Gentry v. Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct, The
3:17-cv-00020
M.D. Tenn.Sep 6, 2017Background
- Plaintiff John Anthony Gentry filed a pro se federal suit alleging judicial and attorney corruption arising from his Tennessee divorce proceedings and related administrative complaints; he seeks damages and broad injunctive relief.
- After amended complaints, Gentry added attorneys Pamela Anderson Taylor and Brenton Hall Lankford (who represent his ex-wife on appeal) and attorney Sarah Richter Perky as defendants; motions to dismiss are pending.
- Gentry moved for an emergency temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction to stop Taylor and Lankford from pursuing appellate attorney’s fees (arguing their cited statute is inapplicable) and to enjoin broad “racketeering” and conspiratorial conduct.
- Gentry alleged irreparable harm from a potential $30,000–$50,000 fee award (wage garnishment, insolvency, bankruptcy) and sought an order directing defendants to withdraw the fee request and various sweeping restraints.
- Defendants opposed, and the Magistrate Judge reviewed the four-factor injunction test, concluding Gentry failed to meet the high burden for extraordinary relief and that federal interference in ongoing state divorce/appellate proceedings was improper.
- The Magistrate Judge recommended denial of the TRO/preliminary injunction as: (1) plaintiff lacked a strong likelihood of success; (2) alleged irreparable harm was speculative and compensable by damages; and (3) injunctive relief would improperly interfere with state court divorce and counsel representation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a TRO/PI should issue to force withdrawal of appellate attorney-fee request | Gentry: fee request rests on inapplicable statute and is part of a racketeering conspiracy; imminent award would cause irreparable financial harm | Taylor/Lankford: Gentry cannot satisfy the high standard for injunctive relief; no emergency shown | Denied — Gentry failed to show strong likelihood of success or irreparable harm; relief would improperly interfere with state proceedings |
| Whether plaintiff demonstrated likelihood of success on the merits of wide-ranging civil-rights and RICO-type claims | Gentry: factual allegations support constitutional and federal criminal/RICO claims arising from state court and oversight conduct | Defendants: merits are weak and procedural/defensive grounds counsels against relief | Denied — court found only a possibility of success, not the substantial likelihood required for injunction |
| Whether irreparable harm is met by potential fee award and claimed insolvency | Gentry: award would lead to wage garnishment, bankruptcy, and irreparable deprivation | Defendants: harm is speculative; monetary relief would be adequate remedy | Denied — alleged harm speculative; damages could compensate |
| Whether federal court may enjoin state court proceedings or counsel conduct in ongoing divorce appeal | Gentry: federal protection of due process permits intervention to prevent alleged collusion/extortion | Defendants/State: federal injunction would improperly interfere with important state interests in divorce proceedings | Denied — court declined federal interference in ongoing state divorce/appellate matters |
Key Cases Cited
- Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956) (TROs and preliminary injunctions are preventive, extraordinary relief)
- Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Detroit Typographical Union No. 18, Int'l Typographical Union, 471 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1972) (extraordinary relief requires caution and discretion)
- Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2007) (four-factor test for preliminary injunction)
- Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 1998) (application of injunction factors)
- Six Clinics Holding Corp., II v. Cafcomp Sys., 119 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 1997) (factors are to be balanced, not strict prerequisites)
- Overstreet v. Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't, 305 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2002) (movant bears burden to show circumstances clearly demand injunction)
- Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2000) (proof for preliminary injunction is more demanding than for summary judgment)
- Mason County Medical Ass'n v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1977) (requiring substantial likelihood of success for injunction)