Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884

Gentry was convicted in Washington state court of aggravated first-degree murder and sentenced to death; the Washington Supreme Court affirmed; the US Supreme Court denied certiorari; Gentry later pursued post-conviction relief and federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254; the district court denied relief on the various claims; AEDPA governs review and Pinholster limits evidence for claims adjudicated on the merits; the court addresses exhaustion, procedural default, and merits of claims including ineffective assistance at the penalty phase, Brady/Napue violations, victim impact evidence, and juror exclusion.
The record shows substantial trial and post-conviction proceedings over decades, including discovery motions seeking mental-health and social-history investigations, PRP amendments, and an evidentiary hearing at the district court on certain claims.
Gentry’s habeas petition asserted multiple claims: ineffective assistance at the penalty phase for failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence, Brady/Napue violations related to jailhouse witnesses, other ineffective-assistance and evidentiary issues, victim-impact evidence challenges, and juror exclusion; the district court determined some claims were defaulted or not exhausted and others adjudicated on the merits; the Ninth Circuit analyzes exhaustion, default, and AEDPA standards to determine whether relief is warranted.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Exhaustion and merits for penalty-phase mitigation claim	Gentry exhausted via PRP filings invoking Sixth Amendment/Strickland	District court found non-exhausted	Exhausted and adjudicated on merits; relief denied on merits under AEDPA
Brady/Napue claims re jailhouse witnesses (Smith, Dyste, Hicks)	Evidence withheld; materiality and cause shown	Claims not properly exhausted; no cause shown for default	Smith claim not exhausted; remaining Brady/Napue claims not granting relief; no materiality shown for Dyste/Hicks evidence at issue
Victim impact evidence and Ex Post Facto/Due Process	Admission of victim impact evidence altered punishment framework	Payne allows victim impact; no due-process violation	Not Ex Post Facto or due process violation; admissibility did not undermine fundamental fairness
Juror 22 exclusion and substantial impairment standard	Juror 22 biased, substantial impairment	Trial court properly excluded; evidence ambiguous	Washington Supreme Court reasonably applied substantial impairment; exclusion affirmed
Pinholster limitation and record scope for AEDPA review	Federal review may consider more than state record after Pinholster	Record limited to state-court record for merits adjudicated claims	Pinholster applicable; for claims not adjudicated on merits, additional evidence permissible under 2254(e)(2)

Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996) (fair opportunity to present federal claims to state courts)
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) (fair opportunity requirement for exhaustion)
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) (federal review requires fair opportunity to present claims)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective assistance standard (deficient performance and prejudice))
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (victim-impact evidence admissibility; limits on ex post facto concerns)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) (limits evidence in §2254(d) review to record before state court)
Lambert v. Blodgett, 972 P.2d 1254 (1999) (state-merits adjudication and exhaustion analysis in PRP context)
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (causation and prejudice in defaulted Brady claims)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality and prejudice in Brady review)
Nooner v. Norris, 402 F.3d 801 (2005) (ex post facto analysis with Payne context in victim impact)