted compelling interest)
- Mayfield v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2008) (genuine disputes precluded summary judgment on religious-congregation restrictions)