959 F.3d 1
1st Cir.2020Background
- William Geoffroy, a Winchendon police officer since 1985, sent threatening voicemail/texts to an ex-girlfriend in October 2011; the department investigated.
- At an October 19, 2011 meeting Geoffroy was told he could resign and keep his pension or face termination, loss of pension, and possible criminal charges; he opted to resign.
- He received a written Separation Agreement (containing an ADEA-waiver and OWBPA notice of a 21-day review and 7-day revocation period) by email and signed it on October 24, 2011; he later claimed he could not open the attachment and only saw it the signing day.
- Geoffroy filed an MCAD complaint for age discrimination (April 2012) and later alleged retaliation when the town denied him a law-enforcement retirement ID for not retiring in "good standing."
- The district court granted summary judgment on the age-discrimination/OWBPA challenge, finding the waiver knowing and voluntary; a jury found for defendants on retaliation and defamation. Geoffroy appealed the summary-judgment ruling and the trial court’s withdrawal of an exhibit; the First Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Separation Agreement violated the OWBPA 21-day review requirement | Geoffroy says he was told he had only a day or two to sign, so he lacked the statutory 21-day review | Agreement facially provided 21 days; no record evidence anyone limited that period | Waiver satisfied OWBPA's 21-day requirement — plaintiff's speculation unsupported and insufficient to void the waiver |
| Whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary under federal common law (duress claim) | Geoffroy contends he signed under duress and emotional pressure to save his pension | Defendants point to education, union consultations, clear agreement language, 21-day period, 7-day revocation, and valuable consideration | Under the totality-of-the-circumstances (Melanson factors) waiver was knowing & voluntary; duress not shown |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by withdrawing Exhibit 54 (police-ID regulation) | Geoffroy contends withdrawing the regulation prejudiced him because it undermined defendants' reliance claim and bore on credibility | Defendants note the regulation post-dated the denial and thus could not support Livingston's claimed reliance; withdrawal was appropriate | No abuse of discretion; withdrawal was proper and harmless (jurors had other evidence of reliance) |
| Whether any preserved trial-law instruction or evidentiary error warrants reversal | Geoffroy argued jury instructions confused jurors and that Exhibit withdrawal harmed him | Defendants maintain any error was waived or harmless and jury followed instructions | Appellate court found Geoffroy waived his objections by failing to timely preserve them and, in any event, no reversible error shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1998) (OWBPA requires that ADEA waivers be knowing and voluntary and include certain minimum elements)
- Melanson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 281 F.3d 272 (1st Cir. 2002) (apply totality-of-the-circumstances test and six-factor guide to determine whether ADEA waiver was knowing and voluntary)
- Theidon v. Harvard Univ., 948 F.3d 477 (1st Cir. 2020) (summary judgment cannot rest on conclusory allegations or unsupported speculation)
- Benoit v. Tech. Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166 (1st Cir. 2003) (summary judgment standards and need for competent evidence)
- McDonough v. City of Quincy, 452 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2006) (standard for harmlessness of evidentiary errors)