936 F.3d 171
3rd Cir.2019Background
- Plaintiff George Matheis, a retired officer with PTSD, donated plasma ~90 times at CSL Plasma without incident before bringing his newly trained psychiatric service dog, Odin.
- CSL refused to allow Odin inside, stating a policy deferring donors who use service animals for anxiety (or who take more than two anxiety medications) until they can donate without the animal.
- CSL required a doctor’s note that Matheis could safely donate without Odin before permitting further donations; Matheis sued under Title III of the ADA challenging that policy as unlawful discrimination.
- District Court held plasma centers are public accommodations under the ADA but granted summary judgment to CSL, accepting CSL’s safety justification and suggesting CSL would admit Matheis if he produced a doctor’s note permitting donation with Odin.
- On appeal the Third Circuit affirmed that plasma donation centers are ‘‘service establishments’’ under 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F), but reversed summary judgment for CSL, finding CSL failed to show its categorical service-animal policy was based on actual risk rather than speculation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plasma donation centers are Title III public accommodations ("service establishments") | Matheis: centers offer a service to the public (extraction/compensation) and fall within "other service establishment." | CSL: donors do not benefit; centers serve the business interest, not public use; hence not a listed service establishment. | Held: plasma centers are service establishments under §12181(7)(F); ADA applies. |
| Whether denying access to donors who use psychiatric service animals violates Title III | Matheis: regulations require permitting service animals unless a narrow exception applies; blanket ban is unreasonable. | CSL: categorical safety policy: donors using service animals for anxiety present safety risks and may be deferred. | Held: Matheis met initial burden; CSL failed to prove its safety rule was based on actual risk rather than speculation; summary judgment improper. |
| Proper legal framework for Title III service-animal disputes | Matheis: follow regulatory framework (Part 36) and Berardelli approach—plaintiff shows reasonableness; defendant must show applicable exception. | CSL: District Court applied McDonnell Douglas employment framework (burden shifting) to find no discriminatory animus. | Held: Use Berardelli/Part 36 framework (not McDonnell Douglas); defendant bears burden to show an exception (e.g., direct threat) justified exclusion. |
| Whether CSL satisfied the "direct threat" or other regulatory exceptions | Matheis: no individualized assessment or evidence of real risk; post-deferral events cannot justify prior exclusion. | CSL: relied on medical director declaration asserting severe-anxiety donors pose safety risks; pointed to Matheis’s later panic incident. | Held: CSL’s evidence (declaration) was speculative and insufficient; individualized assessment required; post-deferral events cannot justify the original deferral on summary judgment. |
Key Cases Cited
- PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (Supreme Court) (establishes Title III ADA framework for reasonable modifications)
- Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104 (3d Cir.) (explains Part 35/36 service-animal regulatory framework and limited exceptions)
- Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., 828 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir.) (held plasma centers are service establishments under the ADA)
- Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 907 F.3d 323 (5th Cir.) (held plasma centers not covered by Title III; reached opposite result on §12181 interpretation)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (Supreme Court) (articulates employment burden-shifting test, rejected for Title III analysis here)
- Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (Supreme Court) (framework on reasonable modifications and meaningful access under disability law)
- Lentini v. Calif. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837 (9th Cir.) (Title III claims do not require proof of intentional discrimination)
- J.D. by Doherty v. Colonial Williamsburg Found., 925 F.3d 663 (4th Cir.) (discusses reasonableness and fundamental alteration inquiries under Title III)